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“Does the existence of uncontrolled financial  
intermediaries vitiate monetary control?” 
James Tobin and William C. Brainard (1963). 
Summary 
Macrofinancial linkages, i.e. the multifaceted interactions between the real economy and the 
financial sector, are the pivotal point of interest in this dissertation. As a result, the importance 
of balance sheets are a reoccurring theme throughout the dissertation, in particular the balance 
sheets of financial institutions which size and composition provide important insight into their 
role in fuelling financial boom-bust cycles and crises. Economists, such as James Tobin, who 
experienced the Great Depression, were well aware of the macroeconomic importance of banks, 
but many of the lessons of the Great Depression were all but forgotten when the recent global 
financial crisis struck (Gertler, 1988, Brunnermeier et al., 2013). The aim of this dissertation is 
to contribute to the rapidly growing post-crisis literature where the lessons of the past are 
uncovered and new insight provided into the complex linkages between the financial sector and 
the real economy, with special focus on such interactions in small open economies.  
The dissertation consists of five chapters where macrofinancial linkages and crises are 
analysed using different empirical and theoretical approaches. The first chapter, Weathering the 
financial storm: The importance of fundamentals and flexibility, is co-authored with Thórarinn 
G. Pétursson (Central Bank of Iceland). The chapter provides a cross-country empirical analysis 
of the recent global financial crisis.1 The goal is to try to identify which factors were important 
in determining the macroeconomic impact of the global crisis, and why some countries 
experienced a systemic banking and currency crises while others escaped more lightly. We do 
this by identifying a broad set of potential pre-crisis explanatory variables in a cross-section of 
forty-six medium-to-high income countries, framed within four possible channels through 
which the crisis spread out from financial markets through the real economy all over the world: 
a financial channel, a trade channel, a macro channel and an institutional channel. We find an 
especially important role for both the macro and financial channels. Thus, the key factors in 
escaping relatively unscathed seem to have been to maintain sound macroeconomic conditions, 
i.e. avoid allowing large economic imbalances to build up, and not allowing the banking system 
to become too large relative to the economy. Exchange rate flexibility also seemed to have 
helped to reduce the real economy impact and expedite the recovery, but increased the risk of 
a currency crisis at the same time. 
The second chapter, The long history of financial boom-bust cycles in Iceland - Part I: 
Financial crises, is co-authored with Bjarni G. Einarsson, Kristófer Gunnlaugsson, and 
Thórarinn G. Pétursson (Central Bank of Iceland).2 The chapter provides an empirical analysis 
of several financial crises over a period spanning almost one and a half century within a single 
small open economy. For this purpose, we construct a dataset that includes macroeconomic 
                                                
1 A shorter version of this chapter has been published as a book chapter in Beblavý, M., D. Cobham and L. Ódor 
(2011). The Euro Area and the Financial Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23-58. 




variables that reflect the structure of the economy and financial variables that are rarely found 
in the literature on financial crises due to lack of data availability over sufficiently long periods. 
This reflects, for instance, data capturing the funding liquidity position of the domestic banking 
system and its varying degree of reliance on cross-border funding. We identify over twenty 
instances of financial crises of different types. Recognising that different types of financial 
crises tend to come in clusters, we also construct a single “multiple financial crisis indicator” 
using a non-parametric common cycle algorithm. This allows us to identify six major financial 
crises occurring every fifteen years with each lasting almost four years on average. We analyse 
the main properties of these crisis episodes and the development of key macroeconomic and 
financial variables in the run-up to these crises and in the period when they unfold. We find that 
macrofinancial imbalances played an important role in most of the serious crises, most notably 
in the last one. However, no single measure provides a robust early-warning signal across all 
crisis episodes. Our results also suggest an important role of contagion from global financial 
crises in most of these episodes, with five of the six episodes coinciding with a global financial 
crisis of some type. 
The third chapter, The long history of financial boom-bust cycles in Iceland – Part II: 
Financial cycles, is co-authored with the same authors as the previous one.3 The chapter 
analyses the financial cycle in Iceland over a period spanning more than a century. The financial 
cycle is a promising instrument to expose the role of financial factors in driving macroeconomic 
dynamics. To capture the financial cycle, Borio (2014) argues that the most parsimonious 
representation of the cycle is in terms of the interaction between credit and property prices, 
although other variables may provide useful complementary information. We measure the 
financial cycle as the low-frequency cyclical co-movement of a set of financial variables 
including both prices and quantities, conceptually similar to the standard approach for defining 
the business cycle. We use a broader collection of variables than just credit and house prices to 
attain additional insight and to expose potentially important small open economy features of 
the financial cycle and its interaction with the domestic economy. To make this operational, we 
aggregate the medium-term cycles in our financial variables using a principal component 
approach. Our findings suggest that indeed there exists a well-defined financial cycle in Iceland 
that has gradually become more prominent, in particular with increased liberalisation and 
deepening of the domestic financial system. We find that this financial cycle has played a key 
role in the country’s macroeconomic developments and its financial crises. Furthermore, our 
results show that the aggregate financial cycle provides a marked improvement over the 
capacity of individual financial and macroeconomic variables to signal ensuing financial crises, 
highlighting the importance of the interaction of different financial variables in amplifying 
financial imbalances. We also find that Iceland is no island in the vast ocean of global high 
finance, uncovering extremely strong spillover effects from the global financial cycle (proxied 
by our estimate of the US financial cycle).   
                                                
3 This chapter has been published as a Central Bank of Iceland Working Paper, no. 72, and is forthcoming in 
Revisiting Macro-Financial Linkages: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, proceeding of the 2016 Bangko Sentral 




Our results are very much in the spirit of the findings of recent papers on the importance 
of the financial cycle in other industrial countries, such as Claessens et al. (2011, 2012), 
Drehmann et al. (2012), and Aikman et al. (2015). Our study adds to this growing literature by 
adding yet another country to the sample of countries studied, a country that has been exposed 
to numerous financial crises of various types over a period spanning over a century. But also 
by showing how more detailed data on bank balance sheets can provide further insights into the 
analysis of the financial cycle and by highlighting important small open economy features of 
the cycle and its interactions with the domestic economy, including the importance of contagion 
from the global financial cycle. We conclude the paper with a first attempt at exploring some 
of the policy questions that our findings raise. 
The fourth chapter, Households’ position in the financial crisis in Iceland: Analysis 
based on a nationwide household-level database, is co-authored with Karen Áslaug 
Vignisdóttir (Central Bank of Iceland). The chapter provides an empirical analysis of a single 
sector’s financial position in the run-up to and aftermath of the recent financial crisis using 
unique micro data.4 Household debt played a pivotal role in the global financial crisis (cf. Mian 
and Sufi, 2014) and Icelandic households were among the hardest hit. This chapter aims to 
portray how the state of households’ finances evolved in the period from January 2007 to 
December 2010. We do this by designing and collecting an extraordinary detailed micro 
database with information covering nearly all individual loans and households within the 
country and then utilising the information to build profiles for debt service, outstanding 
balances, disposable income, living expenses, and housing wealth enabling us to capture the 
key dynamics of the crisis. Hence our database contains detailed information on each individual 
loan and household for an entire country’s population of indebted households at a time of 
unexpected adverse shocks in the form of a banking system collapse and a currency crisis of 
exceptional magnitude.  
The main focus of our analysis is to assess how the share of indebted households in 
financial distress evolved and how it was affected by debt restructuring measures and court 
decisions. We also analyse the share of indebted homeowners in negative housing equity and 
those in the highly vulnerable situation of being in distress and negative housing equity 
simultaneously. An important benefit of our analysis is that it allows us to uncover a more 
complete account of both the build-up of households’ balance sheet weaknesses, the devastating 
consequences of adverse shocks, and the mitigating effects of debt relief measures. 
In the final chapter, Cross-border credit intermediation and domestic liquidity provision 
in a small open economy, a model is developed for a small open economy with a sophisticated 
credit market set-up where global and domestic liquidity is intermediated to the corporate sector 
through two financial intermediation processes. On the one hand, investment banks 
intermediate cross-border credit through interlinked debt contracts to entrepreneurs and, on the 
other hand, commercial banks intermediate domestic savings to liquidity constrained final good 
producers. Both processes are needed to facilitate the use and development of key inputs in 
aggregate production. The economic analysis of the model served to illuminate in a qualitative 
                                                




manner how the interconnectedness within the financial system and the macrofinancial linkages 
transmit shocks within the financial sector and across the real economy. This reflects that the 
richness of the credit market framework allows the model to qualitatively produce procyclical 
investment bank leverage dynamics, global liquidity spillovers, domestic money market 
pressures, and multifaceted macrofinancial linkages through which shocks propagate across the 
two financial intermediation processes, affecting interest rate spreads and balance sheets, as 
well as the real economy through investment and working capital channels. Hence, the model 
provides a richer framework than many other financial friction models, including Bernanke et 
al. (1999) and Hirakata et al. (2009). Empirical motivation for modelling interactions between 
cross-border and domestic credit developments is also provided in the chapter by utilising 
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“Does the existence of uncontrolled financial  
intermediaries vitiate monetary control?” 
James Tobin and William C. Brainard (1963). 
 
Danish Summary (dansk resumé) 
Makro-finansielle koblinger (e. macrofinancial linkages), dvs. de mangefacetterede 
interaktioner mellem den reelle økonomi og den finansielle sektor, er midtpunktet i denne ph.d.-
afhandling. Derfor er betydningen af balancer et gennemgående tema i afhandlingen, særligt 
finansielle institutioners’ balancer, hvis omfang og sammensætning giver et væsentligt indblik 
i deres rolle i forhold til at drive finansielle høj- og lavkonjunktur samt kriser. Økonomer, som 
James Tobin, der oplevede Depressionen, var godt bevidste om bankernes makroøkonomiske 
betydning, men mange af Depressionens erfaringer var så godt som glemte, da den sidste 
globale finansielle krise ramte (Gertler, 1988, Brunnermeier m.fl., 2013). Afhandlingens formål 
er at bidrage til den hurtigt voksende mængde af litteratur, vedrørende den sidste finansielle 
krise, hvor fortidens erfaringer bliver afsløret og der gives ny indsigt i de komplekse koblinger 
mellem den finansielle sektor og den reelle økonomi. Afhandlingen har særligt fokus på disse 
interaktioner i små åbne økonomier.     
 Denne ph.d.-afhandling består af fem kapitler, hvor makro-finansielle koblinger og 
kriser er analyseret ved brug af forskellige empiriske og teoretiske tilgange. Første kapitel, 
Weathering the financial storm: The importance of fundamentals and flexibility, er skrevet i 
samarbejde med Thórarinn G. Pétursson (Central Bank of Iceland). Kapitlet indeholder en 
empirisk analyse af den sidste globale finansielle krise for et sæt af lande.5 Formålet er at 
forsøge at identificere de faktorer, som havde stor betydning for den globale krises 
makroøkonomiske påvirkning, samt at forklare, hvorfor nogle lande oplevede en systemisk 
bankkrise samt valutakrise, mens andre slap lettere fra krisen. Vi identificerer et bredt sæt 
potentielt forklarende faktorer for 46 medium- til høj-indkomst lande, og dem rammer vi ind i 
fire forskellige kanaler, som tydeliggør, hvordan krisen spredte sig fra de finansielle markeder, 
gennem den reelle økonomi og over hele verden. Dvs. en finansiel kanal, en handelskanal, en 
makrokanal og en institutionel kanal. Vores resultat er, at både den makroøkonomiske og den 
finansielle kanal spillede en vigtig rolle. Dvs. at de afgørende faktorer for at slippe nogenlunde 
udenom krisen ser ud til at have været, at beholde sunde makroøkonomiske tilstande (undgå at 
lade for store økonomiske ubalancer opbygges) samt at undgå at lade banksystemet blive for 
omfattende i forhold til økonomien. Fleksibilitet i valutakursregimet ser også ud til at have 
reduceret påvirkningen på den reelle økonomi, men også forøget risikoen for at en 
valutakurskrise kan opstå.  
 Andet kapitel, The long history of financial boom-bust cycles in Iceland - Part I: 
Financial crises, er skrevet i samarbejde med Bjarni G. Einarsson, Kristófer Gunnlaugsson og 
                                                
5 En kortere version af dette kapitel har allerede været udgivet i bogen Beblavý, M., D. Cobham og L. Ódor (2011). 




Thórarinn G. Pétursson (Central Bank of Iceland).6 Kapitlet indeholder en empirisk analyse af 
adskillige finansielle kriser i en lille åben økonomi over en periode, som dækker næsten 
halvandet århundrede. Vi sammensætter et datasæt, der indeholder makroøkonomiske 
variabler, som reflekterer økonomiens struktur, og finansielle variabler, som er sjældne indenfor 
litteraturen om finansielle kriser på grund af begrænset data tilgængelighed over tilstrækkelige 
lange perioder. Her henvises fx til variabler, som fanger finansiering positionen for det 
indlandske banksystem og dets varierende brug af finansiering på tværs af grænser. Vi 
identificerer over tyve tilfælde af forskellige slags finansielle kriser. I lyset af at der er en stærk 
tendens til, at finansielle kriser kommer i flok, konstruerer vi en enkel ”mangfoldig finansiel 
krise indikator” ved brug af en ikke-parametrisk fælles konjunktur algoritme (e. non-parametric 
common cycle algorithm). Dermed kan vi identificere seks mangfoldige finansielle kriser, som 
gennemsnitligt opstår med femten års mellemrum og varer i fire år. Vi analyserer disse krise-
episoders vigtigste egenskaber samt udviklingen i nogle vigtige makroøkomiske og finansielle 
variabler, både under optakten til kriserne og da de udspiller sig. Vores resultat er, at makro-
finansielle ubalancer har spillet en vigtig rolle i de fleste seriøse kriser, særligt i den sidste. Dog 
er det ikke muligt for en enkel variabel at give et tydeligt advarselssignal for alle episodene. 
Vores resultater giver også udtryk for stærk afsmitning fra globale finansielle kriser i de fleste 
af disse episoder, da de i fem ud af seks tilfælde falder sammen med en global krise af en eller 
anden art. 
 Tredje kapitel, The long history of financial boom-bust cycles in Iceland - Part I: 
Financial cycles, er skrevet med de samme medforfattere.7 Kapitlet analyserer finansielle 
konjunktursvingninger (e. financial cycles) i Island over en periode, som dækker over et 
århundrede. Den finansielle konjunktursvingning er et lovende værktøj til at afsløre den rolle, 
som finansielle faktorer spiller i den makroøkonomiske dynamik. Borio (2014) argumenterer 
for, at den enkleste måde at registrere den finansielle konjunktursvingning på, er ved 
interaktionen mellem kredit og ejendomspriser, selv om andre variabler kan indeholde 
komplementerende informationer. Vi måler den finansielle konjunktursvingning med de 
lavfrekvente sammenfaldende konjunktursvingninger i et sæt af finansielle variabler, som 
indeholder både priser og kvantiteter, på lignende måde som den normale strategi for at måle 
økonomiske konjunktursvingninger. Vi bruger et bredere sæt af variabler end kun kredit og 
boligpriser for at opnå yderligere indblik og for at afsløre potentielle træk i de finansielle 
konjunktursvingninger, som er særligt betydningsfulde for små åbne økonomier og deres 
interaktioner med den indenlandske reele økonomi. For at udføre denne strategi i praksis, 
samler vi de mellem-lange konjunktursvingninger i vores finansielle variabler ved brug af en 
”principal component analyse”. Vores resultater tyder på, at der faktisk eksisterer en vel 
defineret finansiel konjunktursvingning i Island, som gradvis er blevet mere fremtrædende, 
særligt efter liberaliseringen og videreudviklingen af det indenlandske finansielle system. Vores 
resultater viser, at den finansielle konjunktursvingning har spillet en afgørende rolle i landets 
                                                
6 Dette kapitel er udkommet som Central Bank of Iceland Working Paper nr. 68. 
7 Dette kapitel er udkommet som Central Bank of Iceland Working Paper nr. 72 og udkommer i 2017 i Revisiting 
Macro-Financial Linkages: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, proceeding of the 2016 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 




makroøkonomiske udvikling og dets finansielle kriser. Desuden viser vores resultater, at den 
samlede finansielle konjunktursvingning i langt højere grad end de enkelte variabler kan sende 
et varsel om kommende finansielle kriser. Det viser, hvor vigtig interaktionen mellem 
forskellige finansielle variabler er, i at forstærke finansielle ubalancer. Vores analyse viser også 
tydeligt, at Island ikke er en ø i det globale, finansielle verdenshav, da vores resultater afslører 
særdeles stærk afsmitning fra den globale, finansielle konjunktursvingning (hvor vi bruger 
vores estimation af den amerikanske finansielle konjunktursvingning som en stedfortræder (e. 
proxy) for den globale version). 
Vores resultater er i overenstemmelse med resultater i en række undersøgelser af 
betydningen af den finansielle konjunktursvingning i andre avancerede lande, fx Claessens m.fl. 
(2011, 2012), Drehmann m.fl. (2012) og Aikman m.fl. (2015). Vores undersøgelse bidrager til 
denne voksende litteratur ved at tilføje endnu et land og faktisk et land, som har været udsat for 
en række finansielle kriser over en periode, der dækker over et århundrede. Vores bidrag er 
også med til at vise, hvordan mere detaljerede informationer om bankerners balancer kan byde 
på yderligere indblik i en analyse af den finansielle konjunktursvingning, samt at gøre 
opmærksom på faktorer, som er særligt betydningsfulde for små åbne økonomier. Det dækker 
både over interaktionen mellem den finansielle konjunktursvingning og den indenlandske 
økonomi, og hvor vigtig afsmitning fra den globale, finansielle konjunktursvingning er. Vi 
afslutter med et første forsøg på at undersøge nogle af de implikationer, som vores resultater 
har for udførelsen af den økonomiske politik.        
Fjerde kapitel, Households’ position in the financial crisis in Iceland: Analysis based 
on a nationwide household-level database, er skrevet i samarbejde med Karen Áslaug 
Vignisdóttir (Central Bank of Iceland). Kapitlet indeholder en empirisk analyse af udviklingen 
i husholdningernes finansielle position under optakten til og udfoldelsen af den sidste 
finansielle krise. Undersøgelsen bygger på et enestående mikrodatasæt.8 Husholdningernes 
gæld spillede en vigtig rolle i den sidste globale, finansielle krise (Mian og Sufi, 2014), og 
islandske husholdninger var særdeles hårdt ramt. Kapitlets formål er at vise, hvordan 
husholdningernes finansielle position udviklede sig i perioden fra januar 2007 til december 
2010. Dette gør vi ved at designe og samle et særdeles detaljeret mikro-datasæt, som indeholder 
informationer om næsten alle enkelte lån og husholdninger i landet, og bruge det til at opbygge 
profiler for gældsbetjening, udestående gæld, disponibel indkomst, nødvendige udgifter, samt 
boligværdi, som betyder, at vi er i stand til at registrere den vigtigste dynamik i krisen. Dvs., at 
vores datasæt indeholder detaljeret information om hvert enkelt lån og husholdning (med gæld) 
for en hel nation, på et tidspunkt hvor et uventet chok kom i form af et systemisk bankkrak og 
en særdeles dyb valutakurskrise. 
I vores analyse fokuserer vi på at vurdere udviklingen i andelen af husholdninger med 
gæld, som er i finansiel nød (e. financial distress), og hvordan de blev påvirket af 
gældsomstrukturering og domstolsafgørelser. Vi analyserer også andelen af husejere med gæld 
og negativ friværdi, samt den særdeles sårbare andel af husejere, som samtidig er i finansiel 
nød og har negativ friværdi. En vigtig fordel er, at vores analyse gør os i stand til at afsløre på 
                                                




en mere omfattende måde, hvordan husholdningernes økonomiske sårbarhed blev opbygget, 
hvordan de voldsomme påvirkninger af krisen kom frem, og hvor effektive 
gældomstruktureringen var med til at dæmpe krisen påvirkninger.  
I det sidste kapitel, Cross-border credit intermediation and domestic liquidity provision 
in a small open economy, udvikles der en model for en lille åben økonomi med et avanceret 
kreditmarked hvor global og indenlandsk likviditet er formidlet til virksomheder igennem to 
financielle formidlingsprocesser. På den ene side, formidler investeringsbanker kredit på tværs 
af lande via relaterede kreditkontrakter til iværksættere, og på den anden side formidler 
kommercielle banker indenlandsk opsparing til likviditetsbegrænsede producenter af den 
endelige vare. Begge processer er nødvendige for at facilitere brugen og udviklingen af nøgle 
input i produktionen. Den økonomiske analyse af modellen viser på en kvalitativ måde, hvordan 
relationer indenfor det finansielle system og makro-finansielle koblinger transmitterer chock i 
det finansielle system og over i den reelle økonomi. Dette afspejler, at den omfangsrige tilgang 
til kreditmarkedet i modellen gør den i stand til, på en kvalitiativ måde, at fremkalde en 
procyklisk gældsatsning (e. leverage) hos investeringsbankerne, effekter af ændringer i de 
globale likviditetsomstændigheder, pres på indenlandske pengemarkeder, og mangefacetterede 
makro-finansielle koblinger, som chock transmitteres igennem indenfor de to finansielle 
formidlingsprocesser (via ændringer i rentespændinger og balancer) og over i den reelle 
økonomi (via investerings- og arbejdskapitalkanaler). Dermed byder modellen på en rigere 
ramme end mange andre modeller med finansielle imperfektioner, inklusiv Bernanke m.fl. 
(1999) og Hirakata m.fl. (2009). Desuden fremlægges der en empirisk motivation for at 
modellere interaktioner mellem kreditformidling på tværs af grænser og indenlandsk 
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The recent global financial tsunami has had economic consequences that have not been 
witnessed since the Great Depression. But while some countries suffered a particularly large 
contraction in economic activity on top of a system-wide banking and currency collapse, others 
came off relatively lightly. This paper aims to explain this difference in cross-country 
experience by means of a non-structural econometric analysis using a variety of potential pre-
crisis explanatory variables in a cross-section of 46 medium-to-high income countries. The 
severity of the macroeconomic impact is measured in terms of depth and duration of the 
contraction in both output and consumption. Potential pre-crisis explanatory variables are 
chosen to reflect propagation channels for the global crisis typically mentioned in the literature, 
i.e. a financial channel, a trade channel, a macro channel and an institutional channel, although 
we offer some new variables that have not been included in such analyses before as far as we 
know. As another contribution to the analysis of the current crisis, we also use cross-country 
probit regressions to identify the main determinants of the probability of a domestic systemic 
banking or currency crises during the current crisis. 
 Our results suggest that the macro channel played a prominent role, as domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities are found crucial for determining the incidence 
and severity of the crisis. An especially important pre-crisis macroeconomic indicator, which 
seems to capture factors that are important in explaining the extent of the crisis along many 
different dimensions, is the rate of inflation in the run up to the crisis. We also find evidence 
suggesting the importance of financial factors. In particular, we find that large banking systems 
tended to be associated with a deeper and more protracted consumption contraction and a higher 
risk of a systemic banking or currency crisis. Our results suggest that greater exchange rate 
flexibility coincided with a smaller and shorter contraction, but at the same time increased the 
risk of a banking and currency crisis. We also find that countries with exchange rate pegs 
outside the European Monetary Union (EMU) were hit particularly hard, while inflation 
targeting seemed to mitigate the crisis. Finally, we find some evidence suggesting a role for 
international real linkages and institutional factors.  
 Several recent papers attempt to explain the cross-country variation in the impact of the 
global crisis. For example, the findings in Berkmen et al. (2009) suggest that private sector 
leverage, credit growth, exchange rate flexibility, trade composition, and the fiscal position are 
important in explaining the cross-country variation in output growth forecast revisions. Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) show that current account deficits, credit and output growth rates, 
and exposure to trade and production of traded goods are all important predictors for the impact 
of the crisis on post-crisis output and domestic demand (including consumption) growth rates. 
Other papers are more sceptical about the importance of initial conditions. Using output growth, 
stock price and exchange rate changes and revisions to country’s credit ratings as crisis 
indicators, Rose and Spiegel (2009a, b) find that initial conditions have limited predictive 
power. Only pre-crisis asset price changes and current account deficits are found to be robust 
crisis predictors, while they find weaker evidence for a role of pre-crisis credit growth. 
Claessens et al. (2010) are also somewhat sceptical concerning the importance of initial 




current account deficits and trade openness can predict the severity of the output contraction 
and the post-crisis developments of a financial stress index. 
Our results, however, give us reason to be more optimistic on the predictive power of 
initial conditions in the current crisis, both in terms of explaining a significant share of the 
cross-country variation in the depth and duration of the crisis and in providing quite sharp 
predictions of the incidence of banking and currency crises. This therefore suggests that 
country-specific initial conditions played an important role in determining the economic impact 
of the crisis and, in particular, that countries with sound fundamentals and flexible economic 
frameworks were better able to weather the financial storm. We find that these results are robust 
to various alterations in the empirical setup. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the country 
sample, our crisis measures and the potential explanatory variables used in the analysis. Section 
3 presents the empirical results, both with regard to the real economy effects of the crisis and 
the probability of a banking and currency crisis. Results from some sensitivity analyses are also 
reported. The section ends with an interpretation of the key results from the paper. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. The data 
 
2.1. The country sample 
This section describes the country sample analysed in this paper. Since the incidence of the 
crisis and occurrences of domestic banking and currency crises was mainly notable in higher-
income countries, the focus is on countries in the upper half of the income spectrum. Thus, the 
aim is to include countries of similar income levels and size as OECD member countries. Hence, 
countries with PPP adjusted per capita GDP lower than the poorest OECD member country 
(Turkey) and PPP adjusted GDP level lower than the smallest OECD member country (Iceland) 
are excluded.11 This gives a sample of 64 countries in total from the 227 countries recorded in 
the CIA World Factbook for the period 2006-2008. After eliminating countries with missing 
data, we are left with 46 countries, i.e. all the current 33 OECD member countries, plus 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hong Kong, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, 
South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand. 
 Thus, the analysis includes all the 27 EU member countries, 6 other European countries 
and 13 countries outside of Europe. There are 27 industrial countries and 19 emerging market 
economies, of which 12 are in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the analysis includes 7 very 
small open economies, i.e. countries with populations below 2.5 million. 
 The sample also includes countries with a wide array of monetary policy frameworks. 
Thus, there are the 16 EMU countries, 4 countries pegging their currency to the euro within the 
ERM2 framework and 4 other unilateral exchange rate pegs. There are also 22 countries with a 
                                                
11 There is, however, one exception: Malta is included although its GDP level falls just short of Iceland’s level, in 




floating exchange rate, of which 19 follow an explicit inflation targeting (IT) regime.12 The 
analysis therefore includes a country sample with a wide range of monetary frameworks. Table 
1 gives an overview of the sample. 
 
Table 1. Country sample 
    
Australia France Lithuania Slovakia 
Austria Germany Luxembourg Slovenia 
Belgium Greece Malta Spain 
Bulgaria Hong Kong Mexico Sweden 
Canada Hungary Netherlands Switzerland 
Chile Iceland New Zealand Taiwan 
Croatia Ireland Norway Thailand 
Cyprus Israel Poland Turkey 
Czech Republic Italy Portugal United Kingdom 
Denmark Japan Romania United States 
Estonia Korea Russia  
Finland Latvia South Africa  
    
Different country groups 
Industrial countries   
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States 
  
Emerging market economies  
 Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey 
  
Central and Eastern European countries   
 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
  
Very small open economies   
 Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia 
  
Inflation targeting countries   
 Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom 
  
Unilateral exchange rate pegs  
 Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Hong Kong, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia,  
 
 
2.2. Crisis indicators 
There is no single, optimal way to measure economic losses due to financial crises and the 
results from this paper and the others quoted in the Introduction clearly show the need to look 
at many different crisis indicators. Various measures have therefore been put forward in the 
literature. Some focus on the fiscal costs of crises (e.g. Hoelscher et al., 2003), which captures 
the transfer of income due to crisis resolution policies rather than the extent of economic costs 
of the crisis. While most papers focus on various measures of output losses, this paper also 
focuses on consumption losses, which we think is important as it is clear that a special feature 
                                                
12 Information on monetary regimes is based on the latest IMF de facto classification of exchange rate regimes and 
monetary policy frameworks from 23 February 2009 (using data from 31 April 2008), but updating the framework 




of this crisis is the unusually prominent role played by the highly indebted household sector in 
propagating and amplifying the financial shock, with an exceptionally large consumption 
contraction occurring in many countries. We also focus on the duration of the crisis with the 
aim to analyse whether the same factors explain the depth and duration of the crisis or whether 
different factors play a role in explaining the cross-country variation in the speed of recovery.  
A common approach to measure the impact of crises on activity is to construct a 
counterfactual path in the absence of a crisis and measure the loss as the actual deviation from 
the constructed trend (see e.g. IMF, 1998, Bordo et al., 2001, and Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
This approach may overstate both the depth and the duration of the economic impact for 
countries were the run-up to the crisis is characterised by booms that make activity levels along 
the constructed trend unsustainable and therefore unattainable even in the absence of a crisis. 
Furthermore, countries are often heading for recessions before the crisis erupts without an 
unsustainable boom taking place and in those cases, comparisons of actual activity levels with 
simple trends may exaggerate the degree of losses due to the crisis (see Hoggarth et al., 2002). 
Instead of constructing a counterfactual path for output or consumption in the absence 
of crisis, we therefore attempt to measure the depth of output (consumption) contraction as the 
log-difference of seasonally adjusted GDP (consumption) level between peak in the period from 
2007Q1 to 2008Q4 and the level in 2009Q4 (our final data observation).13 Our approach has 
the advantage of avoiding the need to construct a counterfactual path for GDP or consumption 
in absence of the crisis. Possible disadvantages are that the peak level in the run up to the crisis 
can in some cases represent an unsustainable level with an adjustment being unavoidable with 
or without a financial crisis taking place. Hence, our measure may overstate the economic loss 
due to the crisis in such cases but on the other hand, we are not extrapolating the growth level 
in the run up to the crisis which is likely to lead to an even further overstatement. In addition, 
the analysis ends in 2009Q4 which means that the full impact of the crisis may yet to be fully 
realised in some of the countries included. Our approach is similar to Cecchetti et al. (2009), 
who measure the depth of contractions following crises as the peak to trough decline in GDP 
where the peak is the highest GDP level within one year either side of the crisis date.  
Duration of output (consumption) contractions is measured as the number of quarters 
with negative quarter-on-quarter growth in seasonally adjusted GDP (consumption) from 
2008Q3 to 2009Q4. The starting point is chosen to capture the effects of the global crisis once 
it entered panic mode in September 2008 so as to avoid capturing normal business cycle 
adjustments unrelated to the crisis. Of course, it can be argued that tighter financial conditions 
due to the emerging global crisis from mid-2007 played a part in reinforcing the downturn in 
activity and bringing some advanced economies into recession at an earlier stage but we choose 
to focus our duration analysis on the impact of the crisis once it entered panic mode in late 
2008.14 
                                                
13 Other measures were also considered, for example the difference between the 2007Q1-2008Q4 peak and the 
trough in 2008Q4-2009Q4 as well as the difference of the level in 2008Q3 and trough in 2008Q4-2009Q4. The 
results were very similar (with correlation between the measures all above 0.9).   
14 We also considered other measures of duration with similar results. Two examples were the number of quarters 




We also want to analyse the cross-country variation in the probability of a banking and 
currency crisis. The incidence of a systemic banking crises is based on an updated version of 
the database in Laeven and Valencia (2008), generously provided by the authors, in addition to 
our own elaboration. They categorise 10 countries from our country sample to have experienced 
a systemic banking crisis during the global crisis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. We add Latvia, Russia and 
Switzerland (which Laeven and Valencia had as borderline cases at the time of our 
correspondence) to the list based on significant stress in the banking sectors of these countries 
and the extent of policy interventions. Hence, there are 13 incidences of systemic banking crises 
in our country sample. 
The definition of currency crises also follows Laeven and Valancia’s (2008) using BIS’s 
nominal effective exchange rate indices (see also Frankel and Rose, 1996). We categorise a 
country as having experienced a currency crisis if the annual average of the nominal effective 
exchange rate depreciated by 30% or more in 2008-2009 and if this depreciation is also at least 
a 10 percentage points increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the two year period 
before. Given this definition, only two countries experienced a currency crisis between 2008 
and 2009, Iceland and Korea, and therefore only Iceland experienced a twin crisis (see the 
Appendix for more detail).15  
 
2.3. Potential pre-crisis explanatory variables 
We use a range of variables to analyse which factors played a role in determining the depth and 
duration of the contraction in activity, on one hand, and the probability of banking and currency 
crisis, on the other. In a broad sense, they can be categorised into four general channels from 
which the crisis was transmitted throughout the world economy: a financial channel (reflecting 
factors such as financial structure, development and cross-country linkages), a trade channel 
(reflecting factors such as trade penetration, trade structure and business cycle synchronisation), 
a macro channel (reflecting macroeconomic volatility and imbalances), and a channel reflecting 
institutional factors. To avoid possible endogeneity problems, all of our explanatory variables 
are measured at pre-crisis values, with most dated in 2006 or 2007 or values obtained from time 
series data with a cut-off point in 2007 or earlier. These variables and their motivation are 
further discussed in the following. A detailed list of variable definitions and sources can be 
found in the Appendix. 
 
Economic structure 
The first set of explanatory variables includes two measures of economic size and development, 
i.e. the PPP-adjusted US dollar value of GDP and the corresponding per capita measure of GDP. 
                                                
respectively. The correlation between these two measures, on the one hand, and the measure chosen on the other, 
is very high (above 0.8) for both output and consumption contractions. 
15 The Icelandic króna depreciated by roughly 48% in total between 2007 and 2009, while the Korean Won fell by 
30%. Expanding the criteria to other countries with large depreciations in both 2008 and 2009, would next include 
Pound Sterling (22% depreciation between 2007 and 2009) and the Romanian lei (19% depreciation between 2007 
and 2009). We decided however to stick to the stricter criteria as we find no supporting evidence suggesting that 




The motivation of including these measures is to capture and control for the effects of size and 
development on the economic impact of the crisis and the probability of a banking and currency 
crisis.  
The global crisis originated in the advanced economies and spread throughout the globe 
(see, for example, Claessens et al., 2010), and the evidence in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) 
suggests that the advanced economies were hit hardest by the crisis. This is different from many 
previous crises in the last few decades and reflects the advanced-economy nature of the current 
crisis. In fact, the experience from previous crises with regard to difference in output contraction 
in developed countries compared to their less developed counterparts is ambiguous, although 
large consumption contractions are more frequently observed in the latter group. The frequency 
of banking and currency crises seems however remarkably similar in developed and developing 
countries (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, Hoggarth et al., 2002, Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008, and 
Barro and Ursúa, 2008). To capture these effects, we include per capita GDP. But including per 
capita income can also serve as a proxy for other economic and institutional factors that are 
probably positively correlated with greater ability to absorb and respond to adverse shocks. 
However, as noted by Rose and Spiegel (2009a), this greater perceived ability to respond to 
crises may lead to greater moral hazard problems, thus leaving richer countries just as 
vulnerable as their less developed counterparts. 
The crisis has also generally been observed as a crisis were smaller countries, which 
make up a significant share of the country sample used here, have taken a particularly big hit 
(see the discussion in Rose and Spiegel, 2009a). Many of these small countries had experienced 
large build-up of imbalances and were also heavily exposed to the collapse of international 
trade and activity and tightening financial conditions that followed the financial crisis than 
larger economies. The smaller countries are probably also less able to absorb shocks than the 
larger ones. Including economic size is meant to capture these effects. 
 
Financial structure and development 
As a second set of explanatory variables we include three different measures of financial 
structure and development. It is often argued that the level of financial sophistication reached 
during the years prior to the crisis, if not triggering the crisis, at least served to exacerbate it and 
propagate it around different financial markets and around the world through rising moral 
hazard problems, opaque and complicated financial instruments and the inability of financial 
regulators to effectively regulate the financial system.16 At the same time, deeper financial 
markets can be more able to absorb shocks and support the recovery from a crisis than thin 
markets with few financial instruments for hedging risk that may even disappear completely 
during crisis periods. The question of sign of these effects is therefore ultimately an empirical 
one. 
The first variable we include measures financial deepening, using the ratio of broad 
money (M2) to GDP, a standard measure of development of financial markets and hence their 
ability to absorb and diversify risk. A higher degree of financial development could be expected 
                                                




to be negatively related to the size and duration of the contraction following the crisis. However, 
if this measure merely reflects the ability of domestic agents to increase their leverage and hence 
contribute to greater imbalances through asset price bubbles and unsustainable balance sheets 
expansion, it could instead indicate greater vulnerability to the crisis and have a positive relation 
to the size of the crisis’ economic impact (cf. Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008, and Claessens et al., 
2010).  
 The second variable measures the size of the domestic banking system as the ratio of 
total assets of the five largest banks to GDP.17 Large banking systems, with significant cross-
border operations, may have served to exacerbate the transmission of the global crisis to the 
domestic economy (cf. Davis, 2008, and Claessens et al., 2010). They may also stretch the 
ability of domestic regulators to deal with such large and complex banking systems and the 
fiscal resources to support the system in times of need.18 They may also exacerbate the risk of 
regulative capture and the moral hazard problem related to the too-big-to-fail problem (cf. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, 2009). Large banking systems with significant cross-border 
operations are also more vulnerable to a liquidity crisis, such as happened in the current crisis 
as the host country’s lender-of-last resort abilities were in many cases restricted to the domestic 
currency of which only a small share of the banking system’s assets and liabilities are 
denominated in (cf. Buiter and Sibert, 2008). Finally, a relatively large banking system can also 
reflect excessive domestic credit expansion which is likely to contribute to the size of the crisis’ 
economic impact. The size of the banking system may also at the same time reflect the type of 
financial intermediation prevalent in the economy, i.e. whether bank lending or financial 
markets are most important for financial intermediation. A higher share of direct lending via 
credit markets may have been beneficial in the current crisis, for example if bank lending has 
been more affected than direct financing through the bond market.  
 Finally, as a third measure of financial development and structure, we use the ratio of 
stock market capitalisation to GDP. The stock market plays an important role in corporate 
funding in many economies and is often considered a vital indicator for a country’s economic 
strength.19 Deep stock markets could be expected to provide an important mean for channelling 
funds to medium-sized and large firms with productive investment opportunities in a time of 
crisis and cushion against bank credit retrenchment, in addition to allowing banks to raise new 
equity in an environment of rapidly deteriorating asset values. However, this is not necessarily 
                                                
17 The results were robust to whether the three, four or five of the largest banks were used. We also tried using the 
largest domestically-owned banks listed in The Banker’s Top 1000 World Bank list (although the coverage was 
not as comprehensive as the one we use), which might be more closely related to the probability of banking crisis 
than our measure, e.g. due to sovereign’s contingent liabilities from supporting domestically-owned banks. 
However, the effects on our results were only minor. An alternative source would be the BIS’s consolidated 
banking statistics for national banking systems but that covers only half of our country sample. 
18 Due to data limitations, we could not include detailed banking system data often mentioned in the discussion as 
having played a role in the current crisis, such as such as banking interconnectedness, cross-currency funding 
needs, and currency and maturity mismatches present in banking systems in the run up to the crisis. Another 
potentially important pre-crisis condition missing due to data limitations is data on interbank turnover, which could 
capture the serious market disruption that occurred in many countries and differentiate more clearly between 
different types of market structures that could have played a role in the propagation of the crisis. 
19 Understandably, stock markets play a large role in market-based economies and therefore also reflect the type 




true in a severe crisis. Declining equity prices can undermine corporate net worth, collateral 
values and limit their access to credit even further, decelerating investment and activity. 
Issuance of bank stock can also be problematic in practice in an environment of extensive 
counterparty risk and asset value uncertainty. Furthermore, high stock market capitalisation can 
also reflect asset price bubbles and therefore be an indicator of vulnerability rather than 
financial development (cf. Rose and Spiegel, 2009a, b).  
 
International real linkages 
The financial crisis literature stresses the importance of international trade as a key channel of 
crisis contagion. With the global recession causing a sharp decline in global demand, the spill-
over effects can be expected to be greater in countries with closer ties to the global economy 
(cf. Rose and Spiegel, 2009b, and Levchenko et al., 2009). We therefore add as a third set of 
explanatory variables five different measures of macroeconomic exposure to external shocks 
through trade linkages. 
To capture the effects of trade intensity, we use a standard measure of trade openness, 
i.e. the ratio of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. As a 
complimentary measure of these global real linkages, we also add a proxy for the link between 
the domestic and global business cycles, i.e. the contemporaneous correlation between the 
domestic and global output gaps, measured as de-trended output (using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter).20 Furthermore, with the global recession dominated by a large contraction in demand for 
manufacturing goods across the globe, it can also be argued that countries whose exports are 
dominated by manufacturing goods were hit particularly hard by the crisis. To capture this 
compositional aspect, we therefore also include as a third variable the share of manufacturing 
goods in total merchandise exports. 
The final two variables capture the possible effects of trade patterns on the transmission 
of the global shock to the domestic economy through the trade channel. Countries that export 
only a narrow range of goods or have trade concentrated on few markets may be expected to be 
more vulnerable to the global crisis than countries who export a broad menu of goods to many 
markets. These effects are captured by two indices on trade diversification and trade 
concentration. The first index measures how a country’s exports differ from that of the average 
country. A country with a narrow export base will have a high value of this index. The second 
index measures the degree of market concentration in trade. A country with exports 




                                                
20 Note that the simple correlation may overstate the co-movement for the large economies as they represent a 
significant part of the world output measure used here. To adjust for this, an alternative measure of world output 
excluding the largest economies individually was constructed (using constant US dollar price data obtained from 
Eurostat). Hence, to calculate the US correlation, US output was compared to world output excluding the US. A 
similar adjustment was made for the other five large economies (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK). This 
led to a significant reduction in the correlation for Japan, the UK and the US, but had no effect on the measured 




International financial linkages 
The fourth set of explanatory variables proxies the extent of financial linkages with the global 
economy. These variables are included to capture the extent of countries’ linkages with the 
international financial system as the crisis rapidly spread from the main financial centres to 
other countries across the globe (cf. Davis, 2008, and Rose and Spiegel, 2009b). It can be 
expected that closer financial links enhanced the spill-over of the financial shock to domestic 
financial systems. But at the same time, it can also be argued that stronger ties to the global 
financial system can facilitate a more rapid recovery from the crisis through greater access to 
global finance once the crisis hit. 
To capture the extent of financial exposure to the global economy we use a general 
measure of financial openness, given as the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to 
GDP, which is commonly used in the literature, cf. Kose et al. (2009). A high ratio implies 
stronger financial links with the international economy and therefore greater exposure to 
disruptions in credit markets and international asset price reversals.21 But as pointed out by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), a high ratio also reflects a more internationally diversified 
asset portfolio and can therefore also reflect some valuable diversification in the event of 
instability in the domestic financial system. The question whether a large international balance 
sheet is associated with a greater or lesser exposure to the global crisis is therefore ultimately 
an empirical one. 
Closely related is a measure of the extent of capital inflows, given as the ratio of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows to GDP. The reversibility of capital flows and the risk of sudden 
stop crises is a recurrent theme in the literature and the idea behind this variable is to capture 
the vulnerability of countries’ risk to reversal due to the global crisis which could increase the 
economic impact. We follow Forbes and Chinn (2004) and use FDI inflows as a measure of 
vulnerability to capital inflows reversal. FDI inflows may, however, not be the type of inflows 
most sensitive to such abrupt reversals but data limitations prevented us from using other 
measures such as foreign portfolio flows and foreign bank loans, which may be more important 
drivers of capital flow reversals (see e.g. Tong and Wei, 2009). This view has though been 
questioned, with Dooley et al. (1994) finding a high level of FDI to be associated with high 
variability in capital flows and Frankel and Rose (1996) finding currency crashes to be related 
to episodes where FDI inflows dry up.  
The final financial linkages variable is meant to capture the possible positive effects of 
global financial ties through a ‘global security net’ and is given as an indicator variable for 
access to the US Federal Reserve extraordinary US dollar liquidity swap facilities in the autumn 
of 2008. The Fed provided US dollar liquidity to a selection of central banks to ease pressure 
that occurred in US dollar short-term wholesale funding markets (McGuire and von Peter, 2009, 
and Allen and Moessner, 2010).22 Thus, the indicator variable takes the value of one if the 
                                                
21 This ignores the importance of the structure of external assets and liabilities, e.g. the share of equity versus short-
term debt in liabilities and the degree of risk in foreign asset holdings. 
22 Swap lines were set up with the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank in December 2007. These 
lines were expanded considerably following Lehman Brother’s collapse and similar swap lines were set up with 




domestic central bank had access to this liquidity program in the autumn of 2008 and zero 
otherwise.23 
 
Underlying economic volatility 
The fifth set of variables includes three measures of underlying economic volatility. In general, 
greater economic volatility can reflect frequent or large shocks, or poor success in dealing with 
shocks, e.g. due to weak institutions and lack of credibility. Greater underlying volatility could 
therefore be expected to make countries more vulnerable to the global crisis. But greater 
volatility in some macroeconomic variables can also capture greater flexibility which can foster 
a swift adjustment to shocks and support a more rapid recovery.  
To capture these different dimensions of the link between crisis vulnerability and 
economic volatility, we first include a variable measuring business cycle volatility using the 
standard deviation of the output gap (using Hodrick-Prescott de-trended output) for quarterly 
data over the period from 1985 to 2007.  
The second variable is the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, measured as the 
standard deviation of quarterly nominal effective exchange rates in the period from 1994 to 
2007. A more volatile exchange rate can reflect a number of factors, e.g. underlying instability 
in the economy, high and volatile inflation and monetary policy’s lack of credibility and 
transparency (e.g. Kuttner and Posen, 2000). But a more volatile exchange rate can also reflect 
greater exchange rate flexibility that can help mitigate economic shocks such as the recent 
global crisis through improved competitiveness of the domestic economy due to depreciation 
of the domestic currency.24  
But not all currency movements serve to facilitate economic adjustment. As a final 
variable capturing underlying economic volatility, we therefore also add a measure of the non-
fundamental part of exchange rate volatility. This measure is obtained from Pétursson (2010), 
which uses the standard monetary model of exchange rate determination to estimate the lower 
bound of the variance of a time-varying exchange rate risk premium within a rational-
expectations signal extraction approach. The idea behind including this variable is that the more 
volatile the exchange rate risk premium is, the more vulnerable the economy is to the financial 
crisis.  
 
Economic imbalances and vulnerabilities 
The sixth set of initial conditions includes variables capturing macroeconomic conditions just 
before the crisis hit. The idea is that the larger the macroeconomic imbalances, the more 
                                                
Korea and Singapore. These facilities were terminated in early 2010 but some were reintroduced in May 2010 
when funding pressures emerged again.  
23 The use of this indicator variable in our analysis may be problematic in the sense that the introduction of swap 
lines between central banks was part of the crisis response of monetary authorities. Any effects of this variable can 
therefore reflect a reverse causality instead of being a truly exogenous regressor.  
24 This shock-absorber role of a flexible exchange rate can be limited in practice however if currency mismatches 
are widespread as non-financial private sector or public sector balance sheets will be dealt a heavy blow by the 
depreciation, causing widespread repayment problems and write-downs of banks’ assets. Data limitations prevent 




vulnerable the economy is to adverse changes in financial and economic conditions. This is a 
well known characteristic of financial crises. Barajas et al. (2009) show for example that large 
macroeconomic imbalances tend to increase the probability of a crisis. They also find that the 
larger the imbalances, the longer the contraction following the crisis tends to be. 
As a first measure of macroeconomic imbalances, we include the rate of inflation in 
2007. Inflation control is likely to reflect the quality of policy institutions and the extent of 
demand pressures within each country, both of which can be expected to influence how 
vulnerable countries are to a global financial crisis and the possibility for policy makers to use 
monetary stimulus measures to cushion against adverse shocks. Thus, we expect countries with 
low inflation and better anchored inflation expectations to have greater scope to ease monetary 
policy more aggressively and be more effective in transforming lower policy rates into lower 
medium and long-term real rates than countries that were also dealing with inflationary 
problems by the time the crisis hit. 
The second variable we include to capture macroeconomic imbalances is the current 
account balance as a share of GDP. Countries running current account deficits are more reliant 
on foreign financing and are therefore more exposed to a sudden stop of capital inflows, which 
is a frequent characteristic of financial crises (cf. Claessens et al., 2009). The ensuing balance 
of payment adjustment usually takes the form of rapidly declining domestic demand and 
currency depreciation. Larger deficits are likely to require larger adjustments in domestic 
demand and the exchange rate which can, if large enough, lead to a currency and banking crises 
through the depreciation’s effect on domestic balance sheets (cf. Fratzscher, 2009). 
Third, we include a variable capturing financial leverage of domestic balance sheets. In 
general terms, leverage refers to the degree to which assets are funded by debt and is therefore 
a useful indicator of balance sheet vulnerabilities. Excessive increase in leverage is also 
typically related to credit and asset price bubbles. At the time the bubbles burst and the crisis 
hits, private sector balance sheets are therefore particularly exposed to collapsing asset prices 
and refinancing risks and households and firms need to rapidly unwind their balance sheets 
which further exacerbates the slowdown of economic activity (see, for example, Rose and 
Spiegel, 2009a, b, and Claessens et al., 2010). Various leverage measures have been used in the 
literature, such as the debt-to-equity ratio and the debt-to-assets ratio. However, due to data 
limitations we follow Berkmen et al. (2009) and measure leverage with the ratio of domestic 
credit to domestic deposits. This compares total credit to a relatively liquid and limited form of 
assets but can nevertheless be expected to reflect the degree of balance sheet vulnerability and 
therefore how fragile countries are to tighter financial conditions and declining asset prices 
brought upon by the global crisis. 
Fourth, we include two variables capturing the underlying vulnerability of the fiscal 
authority, i.e. fiscal balances and government debt (both measured as a ratio to GDP). These 
two variables should capture both the ability of the fiscal authority to respond to the crisis 
through a fiscal stimulus and the transmission of the crisis through the risk premium on 
government debt with possible repercussions on funding and debt sustainability. Higher debt 
levels and larger deficits are therefore expected to make countries more vulnerable to the crisis 




debt levels or large refinancing needs and causes considerable increase in risk premia, the 
government may have to introduce strict fiscal austerity measures that will further increase the 
contraction in domestic demand in the short run.  
The final measure introduced to capture macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities 
is central bank foreign reserves as a ratio to GDP. Low levels of reserves prior to the crisis may 
suggest limited capability of the monetary authority to support the domestic currency in a 
situation where the currency comes under pressure, as often occurs in times of financial stress. 
Limited reserves also reflect restricted ability to provide foreign currency liquidity support to 
the domestic banking system in times of financial panic as occurred during the US dollar 
liquidity shortage as previously discussed. Thus, countries with relatively low reserves can be 
expected to be hit harder by the crisis as their local currency and banking system come under 
more strain (cf. Fratzscher, 2009, and Obstfeld et al., 2009).25 
 
Institutional factors 
One can expect countries with stronger institutions to be better able to cope with crisis situations 
and in general to deliver a more stable macroeconomic environment (cf. Acemoglu et al., 2003), 
which may also make countries less vulnerable to the crisis as discussed above. The seventh set 
of initial conditions therefore includes ten variables capturing different institutional aspects.  
First, we include four different measures of institutional quality: two separate proxies 
of governance quality from the World Bank, i.e. one measure of government efficiency and 
another of regulatory quality; a proxy for the quality of the legal system from the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index; and an index of central bank independence 
from Fry et al. (2000). We expect countries with a stronger governance structure and a sounder 
legal system to be more able to reduce the probability of imbalances building up, e.g. through 
reducing the risk of regulative capture. Greater central bank autonomy can also be argued to 
reduce the risk of crises by better insulating monetary policy from political pressures and 
therefore reducing the time-inconsistency problem and supporting firmer anchoring of inflation 
expectations.  
Second, we include four measures of flexibility of markets, based on the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index: indices of regulatory burden in credit and 
labour markets, respectively, a measure of regulatory burden in overall business transactions, 
and a summary index of overall economic freedom (the EFW-index). Here, the idea is that 
greater flexibility and less regulatory burden may help economies recover faster from a crisis. 
But at the same time, it is often argued that one of the key drivers in the current crisis was ‘too 
much’ freedom and lax supervision of private sector behaviour. The possible effects of these 
institutional features are therefore not necessarily clear a priori. 
Finally, we include two indicator variables capturing past crisis experience, i.e. whether 
countries have experienced systemic banking or currency crises in the previous 30 years. It is 
                                                
25 The size of foreign reserves was to a certain extent made less important for countries with access to international 
swap lines. Of the main international centres, the euro area, the UK, Switzerland and Australia would have depleted 
a substantial fraction of their foreign currency reserves if they would have had to provide foreign currency liquidity 




often argued that countries that have experienced such crises in the past tend to learn from 
earlier mistakes and avoid allowing such vulnerabilities to build up again. Past crises experience 
should therefore reduce the negative effects of the current one. However, it can also be argued 
that recurring crises reflect weak institutions and lack of credibility, which takes a long time to 
recuperate. Hence, past crises experience can make countries more vulnerable to rapid loss of 
confidence once a new crisis hits. The links between past crises experience and the current 
financial crisis are therefore not obvious. 
 
Monetary and exchange rate regimes 
Although no exchange rate peg has been dismantled in the current global crisis, such a collapse 
has marked many crises in the last two decades, and was often linked to severe banking, 
corporate or sovereign debt crises. Many commentators have also argued that the exchange rate 
regime played a key role in the current crisis. Thus, some have argued that euro-membership 
was crucial in preventing a complete collapse in Ireland, Malta and some of the Southern 
European countries, while others have argued that the flexible exchange rate regime played a 
key role in the banking collapse and large contraction in activity experienced in Iceland. Others 
have, however, highlighted the benefit of a flexible exchange rate for supporting the post-crisis 
recovery. At the same time, some have argued that the strong focus on inflation control that 
comes with the inflation targeting regime played an important detrimental role in the build up 
of vulnerabilities in the run up to the financial crisis in some of the inflation targeting countries, 
with Iceland a particular case in point. 
As a final set of initial conditions, we therefore include indicator variables capturing 
different monetary and exchange rate regimes within the country sample. The aim of including 
these regime variables is to analyse to what extent different monetary regimes played a role in 
the crisis and whether any particular regime reduced or added to the impact of the crisis, after 
controlling for the initial conditions discussed above.26 As discussed in the previous section, 
the country sample includes 16 countries that have a common monetary policy and currency 
through EMU membership. In addition, there are 8 countries following some type of a unilateral 
exchange rate peg, either through a currency board or other softer forms of a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Finally, there are 22 countries with a floating exchange rate, of which 19 follow an 
explicit IT framework and the others broadly following a framework similar to IT. 
 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Before turning to the formal analysis of the key determinants of the economic impact from the 
global crisis, it can be useful to look for patterns in the data that may suggest what to expect 
from a more formal analysis. Table 2 therefore reports average values for all the variables 
analysed in the paper for the whole country sample and for various interesting country groups. 
 
 
                                                
26 For example, Berkmen et al. (2009) find evidence that countries with exchange rate pegs experienced a more 
severe contraction than countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes. Against this, the results in Coulibaly 




Table 2. Average values for different country groups 
         
 ALL IND EME CEA VSOE EMU IT PEG 
         
Depth of output contraction 0.055 0.040 0.076 0.098 0.119 0.051 0.036 0.114 
Depth of consump. contract. 0.044 0.011 0.090 0.125 0.138 0.016 0.025 0.162 
Dur. of output contraction 3.739 3.741 3.737 3.583 4.857 3.938 3.368 4.250 
Dur. of consump. contract. 3.109 2.741 3.632 4.000 3.857 3.000 2.684 4.625 
Frequency of banking crisis 0.283 0.407 0.105 0.167 0.429 0.375 0.158 0.375 
Frequency of currency crisis 0.043 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.105 0.000 
         
GDP level 991 1,394 418 347 30 681 638 386 
GDP per capita 30.0 38.7 17.7 19.2 34.0 35.5 27.1 23.1 
         
Financial deepening 0.933 1.143 0.633 0.484 1.509 1.217 0.655 0.879 
Size of banking system 2.247 2.949 1.249 0.635 4.338 3.180 2.041 1.391 
Stock market capitalisation 1.164 1.401 0.828 0.478 1.481 1.108 1.143 1.252 
  
Trade openness 0.863 0.764 1.004 1.027 1.112 0.948 0.691 1.190 
Output correlation 0.447 0.524 0.337 0.346 0.465 0.584 0.383 0.329 
Manufacturing exports share 0.666 0.685 0.639 0.682 0.653 0.770 0.577 0.592 
Trade diversification 0.478 0.458 0.508 0.480 0.570 0.442 0.511 0.511 
Trade concentration 0.166 0.156 0.181 0.153 0.229 0.143 0.188 0.171 
  
Financial openness 10.545 15.117 4.047 2.116 42.907 22.834 3.680 5.229 
Capital inflows 0.059 0.040 0.087 0.081 0.038 0.043 0.054 0.122 
Access to US$ liquidity 0.609 0.852 0.263 0.167 0.571 1.000 0.474 0.125 
  
Output volatility 0.020 0.015 0.026 0.028 0.023 0.015 0.021 0.028 
Exchange rate variability 0.031 0.021 0.044 0.043 0.019 0.014 0.039 0.045 
Exchange rate noise 0.137 0.097 0.209 0.211 0.177 0.101 0.155 0.203 
         
Inflation rate 0.034 0.022 0.050 0.056 0.044 0.024 0.034 0.058 
Current account balance -0.030 0.006 -0.082 -0.101 -0.124 -0.030 -0.015 -0.085 
Size of foreign reserves 0.173 0.110 0.263 0.213 0.311 0.131 0.135 0.300 
Financial leverage 1.494 1.607 1.332 1.399 1.842 1.464 1.512 1.662 
Fiscal balance 0.010 0.018 0.000 -0.007 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.021 
Government debt 0.461 0.555 0.327 0.269 0.272 0.578 0.415 0.166 
         
Government effectiveness 1.176 1.601 0.571 0.491 1.260 1.284 1.215 0.797 
Regulatory quality 1.167 1.448 0.767 0.781 1.345 1.324 1.104 1.010 
Legal structure 7.299 7.930 6.403 6.244 7.493 7.494 7.285 6.912 
Central bank independence 0.831 0.822 0.843 0.858 0.807 0.845 0.806 0.835 
Credit market regulation 8.879 8.895 8.855 8.892 9.300 8.766 8.884 9.228 
Labour market regulation 5.976 6.085 5.821 5.921 5.994 5.403 6.213 6.212 
Business regulation 6.853 7.460 5.991 5.964 6.752 6.824 6.989 6.526 
Economic freedom index 7.402 7.648 7.052 6.974 7.400 7.383 7.403 7.321 
Past banking crisis 0.522 0.296 0.842 1.000 0.429 0.250 0.632 0.750 
Past currency crisis 0.435 0.333 0.579 0.500 0.429 0.313 0.526 0.625 
The values for the current and past banking and currency crisis and access to US$ liquidity report the average 
number of countries in each group which experienced a banking and currency crisis. All variables are 
measured in percentages, except the duration of the output and consumption contractions (in quarters), the 
GDP level and per capita (in billions and thousand of US dollars respectively), trade diversification, trade 
concentration and central bank independence (indices between 0 and 1), government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality (indices between -2.5 and 2.5) and credit market regulation, labour market regulations, 
business regulation and the economic freedom index (indices between 0 and 10). ‘All’ denotes the whole 
country sample, ‘IND’ denotes the 27 industrial countries, ‘EME’ denotes the 19 emerging market 
economies, ‘CEA’ denotes the 12 central and eastern European countries, ‘VSOE’ denotes the 7 very small 
open economies, ‘EMU’ denotes the 16 EMU countries, ‘IT’ denotes the 19 inflation targeting countries, and 
‘PEG’ denotes the 8 countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs. Bolded (underlined) numbers denote 
significant difference between individual group averages and the whole sample average, allowing for 




 First, looking at the whole country sample, Table 2 shows that the average output loss 
in the crisis was 5.5%, whereas the average consumption loss was slightly smaller or 4.4%.27 
This indicates that output contraction in the global crisis during our sample period was less than 
the 6.3% average for a severe recession in the period 1960-2007 in the 21 OECD country sample 
analysed in Claessens et al. (2009). The consumption contraction is, on the other hand, much 
larger in the current crisis than the 1.2% average they report. This large consumption 
contraction is therefore a key characteristic of the recent global crisis and underlines the 
importance of looking beyond measures of output losses. The average duration of the 
contraction period for the whole country sample ranges from roughly 3 quarters for 
consumption to closer to 4 quarters for output. The average frequency of a systemic banking 
crisis was 28%, while a currency crisis only occurred in 4% of the sample.28  
Looking at different country groups, it appears that despite greater incidence of banking 
system crises, the contraction in economic activity was smaller in the industrial countries than 
in the less developed countries. This might at first glance seem at conflict with the previous 
claim that this crisis, unlike most previous financial crises, has hit more developed countries 
harder than less developed countries. This, however, simply reflects the choice of including 
only medium-to-high income countries in the analysis. The table also shows that very small 
open economies and countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs were hit particularly hard. 
Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that countries whose real economy suffered the most 
had significant macroeconomic imbalances prior to the crisis, were highly leveraged, and had 
less flexible exchange rates, whereas countries which had the greatest banking and currency 
crises incidences tend to be those who had large and integrated financial systems and large 
macroeconomic imbalances prior to the crisis. The next section takes a more formal view on 
these possible links. 
 
3. Empirical results  
In this section, we move on to a more formal analysis of the relevance of different initial 
conditions in explaining the depth and duration of the output and consumption contraction, 
using cross-country regressions, and the probability of a systemic banking and currency crisis, 
using cross-country probit regressions. The two following sections report the main results, 
while Section 3.3 reports some sensitivity analysis. The economic interpretation of the main 
results is relegated to Section 3.4.  
Note that the explanatory variables predate the crisis and the analysis is therefore an 
attempt to identify what factors were important in predicting the depth and duration of the 
contraction and whether countries experienced banking or currency crisis or both. Furthermore, 
                                                
27 The variation in consumption loss across the country sample is however much larger than the variation in output 
loss: the standard deviation of consumption loss equals 8.7% while the standard deviation of output loss equals 
5.8%. 
28 The real economy crisis indicators are positively correlated, but not overwhelmingly so. The correlations range 
from 0.39 between the duration of output and consumption loss to 0.78 between the depth of output and 
consumption loss. The correlations between the banking and currency crises incidences and the correlations of 




with the large number of potential explanatory variables included in this study and limited 
guidance from theory on exactly what factors to include, we necessarily had to undertake some 
experimentation before arriving at the preferred baseline specifications presented. Thus, all the 
potential variables were tested but only those found to be statistically significant at conventional 
levels are retained. 
 
3.1. The real economy effects of the crisis 
Tables 3-6 present the main results, i.e. the preferred baseline specifications and the marginal 
contributions of additional dummy variables for different monetary and exchange rate regimes.  
 
Table 3. Regression results for the depth of the output contraction 
       
 Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















      















      















      















      















      















      
EMU dummy  0.005 
(0.661) 
[0.617] 
   








Floating exchange rate dummy     -0.014 
(0.200) 
[0.148] 
      
R2 0.726 0.728 0.766 0.738 0.738 
Standard error 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.032 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-
values based on robust (White) standard errors. 
 
As the tables show, we are able to explain up to three-quarters of the cross-country variation in 




obtain the important result that initial conditions have mattered in this crisis, unlike the 
conclusions drawn by Claessens et al. (2010) and Rose and Spiegel (2009a, b).29 
 
Table 4. Regression results for the depth of the consumption contraction 
       
 Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















      















      















      















      















      
EMU dummy  -0.014 
(0.415) 
[0.190] 
   








Floating exchange rate dummy     -0.027 
(0.081) 
[0.099] 
      
R2 0.704 0.708 0.735 0.794 0.726 
Standard error 0.050 0.050 0.048 0.042 0.049 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-
values based on robust (White) standard errors. 
 
The depth of the contraction 
The macro channel seems to have played a particularly important role in determining the depth 
of the real economy contraction during the current crisis, both through macroeconomic 
volatility and macroeconomic imbalances in the run up to the crisis. This is especially true for 
inflation which seems to capture factors that were crucial in determining how large the 
contraction in output and consumption turned out to be. The baseline results (Specification 1 in 
Tables 3 and 4) suggest that a 1 percentage point higher inflation prior to the crisis coincided 
with 1.6 percentage point deeper contraction in output and a 2.4 percentage point deeper 
                                                
29 As the tables show, we are only able to explain one-third to half of the cross-country variation in crisis duration. 
That we are able to explain less of the country variation in crisis duration than crisis depth probably reflects the 
fact that the variation in duration across countries is smaller than the variation in depth. Again, this may reflect the 
fact that the crisis is still being played out in some countries and greater variation in the duration of the crisis can 




contraction in consumption, respectively. The baseline results also suggest that output volatility 
had a sizeable effect, with a 1 percentage point higher standard deviation in the output gap 
coinciding with a 3 percentage point larger output contraction. There are also effects from 
private sector leverage, with a 10 percentage point higher leverage relative to GDP coinciding 
with a 0.2 percentage point deeper contraction in output. However, a more flexible exchange 
rate seems to have contributed to a smaller output contraction: a 1 percentage point higher 
standard deviation of the effective nominal exchange rate coincided with a 0.9 percentage point 
smaller contraction in output. The macro channel also had an effect on the consumption 
contraction through the current account balance, with the baseline results in Table 4 implying 
that a 10 percentage point better current account position leading to the crisis coincided with a 
2.5 percentage point smaller consumption contraction. 
 There is also a role for the trade and financial channels in determining the extent of the 
output and consumption contractions. Thus, closer ties to the world economy, through a 0.1 
higher correlation of the domestic and world business cycle, coincided with a 0.7 percentage 
point deeper output contraction, while countries with bigger banking systems tended to have a 
larger consumption contraction: a country with a banking system that was 1 GDP larger than 
the average country tended to have a 1.3 percentage point larger contraction in consumption. In 
addition, we find that countries which experienced a systemic banking crisis in the past tended 
to have a 3.3 percentage point larger consumption contraction compared to countries which 
have not experienced such a crisis in the past 30 years. 
Finally, our results suggest that countries with some kind of unilateral exchange rate 
pegs were hit particularly hard by the crisis, while we find no significant additional effects for 
the EMU countries. Countries with floating exchange rates came out better, in particular if they 
also had a formal inflation target. Thus, countries outside EMU with an exchange rate peg 
experienced an almost 8 percentage point larger contraction in consumption compared to other 
countries, while countries with an inflation target tended to have a 2.5 percentage point smaller 
contraction in output and 3.2 percentage point smaller contraction in consumption.  
 
The duration of the contraction 
We also find that the macro channel played a key role in determining the length of the crisis 
(Specification 1 in Tables 5 and 6). Again, we find that higher inflation in the run up to the 
crisis is reflected in a more protracted economic impact, with a 1 percentage point higher 
inflation coinciding with a roughly 0.3 quarters longer contraction in output and 0.5 quarters 
contraction in consumption, respectively. Higher government debt prior to the crisis also seems 
to have coincided with a longer output contraction: a 10 percentage point higher debt ratio 
coincided with a 0.1 quarter longer output contraction. Just as with the depth of the crisis, we 
find that greater exchange rate variability tended to coincide with a more rapid recovery: a 1 
percentage point higher standard deviation in the nominal exchange rate coincided with a 0.3 







Table 5. Regression results for the duration of output contraction 
       
 Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















      















      















      















      















      















      















      















      
EMU dummy  -0.457 
(0.205) 
[0.156] 
   








Floating exchange rate dummy     0.040 
(0.905) 
[0.898] 
      
R2 0.494 0.515 0.495 0.521 0.494 
Standard error 0.930 0.922 0.941 0.916 0.942 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-
values based on robust (White) standard errors. 
 
 We also find some role for the financial channel in determining the length of the output 
contraction. Thus, the more financially open countries tended to experience a somewhat longer 
contraction, although the effects are quite small. For example, increasing our measure of 
financial openness by 1 GDP lengthens the output contraction by 0.03 quarters. There are also 
negative effects from the extent of capital inflows: increasing the ratio of capital inflows to 
GDP by 10 percentage points, coincides with a 0.7 quarters longer output contraction. However, 
we find that countries more open to trade experienced a shorter output contraction: increasing 
the share of trade to GDP by 10 percentage points reduces the duration of the output contraction 




in the past tended to have a 0.7 quarters longer output contraction than countries which had not 
experienced such a crisis in the past 30 years. 
Finally, we find no additional effects from the monetary and exchange rate regime 
dummies, except that countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs experienced a 1 quarter 
longer consumption contraction than countries with floating exchange rates or peg within EMU. 
 
Table 6. Regression results for the duration of consumption contraction 
       
 Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















      















      















      
EMU dummy  0.012 
(0.977) 
[0.977] 
   








Floating exchange rate dummy     -0.547 
(0.168) 
[0.120] 
      
R2 0.358 0.358 0.386 0.411 0.386 
Standard error 1.237 1.252 1.224 1.198 1.223 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-
values based on robust (White) standard errors. 
 
 
3.2. The probability of a banking and currency crisis 
To estimate the probability of a systemic banking or a currency crisis, we estimate a multivariate 
ordered probit model. Tables 7-9 report the results for a banking, currency and twin crisis, 
respectively.30 Since probit coefficients are difficult to interpret, we also report the marginal 
effects measured as a one-unit change in the regressors on the probability of a crisis, evaluated 
                                                
30 For the banking and currency crisis specifications, the indicator variable takes on the value 1 if a banking 
(currency) crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. For the twin crisis specification the indicator variable takes on the value 
0 if neither a banking nor currency crisis occurs, one if either a banking or currency crisis occurs and 2 if a twin 
crisis occurs. We also tried separating the banking and currency crisis incidence in the crisis indicator (thus 
allowing four mutually exclusive outcomes: no crisis, a banking crisis, a currency crisis and a twin crisis). The 





at the mean of the data.31 However, for binary regressors, we report the effect of a change from 
0 to 1 on the probability of a crisis. For the twin crisis specification, we only report the marginal 
effects on the probability of a banking or currency crisis, as the marginal effects on the 
probability of a twin crisis were extremely small, with twin crises found to be highly unlikely 
in this data set. The marginal effects on the probability of no crisis were therefore practically 
identical (but with opposite signs) to the marginal effects of either a banking or currency crisis. 
The tables also report some diagnostic statistics, including the success of correctly predicting a 
crisis (using a cut-off point of 50%) and a measure of improvement over a simple constant-
probability model (a probit model which only includes a constant). 
Before proceeding to individual results, it is important to note that the estimation results 
for the currency crisis incidences need to be interpreted with some caution as the frequency of 
such crises is very low in the country sample (two currency crises and one twin crisis). These 
results should therefore be thought more of as indicative. This is much less of a problem for the 
estimation of a banking crisis, where there are 13 crisis observations (28% of the sample). 
 
Determinants of a banking crisis 
The variables that significantly predict a systemic banking crisis are reported in Table 7. First, 
higher GDP per capita is found to have coincided with a higher probability of a banking crisis. 
This finding simply reflects the fact that a higher frequency of banking failures in the current 
financial crisis is found among higher income countries and therefore has no obvious structural 
implication. More interestingly, a larger banking system prior to the crisis is found to have 
coincided with higher probability of banking crisis. The marginal effect in the baseline 
specification (Specification 1) suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of 
banking system assets to GDP increased the probability of a banking crisis by 1 percentage 
point. Higher pre-crisis inflation is also associated with a higher probability of a banking crisis. 
The baseline specification suggests that a 1 percentage point higher inflation in the run up to 
the crisis raised the probability of a banking crisis by 12 percentage points. Finally, a higher 
level of foreign reserves relative to GDP is found to decrease the probability of a banking crisis, 
with the marginal effects suggesting that a 10 percentage point higher ratio of reserves to GDP 
reduced the probability of a banking crisis by almost 5 percentage points. 
 The table also reports the effects of adding dummy variables for different monetary 
regimes. The dummy variables for EMU membership and countries with unilateral exchange 
rate pegs are not found to be significant, but the dummy variables for IT countries and floating 
exchange rate countries are found significant at the 5% critical level. The results suggest that 
the probability of a banking crisis was 8 percentage points lower for the IT countries than for 
non-IT countries, other things equal, while the probability was almost 6 percentage points lower 
for the floating exchange rate countries in general. Note also that the original regressors remain 
highly significant although that the marginal effects decline somewhat when the regime 
dummies are added. 
                                                
31 Thus, for single-digit percentages the unit change measures a rise of 1 percentage point, while for double-digit 
or higher percentages the unit change measures a rise of 10 percentage points. For GDP per capita the unit change 





Table 7. Probit estimates of the likelihood of a banking crisis 
       
 Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











      















      















      















      















      
EMU dummy  0.586 
[8.18] 
(0.414) 
   








Floating exchange rate dummy    -1.538 
[-5.78] 
(0.047) 
      
Log-likelihood -11.706 -11.437 -8.592 -10.491 -10.031 
Pseudo R2 0.573 0.582 0.686 0.617 0.634 
Cases correct 37 39 41 41 39 
Percent gain 0.308 0.462 0.615 0.615 0.462 
Numbers in brackets are marginal effects of a one-unit change in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of a banking crisis (× 100 to convert into percentages), evaluated at the mean of the data, 
except when reporting the marginal effects for the dummy variables, in which case the numbers are the 
effects of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a banking crisis. Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values based on robust (Hubert-White) standard errors. Cases correct show the number of cases predicted 
correctly by each model, using a cut-off point of 50%, while the percent gain shows the percent of 
incorrect cases predicted by a simple constant-probability specification corrected by each model. 
 
Determinants of a currency crisis 
Table 8 reports the variables that significantly predict a currency crisis. It should, however, be 
noted from the outset that with only two observations of currency crisis, these results by and 
large pick up the difference between Iceland and Korea, on one hand, and the whole country 
sample, on the other. Sweeping conclusions cannot therefore be drawn. That said, we again find 
that GDP per capita needs to be included as a control variable. A larger banking system is also 
found to have coincided with a higher probability of a currency crisis. There are also positive 
effects on the probability of a currency crisis from greater exchange rate flexibility and higher 
fiscal deficits prior to the crisis. However, better institutions, as reflected in greater central bank 
independence and fewer incidences of past banking crises are found to have coincided with a 




extremely low, the marginal effects of changes in the explanatory variables are found to be very 
small, as shown in Table 8. Furthermore, note that we are not able to add the regime dummies 
as the maximum likelihood procedure breaks down with the probit model perfectly predicting 
the binary variable. 
 
 
Table 8. Probit estimates of the likelihood of a currency crisis 







    
Constant -20.558 - 0.004 
    
log of GDP per capita 5.471 2.10E-7 0.002 
    
Size of banking system 1.040 1.10E-7 0.005 
    
Exchange rate variability 62.843 6.63E-7 0.003 
    
Fiscal balances -40.440 -4.27E-7 0.005 
    
Central bank independence -13.353 -1.41E-7 0.016 
    
Past banking crisis 7.402 0.89 0.003 
   
Log-likelihood -3.075  
Pseudo R2 0.626  
Cases correct 45  
Percent gain 0.500  
The table reports the marginal effects of a one-unit change in the explanatory 
variables on the probability of a currency crisis (× 100 to convert into 
percentages), evaluated at the mean of the data, except when reporting the 
marginal effects for ‘Past banking crisis’, in which case the number is the effect 
of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a currency crisis. The p-values are 
based on robust (Hubert-White) standard errors. Cases correct show the number 
of cases predicted correctly by the model, using a cut-off point of 50%, while the 
percent gain shows the percent of incorrect cases predicted by a simple constant-
probability specification corrected by the model. 
 
 
Determinants of a twin crisis 
Finally, Table 9 reports the significant variables predicting a twin crisis. As for the previous 
two crisis variables, GDP per capita is needed as a control variable. The size of the banking 
system and the level of inflation are also found to have positively coincided with a twin crisis, 
with similar marginal effects as found for the baseline specification on the probability of a 
banking crisis in Table 7. Greater exchange rate variability and higher fiscal deficits are also 
found to have coincided with higher probability of a currency crisis, similar to the findings in 
Table 8, with a 1 percentage point increase in these variables raising the probability of a banking 
or currency crisis by 6 and 3 percentage points, respectively. However, a 10 percentage point 
increase in financial deepening is found to have reduced the probability of a banking or currency 








Table 9. Probit estimates of the likelihood of a banking, currency or twin crisis 
       
 Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      















      















      















      















      















      















      










      










      
EMU dummy  -0.097 
[-2.11] 
(0.883) 
   








Floating exchange rate dummy    -0.448 
[-8.81] 
(0.527) 
      
Log-likelihood -14.185 -14.176 -13.831 -13.294 -13.907 
Pseudo R2 0.555 0.555 0.566 0.583 0.564 
Cases correct 39 39 40 41 40 
Percent gain 0.500 0.500 0.571 0.643 0.571 
Numbers in brackets are marginal effects of a one-unit change in the explanatory variables on the probability 
of a banking or a currency crisis (× 100 to convert into percentages), evaluated at the mean of the data, 
except when reporting the marginal effects for the dummy variables, in which case the numbers are the 
effects of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a banking or a crisis. The marginal effects on the 
probability of a twin crisis are extremely small and therefore not reported. The marginal effects on the 
probability of no crisis are therefore practically the same as the marginal effects on the probability of either 
banking or currency crisis, but with reversed signs. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on robust 
(Hubert-White) standard errors. Cases correct show the number of cases predicted correctly by each model, 
using a cut-off point of 50%, while the percent gain shows the percent of incorrect cases predicted by a 








Estimated banking and currency crisis probabilities 
The probit models are quite successful in predicting the banking and currency crises correctly. 
The three baseline specifications (Specifications 1) predict the incidences correctly in 80-98% 
of the cases (using a cut-off point of 50%), sometimes with some improvements when the 
regime dummies are added. The baseline specifications also show a significant improvement 
over a simple constant-probability alternative, with the percentage gain ranging from 30-50%. 
The models are also generally able to make a sharp distinction between crisis and non-crisis 
countries: the crisis probabilities tend to lie above 90% or below 10% in 59-91% of the cases 
and above 80% and below 20% in 76-96% of the cases. 
The banking crisis regression in Table 7 correctly predicts a banking crisis in Belgium, 
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland with close to 100% 
probability and in the UK with a slightly lower probability, or 70%. The model predicts a 
banking crisis in Austria and the US with just short of 50% probability, and assigns an even 
lower probability to a banking crisis in Denmark (34%), Russia, (23%) and Germany (18%). 
There are also a few cases of false warnings: the model predicts a banking crisis in Sweden 
with a 70% probability and a banking crisis in Estonia, Hungary and Norway with a probability 
just above 50%.32 A somewhat smaller probability is assigned to a crisis in Spain, or 31%.33 
However, as Figure 3(a) shows, only four of the incorrect predictions are larger than two 
standard errors. 
The currency crisis regression in Table 8 predicts a currency crisis in Iceland with a 93% 
probability, but fails to predict the currency crisis in Korea (only 15% probability). It also 
incorrectly assigns quite a high probability of a currency crisis in Israel (43%) and Bulgaria 
(23%) – but only the prediction errors for Korea and Israel are found to be significant at the 
95% critical level (Figure 3(b)). 
Finally, the probit specification for the twin crisis in Table 9 is better able to predict the 
banking crisis in Austria, Russia, the UK and the US than the banking crisis specification in 
Table 7 but seems less certain about the crisis in Latvia (Figure 4). For other countries, the crisis 
predictions are very similar to those from the banking crisis specification. Of the false banking 
crisis predictions, the high probabilities of a banking crisis in Hungary and Sweden remain, but 
the probabilities for Estonia, Norway and Spain decline substantially. Against this, the model 
incorrectly predicts a crisis in Bulgaria with a 54% probability. Furthermore, the false currency 
crisis in Israel has disappeared. Finally, the model predicts the twin crisis in Iceland correctly, 
with a 79% probability. 
 
 
                                                
32 Allen and Moessner (2010) doubt that Sweden and Denmark could have provided effective support to their 
banks in the absence of swap lines from the Fed after the Lehman Brother’s failure and from the ECB a little later 
as the necessary provision of foreign currency liquidity would have used up most of their reserves. Swedish banks 
in Estonia received support from their mother companies and the Swedish Riksbank set up swap lines with their 
Estonian counterpart. Hungary did turn to the IMF and the European Union for considerable support and the 
European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank set up swap facilities with the Hungarian central bank to provide 
commercial banks within the country with access to euro and Swiss franc liquidity. 
33 Problems among Spanish saving banks became clear in May 2010, outside of our sample period, when the Bank 




Table 10. Robustness analysis: adding different country group dummies 




















































































       












       












       












       












       












       



















































       












       

























The table reports estimated parameters for country group dummy variables in each equation from 
Specification 1 in Tables 3-9, except for the probit model for currency crisis, where identification problems 
made it impossible to add country group dummies to the model specification. The country groups are 
explained in Table 2. ‘High income countries’ represents the upper GDP per capita quartile of the country 
sample, ‘Mid-income countries’ represents the two mid GDP per capita quartiles of the country sample, 
while ‘Low income countries’ represents the low GDP per capita quartile of the country sample. Different 









3.3. Robustness tests 
As a first robustness test, we try retaining the GDP level and GDP per capita as controls in all 
the baseline regressions in Tables 3-9, capturing the greater crisis impact in higher income 
countries and smaller countries, as discussed before. In all cases are these variables non-
significant (except in the banking and currency crisis equations, were the significant GDP per 
capita variable is already included) and in no case does the inference on other explanatory 
variables change. With a relatively large number of small countries in our sample, it could also 
be the case that the small countries are given unduly large weights in the empirical findings, 
thus somewhat blurring how the global crisis spread from its epicentre in the US to other large 
countries. To test for the sensitivity of our results to a possible small-country bias we therefore 
re-estimate all the regressions using weighted least squares, with the log of GDP as a scaling 
variable. However, we find that our results are insensitive to this and in no case is the inference 
altered. 
We also try adding different country group dummy variables to the baseline regressions, 
reported in Table 10. First, we add country dummy variables for OECD countries, EU countries, 
emerging market countries, the central and eastern European countries, and the very small open 
economies. As Table 10 shows, these dummy variables are found insignificant in almost all 
cases. Furthermore, the addition of these variables is not found to alter the statistical properties 
of the other explanatory variables.34 
Next, we split the country group into income and size quartiles using GDP per capita 
and GDP levels, respectively, and add dummy variables defining different income and size 
groups to the baseline regressions. Table 10 reports the estimated coefficients on the dummy 
variables. The income and size dummies are found to be insignificant in almost all cases, and 
in all but two cases is the significance of the explanatory variables unaltered: the current account 
balance becomes insignificant in the consumption-loss equation when a country dummy for 
small countries is added and foreign reserves become insignificant in the banking-crisis 
equation when a country dummy for low income countries is added. 
The final part of Table 10 adds continental dummies to the baseline regressions. The 
African dummy variable is found to be highly significant in all the regressions, but as South 
Africa is the only African country in the sample, this dummy variable simply serves as a dummy 
variable for that country. The other continental dummies are found to be insignificant in most 
other cases, and in all cases are the results from the baseline regressions unaffected. 
As a final robustness test, we re-estimate all the baseline regressions dropping one 
observation at a time and check whether the explanatory variables continue to be significant. 
We find that they do in almost all cases. There are, however, four exceptions: dropping Hong 
Kong from the sample makes foreign reserves insignificant in the bank-crisis equation, 
dropping Luxembourg from the sample makes financial openness insignificant in the output-
                                                
34 Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), we also try adding a country group for small countries with large 
financial centres (defined as countries with financial openness ratio exceeding 800%), which have been hit 
particularly hard by this crisis. These 10 countries are Belgium, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. In no case is this dummy variable found 




duration equation and financial deepening insignificant in the twin-crisis equation, and 
dropping Norway from the sample makes fiscal balances insignificant in the twin-crisis 
equation. We also do a similar sensitivity analysis for the regime dummies. The inference on 
the IT and exchange rate peg dummies is found to be robust to variations in the country sample, 
whereas the dummy variable for floating exchange rate countries become marginally 
insignificant in the consumption-loss equation in some cases, and three other cases give a p-
value close to 0.2 (Russia, South Africa and Turkey). However, leaving out Iceland in the 
consumption-loss equation results in a highly significant dummy variable for floating exchange 
rate countries. 
 
3.4. Interpreting the results 
In this section we offer an interpretation of what we think are the key results of our paper. 
Before proceeding it should, however, be emphasised that this paper is not a general analysis 
of financial, banking or currency crises, but focuses only on the current crisis and its 
consequences. Therefore, some of the results found in this paper may be specific to this crisis 
and need not generalise to others. However, there are some interesting results worth 
highlighting that may be relevant to understanding not only this crisis but financial crises in 
general, and have some important policy implications.  
One of the most striking results we obtain is how strong the effects of inflation just prior 
to the crisis seems to be, with the inflationary-effect generally the most significant effect of all 
the initial conditions. Thus, countries with higher inflation tended to experience a deeper and 
more protracted contraction, and were more vulnerable to the risk of a systemic banking and 
currency crises. We believe that this inflationary-effect captures the degree of macroeconomic 
imbalances in the run up to the crisis and policy constraints that countries faced in their response 
to the crisis. The scope for monetary policy easing and its transmission to the real economy is 
affected by current inflationary pressures and to what degree inflation expectations are 
sufficiently anchored. Countries with higher inflation in the run up to the crisis were therefore 
likely to be in a less favourable position to use monetary stimulus measures to counteract the 
economic impact of the global crisis than countries were inflation was already well anchored.35 
Looking at other measures of economic imbalances and vulnerabilities, the general story 
emerges that the greater the macroeconomic imbalances in the run up to the crisis, the more 
painful it turned out to be. Higher private sector leverage, larger current account deficits,36 more 
                                                
35 This finding on the importance of inflation may to a certain extent be interpreted as being at odds with the recent 
recommendation of the IMF’s chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, and his co-authors (2010) who suggest that 
higher inflation targets, and therefore higher average inflation, makes crisis responses easier by increasing the 
room for lowering interest rates to counteract the crisis. Our results suggest that higher inflation in the run up to 
this crisis made it worse, not better, and these results seem robust to different crisis measures and various 
robustness checks. In particular, it is worth emphasising that they are not driven by few observations of extremely 
high inflation (the highest observed inflation in our sample is 10% and the average inflation rate across the country 
sample is 3.4%). 
36 Interestingly, we find that higher current account deficits tend to exacerbate the consumption contraction but 
have no effects on the output contraction. This seems logical as higher current account deficits call for an 
adjustment in domestic demand, with a net export adjustment (especially through import compression) reducing 




output volatility, or lower foreign reserves all seemed to contribute in one way or another to a 
deeper contraction and increased risk of a systemic banking crisis. It is interesting to note that 
the level of foreign reserves did not have any significant effect on the probability of a currency 
crisis. Instead we find that lower reserves increased the risk of a banking crisis, which may 
reflect the interaction between very large banking systems and limited ability of the domestic 
monetary authority to provide foreign currency liquidity services, often pointed out as a major 
vulnerability during the current crisis. We note, however that the effect of reserves is not robust 
to the exclusion of Hong Kong from the country sample and that the interaction between access 
to central bank swap lines and actual reserve holdings can be difficult to control for. 
We also find that the fiscal position played a role in this crisis. Thus, we find that greater 
government debt in the run up to the crisis coincided with a longer output contraction. This 
seems logical: the worse the debt position of the government, the less the fiscal space for 
supporting the recovery after the crisis hit. We also find that larger fiscal deficits prior to the 
crisis tended to increase the risk of a banking or currency crisis. Again, this seems logical: larger 
deficits tend to go hand in hand with higher risk premia which would presumably rise sharply 
once the crisis hit and exacerbate uncertainty that could eventually lead to panic and a full 
blown currency crisis. The significance of this effect depends, however, on the inclusion of 
Norway in the country sample. 
Furthermore, we also find that the size of the banking system played an important role. 
First, we find that the larger the banking system, the larger the consumption contraction tended 
to be. This is consistent with the interpretation that once the crisis hit, governments needing to 
support large banking systems had less fiscal space to support domestic demand. It can also 
reflect increased households’ dependence on credit for consumption financing in countries with 
larger banking systems. We also find that larger banking systems increased the probability of a 
banking and currency crises. However, our results suggest that a more developed financial 
system reduced the risk of a banking or currency crisis. This last finding, however, is not robust 
to excluding Luxembourg from the country sample. 
We find mixed results on whether stronger ties to the global economy through trade and 
finance exacerbated the crisis or not. Thus, stronger trade and financial linkages coincided with 
a larger and longer output contraction, as the global financial panic and the sudden reversal of 
capital inflows and sharp contraction in global demand that followed hit those countries 
especially hard, which relied more heavily on these capital flows or were more open to trade. 
The significant effect of financial openness on the persistence of the output contraction is, 
however, very much driven by the extremely large external balance sheet of Luxembourg and 
excluding Luxembourg from the sample leaves this effect insignificant. Thus, any interpretation 
of a causal link between financial openness and exposure to the global crisis will need to take 
account of the sensitivity to this large outlier. The significance of capital inflows however 
remains when Luxembourg is excluded from the sample. At the same time, we find that 
countries more open to trade recovered faster from the crisis. This probably reflects the fact that 
these countries benefitted more by the relatively rapid reversal in global demand (especially in 




We also find some mixed results on the role of exchange rate flexibility. While our 
results suggest that greater exchange rate flexibility reduced both the depth and the duration of 
the contraction, it increased the risk of a banking or currency crisis. Thus, exchange rate 
flexibility facilitated the economic adjustment to the crisis through greater relative price 
flexibility, but at the same time made countries more vulnerable to a banking or currency crisis. 
Flexibility was thus a double-edged sword in this sense. This is further corroborated by the 
effects of different unilateral exchange rate regime dummies: we find that countries with 
unilateral exchange rate pegs had a particularly large and protracted consumption contraction. 
This, however, only applies to countries with exchange rate pegs outside a monetary union: we 
find no evidence that EMU membership led to additional negative effects of the crisis 
comparable to the effects we find for the unilateral peg countries.37 At the same time we find 
that countries with a formal inflation target (and sometimes floating exchange rates in general) 
tended to have a smaller contraction and were less likely to have a systemic banking crisis.38  
We also find that countries that have experienced a banking or currency crisis in the past 
tended to have a deeper and longer consumption contraction and were more likely to suffer a 
currency crisis. No evidence is found that suggests that past crises experience reduced the 
probability of a banking system crisis in the current crisis. Thus, learning from past crises does 
not seem to have benefitted in the current crisis or, at least, seems to have been outweighed by 
the possible negative effects of past crises experience on credibility of current institutions to 
deal with the crisis. The importance of sound institutions is also suggested by our finding that 
greater central bank independence reduced the probability of a currency crisis. Other 
institutional factors are not found significant, however.  
Our results indicate a non-significant role for some variables which have been widely 
discussed as having played an important role in determining the economic impact of the crisis. 
Especially, it is noteworthy that we find no role for access to the Fed’s dollar liquidity facility 
for the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. The establishment of central bank swap lines 
has been widely praised for having effectively relieved US dollar liquidity stresses in money 
and FX swap markets and hindering global financial instability from becoming much more 
serious (see e.g. Allen and Moessner, 2010). Our results should however not be interpreted as 
rejecting the importance of these international facilities as we cannot measure what the outcome 
would have been in their absence. We could also be overlooking the role played by the access 
to central bank swap lines in limiting the scale of a systemic banking crisis as our measurement 
of banking crises does not make any distinction between a banking crisis and a total banking 
system collapse. Neither do we find a role for our three measures of trade structure (the share 
of manufacturing exports, trade diversification and trade concentration), which might emerge 
if the country sample would be expanded to include more developing countries.  
                                                
37 Furthermore, we do not analyse possible effects from EMU membership on the probability of sovereign debt 
crisis. Effects from the turmoil in 2010 surrounding the sustainability of sovereign debt of countries within the 
euro area lie outside of our sample period.  





While our finding that exchange rate flexibility seems to facilitate the real adjustment 
to the crisis while at the same time increasing the risk of currency crisis is plausible, a comment 
with respect to the apparent lack of separate effect of EMU membership is also in order. For 
example, it is important to keep in mind that the pre-crisis initial conditions are unlikely to be 
exogenous to the exchange rate regime in a given country. In addition, within a monetary union 
it is probable that a larger share of external debt and the current account deficit would be in 
domestic currency and thus less likely to be a source of vulnerability. Furthermore, it seems 
obvious that EMU membership protected countries against a currency crisis and may thus have 
helped mitigating the real impact of the crisis through that channel (cf. Cecchetti et al., 2009, 
who find that output losses tend to be much higher in currency crises episodes). Finally, as 
previously mentioned our measure of banking crises does not discriminate between the size of 
different banking crises in our sample. It could for example be argued that the large banking 
collapse in Iceland could have been contained to some extent had Iceland been a member of 
EMU, with stronger institutional support, for example through the greater ability of the ECB to 
provide liquidity support. 
Finally, in terms of specific crisis episodes, we are able to predict quite accurately the 
extent of the crisis in some of the countries hit particularly hard (both in terms of the real 
economy impact and the banking and currency crisis incidences), such as Iceland, Ireland, and 
the three Baltic countries (see Figures 1-4). As can be seen in Figure 5, our statistical models 
suggest that the main reasons for the large and persistent contraction in output and consumption 
in the Baltic countries are the higher-than-average rate of inflation and, to a lesser extent, greater 
underlying economic volatility and higher current account deficits, whereas in Iceland and 
Ireland the main reasons were in addition to the inflationary-effect, the greater-than-average 
financial exposure of these two countries (larger capital inflows and higher private sector 
leverage in the case of Iceland, larger financial openness and limited exchange rate flexibility 
in the case of Ireland, and the very large banking systems in both countries). 
However, some countries did worse than our statistical models predict. For example, 
our models predict a less protracted output contraction in Denmark and a smaller consumption 
loss in Russia, while assigning a relatively small probability of a banking crisis in either 
country. Our probit specifications also fail to spot the currency crisis in Korea.39 At the same 
time, there are some countries that seem to have done better than predicted by our statistical 
models. For example, we find that the real economy impact in Australia and Poland was smaller 
than the initial conditions suggest and obtain quite a high probability of a banking crisis in 





                                                
39 Given the relatively small real economy impact on Korea, this could suggest a problem in our definition of a 
currency crisis, which may incorrectly be signalling a currency crisis in Korea rather than suggesting a failure of 




4. Conclusions  
The goal of this paper is to try to identify which factors were important in determining the 
macroeconomic impact of the recent global financial crisis, and why some countries 
experienced a systemic banking and currency crises while others escaped more lightly. We do 
this by identifying a broad set of potential pre-crisis explanatory variables in a cross-section of 
46 medium-to-high income countries, framed within four possible channels through which the 
crisis spread out over from financial markets through the real economy all over the world: a 
financial channel, a trade channel, a macro channel and an institutional channel. 
 We find an important role for the macro channel in the propagation of the shock and the 
extent of the crisis, through various measures of pre-crisis macroeconomic imbalances and 
vulnerabilities. Thus, we find that countries that, in the run up to the crisis, had higher inflation, 
larger current account deficits, a more leveraged private sector, greater output volatility, or a 
poorer fiscal position tended to experience some combination of a deeper or more protracted 
contraction in output or consumption, and were more likely to experience a systemic banking 
or currency crisis.  
We also find an important role for the financial channel. Thus, countries with relatively 
large banking systems or stronger global financial linkages tended to experience a deeper or 
longer contraction in output or consumption. In addition we find that large banking systems 
significantly increased the probability of a systemic banking or currency crisis. 
Our results on the trade channel are mixed. While we find that countries with business 
cycles that were closely connected to the global business cycle experienced a deeper output 
contraction, we also find that the output contraction tended to be shorter in those countries that 
were more open to trade. 
We also get mixed results for the role of exchange rate flexibility. We find that greater 
exchange rate flexibility coincided with a smaller and shorter contraction, while at the same 
time increasing the probability of a currency crisis or a combination of a systemic banking and 
currency crisis. We also find that countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs had a particularly 
large and protracted consumption contraction, while no comparable evidence is found for the 
EMU countries. This suggests that countries with exchange rate pegs outside a monetary union 
were particularly vulnerable in the current financial crisis. We also find that countries with a 
formal inflation target (and sometimes floating exchange rates in general) tended to have a 
smaller contraction and were less likely to have a systemic banking crisis.  
Finally, we find that past experience of a systemic banking or currency crises had no 
beneficial effect during this crisis. In fact, our results suggest that past crises-countries tended 
to have a deeper and longer contraction and were more likely to suffer a currency crisis. We 
conclude that the possible positive learning effects from past crises is outweighed by loss of 
credibility resulting from past crises experience. We also find some tentative evidence 
suggesting the importance of institutional quality in that countries with more independent 
central banks were less likely to experience a currency crisis.  
The policy implications of these results seem clear and perhaps uncontroversial. Thus, 
the key factors in escaping this global crisis relatively unscathed seem to have been to maintain 




and not allowing the banking system to get too large relative to the economy. Our results suggest 
that economies that achieved this were better able to absorb the financial shock and faster to 
recover from the crisis. Exchange rate flexibility also seemed to have helped reducing the real 
economy impact and expedite the recovery, but increased the risk of a currency crisis at the 
same time. Exchange rate flexibility, jointly with a formal inflation target, however, seemed to 
have helped reduce the risk of a systemic banking crisis. Although we find no significant effects 
of EMU membership, the fact that the additional negative effects of unilateral exchange rate 
pegs are not found in the case of the EMU countries suggests that fixed exchange rates through 
euro membership mitigated the negative effects of exchange rate pegs in the crisis. EMU 
membership can also have helped through preventing the occurrences of currency crises and 







Figure 1. Actual and fitted output and consumption contraction 
(Specification 1 in Tables 3 and 4) 
 
 
Figure 2. Actual and fitted output and consumption contraction duration 
(Specification 1 in Tables 5 and 6) 
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Figure 3. Actual and fitted banking and currency crisis  




Figure 4. Actual and fitted banking and currency crisis 
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Figure 5. Baseline predictions of output and consumption losses and duration in selected 
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Appendix: The data 
 
Table A1. Data definitions and sources 
   
Variable Description Source 
   
Dependent variables 
Depth of output 
contraction 
Log difference of seasonally adjusted GDP 
level from peak in 2007Q1-2008Q4 to 
2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 
   
Depth of consumption 
contraction 
Log difference of seasonally adjusted private 
consumption level from peak in 2007Q1-
2008Q4 to 2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 
   
Duration of output 
contraction 
Numbers of quarters with negative quarter-on-
quarter growth in seasonally adjusted GDP 
from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 




Numbers of quarters with negative quarter-on-
quarter growth in seasonally adjusted private 
consumption from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 
   
Banking crisis Indicator variable for a systemic banking 
crisis: defined as 1 if a country’s corporate 
and financial sectors experience a large 
number of defaults and financial institutions 
and corporations face great difficulties 
repaying contracts on time leading to a rise in 
non-performing loans and an almost complete 
exhaustion of aggregate banking system 
capital and 0 otherwise 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
updated database and authors 
own elaboration 
   
Currency crisis Indicator variable for a currency crisis: 
defined as 1 if the annual average of the 
nominal effective exchange rate depreciated 
by 30% or more in 2008-2009 and if this 
depreciation is also at least a 10 percentage 
points increase in the rate of depreciation 
compared to the two year period before and 0 
otherwise 
Effective exchange rates from 
the BIS database 
   
Economic structure 
GDP level GDP level in 2008 (PPP adjusted billion US$) CIA World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov/publications/fact
book) 
   
GDP per capita GDP per capita in 2008 (PPP adjusted 
thousand US$) 
CIA World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov/publications/fact
book) 
   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
Table A1. Data definitions and sources (cont.) 
   
Variable Description Source 
   
Financial structure and development 
Financial deepening Broad money (M2) as a share of GDP in 2007 IMF/IFS and local central 
banks 
   
Size of banking system Total assets of the 5 largest banks in each 
country as a share of GDP in 2007  
The Banker (2008) database 
   
Stock market 
capitalisation 
Market value of publicly traded stocks as a 
share of GDP in 2007 
CIA World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov/publications/fact
book) 
   
International real linkages 
Trade openness Imports and exports as a share of GDP in 2007 IMF/IFS 
   
Output correlation Correlation of cyclical part of seasonally 
adjusted domestic GDP and world output 
1985Q1-2007Q4 (or time period available, 
using the HP filter to generate trend GDP. For 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and the 
US world output is measured using world 
output excluding  each of these countries 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Pétursson 
(2010) 
   
Manufacturing exports 
share 
Share of manufacturing exports (SITC 5 to 8, 
less 667 and 68) in total merchandise exports 
in 2006  
UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
   
Trade diversification A modified Finger-Kreinen index of trade 
similarities, measuring to what extent a 
country’s trade structure in 2006 differs from 
that of the average country. Index ranging 
from 0 to 1, with higher numbers indicating a 
bigger difference from the world average 
UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
   
Trade concentration A Herfindahl-Hirschmann index measuring 
the degree of market concentration in 
country’s trade in 2006. Index ranging from 0 
to 1, with higher numbers indicating greater 
market concentration in trade 
UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
   
International financial linkages 
Financial openness Sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a share 
of GDP in 2007 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006); updated database 
   
Capital inflows FDI inward flows as share of GDP in 2007  UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
   
Access to US$ 
liquidity 
Indicator variable for participation in the US 
Fed liquidity program in 2008: defined as 1 if 
a country participated in the liquidity program 
and 0 otherwise 
McGuire and von Peter (2009)  
   
   
   
   





   
Table A1. Data definitions and sources (cont.) 
   
Variable Description Source 
   
Underlying economic volatility 
Output volatility Standard deviation of cyclical component of 
seasonally adjusted GDP in 1985Q1-2007Q4 
(or time period available, using the HP filter to 
generate trend GDP 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin and 
local central banks 
   
Exchange rate 
variability 
Standard deviation of quarterly changes in 
effective nominal exchange rates in 1994-
2007 
Effective exchange rates from 
the BIS database 
   
Exchange rate noise A measure of the standard deviation of the 
exchange rate risk premium, i.e. the present 
value of the rational expectations deviation 
from the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition in effective exchange rates. 
Estimated for the period 1990Q1-2005Q4 and 
available for all the countries except, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania and Russia. 
Pétursson (2010) 
   
Economic imbalances and vulnerabilities 
Inflation rate Average consumer price inflation in 2007 Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin and 
local central banks 
   
Current account 
balance 
Current account balance as a share of GDP in 
2007 
IMF/IFS 
   
Size of foreign 
reserves 
Foreign reserves as a share of GDP in 2007  IMF/IFS 
   
Financial leverage Ratio of domestic credit to domestic deposits 
in 2007  
 
IMF/IFS 
   
Fiscal balance General government balance as a share of 
GDP in 2007 
IMF/IFS, Eurostat, 
Reuters/EcoWin, local central 
banks and statistical offices 
   
Government debt General government debt as a share of GDP in 
2007 
IMF/IFS, Eurostat, 
Reuters/EcoWin, local central 
banks and statistical offices 





Table A1. Data definitions and sources (cont.) 
   
Variable Description Source 




A measure of government governance quality. 
Index from 2007 ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values indicating more effective 
governments 
World Bank database 
(http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/index.asp) 
   
Regulatory quality A measure of regulatory quality. Index from 
2007 ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values indicating greater regulatory quality 
World Bank database 
(http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/index.asp) 
   
Legal structure and 
security of property 
rights 
A measure of quality of legal system covering 
judicial independence, impartiality of courts, 
protection of property rights, military 
interference in rule of law, integrity of legal 
system, legal enforcement of contracts and 
restrictions on sale of real property. Index 
from 2006, ranging from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating greater quality of legal 
system 




   
Central bank 
independence 
A measure of central bank overall 
independence. Index ranging from 0 to 1, with 
higher values indicating greater independence 
Fry et al. (2000) 
   
Credit market 
regulations 
A measure of regulatory burden in the 
domestic credit market. Index from 2006 
ranging from 0 to 10, with lower values 
indicating greater regulatory burden 





   
Labour market 
regulations 
A measure of regulatory burden in the 
domestic labour market. Index from 2006 
ranging from 0 to 10, with lower values 
indicating greater regulatory burden 





   
 Business regulations A measure of regulatory burden in general 
business activities. Index from 2006 ranging 
from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating 
greater regulatory burden 





   
Economic freedom 
index 
Overall economic freedom index, weighing 
together sub-indices covering size of 
government, legal structure, access to sound 
money, freedom of international trade, and 
regulation of markets. Index from 2006 
ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating greater economic freedom 





   
Past banking crisis Indicator variable for past banking crisis: 
defined as 1 if it has experienced a banking 
crisis in the past 30 years and 0 otherwise 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
   
Past currency crisis Indicator variable for past currency crisis: 
defined as 1 if it has experienced a banking 
crisis in the past 30 years and 0 otherwise 
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Iceland suffered a severe financial crisis in 2008 which can only be described as the perfect storm, with the 
currency falling by more than 50% and over 90% of the domestic financial system collapsing. What followed was 
a deep recession. This was not the first financial crisis experienced in Iceland, however. In fact, over a period 
spanning almost one and a half century (1875-2013), we identify over twenty instances of financial crises of 
different types. Recognising that crises tend to come in clusters, we identify six serious multiple financial crisis 
episodes occurring every fifteen years on average. These episodes seem to share many commonalities and the 
tragic but universal truth that “we’ve been there before” when it comes to financial crises really becomes all too 
clear. We find that these episodes usually involve a large collapse in domestic demand that in most cases serves 
as a trigger for the ensuing crisis. What typically follows is a currency crisis, sometimes coinciding with a sudden 
stop of capital inflows and an inflation crisis, and most often a banking crisis. In line with international evidence, 
we find that contractions coinciding with these large financial crises tend to be both deeper and longer than regular 
business cycle downturns. Although the crisis episodes share many common elements, each one of them is also 
different to some extent. We are therefore not able to find financial variables that consistently provide an early-
warning signal of an upcoming financial crisis across all the six episodes. However, we find that some key 
macroeconomic variables give a somewhat more robust signal. Our results also suggest that five of the six multiple 
crisis episodes coincide with a global financial crisis of some type, and that the most serious global episodes 
coincide with a two- to threefold increase in the probability of a financial crisis in Iceland. A companion paper 
(Part II) extends our analysis of the Icelandic financial boom-bust cycle to identifying financial cycles in our long 
data set, i.e. cycles that are of lower frequency and last longer than common business cycles and are characterised 
by co-movement of many key financial variables and often have peaks closely associated with financial crises. 
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“There is nothing new except what has been forgotten” 
Marie-Jeanne Rose Bertin (Queen Marie Antoinette’s dressmaker and confidante) 
 
1 Introduction 
Iceland suffered a severe financial crisis in 2008 which can only be described as the perfect 
storm, with the currency falling by more than 50% and over 90% of the domestic financial 
system collapsing. What followed was a deep recession, with output declining by almost 12% 
from its pre-crisis peak in late 2007 to its post-crisis trough in early 2010. The collapse in 
domestic demand was even more punishing: consumption fell by 21% from peak to trough and 
total domestic absorption by 30%, while unemployment rose by 7 percentage points.  
 This was not the first financial crisis experienced in Iceland, however. In fact, over a 
period spanning almost one and a half century, we identify over twenty instances of financial 
crises of different types. Recognising that crises tend to come in clusters, we identify six serious 
multiple financial crisis episodes occurring every fifteen years on average. The first two 
episodes occur during the early 1900s: the first coincided with the First World War (WWI) and 
lasted into the early 1920s, when a sharp collapse in economic activity led to an inflation crisis 
that was followed by a sudden stop of capital inflows and a currency crisis and eventually by a 
systemic banking crisis; while the second crisis coincided with the outbreak of the Great 
Depression in the early 1930s when another systemic banking crisis followed a recession and 
morphed into a currency crisis in 1932. There are two further episodes occurring at the end of 
the 1940s and in the late 1960s that are related to a serious deterioration of external conditions, 
in both cases leading to currency and inflation crises: the first followed a sharp deterioration of 
terms of trade and a contraction in economic activity; the second of these episodes following a 
collapse in fish catch. The fifth episode occurs during the early 1990s when falling economic 
activity, following the rein in of the chronic inflation of the 1970s and the 1980s, led to a twin 
currency and (non-systemic) banking crisis in 1993. The final episode is the most recent one 
when a build-up of enormous imbalances in the run-up to the crisis were followed by a sudden 
stop and a twin currency and banking crisis in 2008, further compounded by the global financial 
crisis occurring at the same time. 
These financial crisis episodes seem to share many commonalities. They usually involve 
a large collapse in demand that in most cases serves as a trigger for the ensuing crisis. What 
typically follows is a currency crisis, sometimes coinciding with a sudden stop of capital 
inflows and an inflation crisis, and most often a banking crisis – usually towards the end of the 
episode. Three of those episodes involve a systemic banking crisis and they tend to leave the 
largest footprints on the real economy although all six episodes lead to large contractions in 
demand and output. In line with international evidence, we find that contractions coinciding 
with these large financial crises tend to be about twice as deep as regular business cycle 
downturns and last almost twice as long. We also find that two of the more serious episodes 
coincide with a sudden stop crisis. Although the crisis episodes share many common elements, 
each one of them is also different to some extent. While we find evidence of financial 




in markedly above-trend growth in money, credit and bank leverage (and to a lesser extent, 
house prices), the financial crises in the late 1960s and early 1990s had pure real economy 
sources. The latest episode saw major financial and macroeconomic imbalances combine to 
make it the most serious crisis of them all. We therefore find no single financial variable 
consistently providing an early-warning signal of an upcoming financial crisis across all the six 
episodes. However, we find that some macroeconomic variables, such as output, domestic 
demand, the trade deficit and, to a lesser extent, the real exchange rate, give a somewhat more 
robust warning signal. 
Our results also suggest an important role of contagion from global financial crises in 
most of these episodes, with five of the six episodes coinciding with a global financial crisis of 
some type; only the financial crisis in the late 1960s seems almost exclusively local. Our results 
also suggest that of the different types of financial crises, banking crises have the strongest 
global component while currency and inflation crises mainly seem to be of local nature. We 
also find that the most serious global episodes coincide with a two- to threefold increase in the 
probability of a financial crisis in Iceland. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we use data on aggregate economic 
activity to identify regular business cycle downturns and the more serious demand disasters 
used for reference in our analysis of the financial boom-bust episodes over the period 1875-
2013. We also introduce the macroeconomic and financial variables that we use in the paper 
and discuss their key business cycle properties and historical context. In Section 3, we move on 
to identify and date different types of financial crises, i.e. the closely related currency and 
inflation crises, and banking crises. Not surprisingly, we find that these different types of 
financial crises often tend to overlap and to capture this clustering nature of financial crises, 
Section 4 applies a non-parametric common cycle algorithm to identify the more serious, 
multiple financial crises in a single indicator. This approach allows us to identify six major 
financial crisis episodes that we discuss in more detail in the remainder of Section 4. We discuss 
the main properties of these episodes and the development of our macroeconomic and financial 
variables in the run-up to these crises and in the period when the crises unfold. In Section 5, we 
analyse whether our financial and macroeconomic variables consistently provide early-warning 
signals in the run up to the multiple financial crises, whether these crises make recessions worse, 
and to what extent these episodes coincide with global financial crises. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. Robustness checks, documented in Appendices 1 and 2, suggest that our key results are 
robust to variations in crisis definitions. In a companion paper (Part II) we use the same dataset 
to identify and analyse financial cycles, i.e. cycles that are of lower frequency and last longer 
than common business cycles and are characterised by co-movement of many key financial 
variables and often have peaks closely associated with financial crises. The companion paper 
also contains discussions of policy implications of our findings. 
  
2 The data 
Our analysis of the financial boom-bust cycle in Iceland and its relationship with financial crises 




rates, terms of trade and inflation, asset prices, money and credit, and data on the banking 
system assets, leverage, and liability composition. This section of the paper describes the data 
we use and gives a broad-brush description of its main properties and stylised historical context, 
as well as presenting our identified dates of economic downturns (both regular cyclical 
downturns and more punishing demand disaster episodes). 
The fact that financial boom-bust cycles usually take a long time to complete – decades 
even – calls for a longer data span than is usually required for analysing most other 
macroeconomic phenomena. We have therefore constructed an annual frequency database 
covering a 139 year period from 1875 to 2013 (described in more detail in Appendix 3). As is 
often the case, the need for a long data span comes at the cost of only having annual data 
available and thus the loss of higher frequency information found in quarterly data. Although 
we acknowledge that some finer points of dating business cycles and financial booms and busts 
may be lost using annual data, our focus on financial crises necessitates it. At the same time we 
gain some unique insight into the domestic financial boom-bust cycle that would be lost by 
focusing on a shorter time period, and the tragic but universal truth that “we’ve been there 
before” when it comes to financial crises really becomes all too clear. 
 
2.1 Economic activity and downturns 
A central variable in any analysis of financial boom-bust cycles is some measure of aggregate 
economic activity, not only for measuring the real economy consequences of financial crises 
but also for analysing the interactions of economic activity and financial booms and busts, and 
phasing the crisis episodes in terms of the business cycle. We use GDP as our measure of overall 
activity and as a basis for estimating and dating cyclical downturns although we acknowledge 
that a more broad-based analysis of multiple indicators for identifying the business cycle might 
be more appropriate. For example, small open economies can use the current account to absorb 
shocks and smooth output although there is also ample evidence suggesting that this risk sharing 
property may be overstated as discussed below. Thus, we also look at overall domestic demand 
as it can shed important additional light on economic activity over the financial boom-bust 
cycle. 
The data on GDP and domestic demand comes from official national accounts for the 
period from 1945. Prior to that we use data compiled by the economic historian Gudmundur 
Jónsson and published by the now defunct National Economic Institute in 1999 (see also 
Jónsson, 2004). This dataset does not directly include data on domestic demand but we 
construct the series by subtracting nominal net exports (available from the same source) from 
nominal GDP and use the implicit GDP price deflator to construct real domestic demand. 
Appendix 3 gives the details. 
Table 1 summarises key properties of output and demand, together with other variables 
in our dataset, for the whole sample and for two subsamples which divide the data into two 
roughly equally long periods and coincide with the period up to the end of World War II (WWII) 
and the post-WWII period, respectively. The first subsample therefore covers the modernisation 




technological innovation, and financial deepening paved the way for export-oriented 
industrialisation and ends with a “great leap forward” in terms of the modernisation of the 
economy during WWII (Jónsson, 2004), while the second subsample covers the period from 
which Iceland had caught up with other advanced economies in terms of income levels. As 
Table 1 shows, average annual growth of real GDP and demand over the whole sample has 
measured just under 3½%, somewhat higher and less volatile in the post-WWII period – 
although the economy remains very volatile compared to other industrial countries as 
documented in Einarsson et al. (2013).  
 
Table 1 Summary statistics 
         
 Total sample  
(1875-2013) 
 First half  
(1875-1944) 
 Second half  
(1945-2013) 
         
 Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev. 
Real house prices  0.010 0.064  0.015 0.062  0.008 0.066 
Real credit 0.064 0.129  0.072 0.149  0.057 0.110 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 1.082 0.734  0.644 0.377  1.457 0.759 
Real M3 0.061 0.113  0.090 0.110  0.036 0.110 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.381 0.203  0.303 0.189  0.448 0.192 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 2.814 1.182  2.179 0.794  3.356 1.194 
Bank assets-to-GDP ratio 0.676 1.132  0.349 0.257  1.008 1.520 
Bank leverage ratio 11.085 3.945  10.042 4.113  12.143 3.486 
Foreign non-core liabilities 0.096 0.108  0.059 0.053  0.128 0.132 
Total non-core liabilities 0.169 0.135  0.161 0.121  0.176 0.146 
         
Real GDP 0.034 0.051  0.030 0.058  0.037 0.042 
Real domestic demand 0.033 0.084  0.031 0.087  0.035 0.082 
Trade deficit-to-GDP ratio -0.009 0.063  -0.036 0.062  0.018 0.052 
USD exchange rate -0.059 0.163  -0.008 0.101  -0.109 0.196 
Real exchange rate 0.000 0.106  0.014 0.083  -0.014 0.123 
Terms of trade 0.006 0.123  0.010 0.160  0.002 0.068 
Inflation 0.081 0.133  0.028 0.107  0.136 0.136 
The table reports summary statistics for the total sample from 1875-2013 (139 years) and for two subsamples: the period 1875-1944 (70 years) 
and the period 1945-2013 (69 years). USD exchange rate refers to number of US dollars per 1 unit of Icelandic króna. Bank leverage ratio 
refers to the ratio of total banking system assets to equity. The non-core financing ratios refer to the ratio of non-core banking liabilities (either 
foreign or total) to total banking liabilities. Real house prices, real credit, real M3, real GDP, real domestic demand, USD exchange rate, real 
exchange rate, and terms of trade are reported as log differences of each variable. Inflation is measured as the log difference of consumer 
prices. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 1 shows real GDP and domestic demand in levels and growth rates for the period 
1875-2013 together with dates of business cycle downturns as identified by the Harding and 
Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm.41 This seeks to identify cyclical peaks and troughs in the 
GDP series using a simple algorithm that identifies local maxima and minima over a specific 
window by imposing restrictions on the minimum length of the cycle (the distance between two 
consecutive peaks and troughs) and the minimum length of each phase (the length from peak 
                                                
41 This turning point approach to dating business cycles goes back to the pioneering work of Burns and Mitchell 
(1946) and is widely used for dating business cycles, see Claessens et al. (2011, 2012) for a discussion and 




to trough or trough to peak). The screening process also requires peaks and troughs to alternate. 
If two peaks (troughs) occur in a row the higher (lower) one is chosen. 
The duration of business cycles is typically assumed to last between 5 quarters and 8 
years. With this in mind, and given the restrictions imposed by using annual data, we assume 
that the minimum phase of expansions and contractions is 1 year and the minimum length of a 
complete cycle is 2 years. Given these restrictions, we define the peak (trough) of the business 
cycle in a given year as the highest (lowest) value of GDP within a 2-year symmetric window 
(i.e. within a 5 year window centred at the given year). The use of a 2-year symmetric window 
is not ideal though as it will probably lead to an identification of too few business cycle turning 
points. However, the alternative of using a 1-year symmetric window is even less appealing, 
especially given the relatively high volatility in Icelandic macroeconomic data, as it would 
simply replicate all years of contractions in GDP (however small) and thus arguably identify 
too many cycles (see the second panel of Figure 1). To compensate for this drawback (which 
comes from using annual data), we also allow for the algorithm to be overruled if the annual 
contraction in GDP exceeds one standard deviation of total sample GDP growth. Although it is 
still likely that we are missing some of the smaller business cycle downturns, our filtering 
choices allow us to concentrate on the most important ones which are the ones of most interest 
to us in the context of our analysis of financial booms and busts. 
 
Figure 1 GDP and domestic demand 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
This approach identifies eleven downturns in GDP over the 139 year period (17% of the 
total sample). This gives a cyclical downturn every 10 years which lasts for 2.1 years with 
output contracting by 7.6% on average. The identified dates are reported in Table 2. Most of 
the downturns identified are well-known in the chronology of the Icelandic business cycle. The 
first one we identify occurs in 1882-1883 when output contracts by no less than 16%. This and 
the short contraction in 1887 are mainly due to large negative terms of trade shocks and 
unusually cold weather (see, Jónsson, 1999, 2004). Another short and relatively shallow 
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for wool in the UK.42 The first and most severe downturn identified in the 20th century occurs 
during WWI with output contracting by almost 18%. This is followed by a short but sharp 
contraction in 1920 when output fell by 14% following a 40% deterioration of terms of trade 
during the global post-WWI recession and widespread foreign liquidity shortages in the 
domestic banking system. Two relatively short contractions occurred in the Great Depression 
in the early 1930s coinciding with a systemic banking crisis (see the discussion on banking 
crises in Section 3.2).  
 
Table 2 Economic downturns in Iceland 
 
Business cycle downturns  Demand disasters 





(in years)  Date 




1882-83 0.161 2     
1887 0.027 1     
1898 0.020 1     
1914-18 0.179 5  1914-15 0.192 2 
    1918 0.166 1 
1920  0.140 1  1923-24 0.137 2 
1931-32 0.034 2  1931-32 0.179 2 
1935 0.027 1     
1949-52 0.071 4  1948-51 0.309 4 
1967-68 0.067 2  1968-69 0.155 2 
    1975-76 0.106 2 
1991-92 0.036 2  1988-93 0.136 6 
2009-10 0.079 2  2007-10 0.276 4 
       
Average 0.076 2.1  Average 0.184 2.8 
The table gives the dates of economic downturns identified by the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm and the dates of domestic 
demand disasters based on the criteria suggested by Barro and Ursúa (2008) for consumption disasters. The table reports the duration of the 
given episode in years and the contraction in GDP for business cycle downturns and per capita domestic demand for demand disaster dates 
between the start and end of the crisis. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
The cyclical downturns are fewer and less severe in the post-WWII period, as reflected 
in the declining output volatility referred to earlier. The first downturn is a relatively sharp 
contraction following large negative terms of trade shocks in the late 1940s due to a weakening 
of export prices that were further exacerbated by a global trade contraction in connection with 
the Korean War and an overvalued real exchange rate. This is followed by another sharp 
contraction in the late 1960s with the collapse of fish stocks causing output to fall by close to 
7%. No business cycle contraction is identified until the early 1990s when output fell by 3½% 
following a tightening of monetary conditions in the latter half of the previous decade (see 
Pétursson, 2002), further exacerbated by a negative terms of trade shock and a contraction in 
fish catches in the early 1990s. Finally, a sharp contraction is identified in 2009-10 following 
the most recent financial crisis when output fell by 8%.  
                                                
42 The downturns in the late 1800s coincide, and are followed, by unusually large emigration flows to North 




Although some of these downturns can be attributed to different types of financial 
distress, it is clear that downturns related to negative supply shocks (whether they are terms of 
trade or fish catch shocks) dominate the Icelandic business cycle.43 These shocks can obviously 
also trigger some type of financial distress or interact with the underlying financial cycle to 
amplify financial shocks occurring at a similar time. We will indeed see examples of both when 
we revisit some of these episodes in our discussion of financial crises below. 
Using the turning point algorithm on domestic demand gives broadly the same dates, 
although the exact start or finish of some differs slightly from those identified using GDP. 
However, not surprisingly given that domestic demand is more volatile than output, the 
algorithm also identifies additional downturns using the demand series. By focusing on the 
more severe episodes, i.e. what we can call “demand disasters” following the definition of Barro 
and Ursúa (2008) of “consumption disasters” as periods where per capita demand contracts by 
more than 10% from peak to trough, gives us nine disaster episodes occurring every 12 years 
on average with duration of almost 3 years.44 In most cases, these episodes coincide with the 
downturns identified by the turning point algorithm for GDP (see Table 2) although the 
downturns in the late 1800s drop out as the large contractions in domestic demand are offset by 
a large decline in total population, so that the per capita measures falls below the 10% threshold. 
The sharp contraction in domestic demand in 1909, following a large terms of trade 
deterioration and loss of foreign bank funding in the aftermath of the global bank panic of 1907 
(see below), and the downturn in the mid-1930s, related to the loss of important export markets 
in Southern Europe, also drop out as the cumulative contractions fall just shy of 10%. By this 
measure, there was also a downturn in the mid-1970s related to the first oil shock where per 
capita demand fell by 10½% while GDP growth only slowed down to 0.7% in 1975 and picked 
up strongly the year after.  
 
2.2 Trade balance 
As previously discussed, a small open economy should in principle be able to use its external 
accounts to absorb shocks and smooth activity by borrowing in bad times and saving when 
conditions improve. A current account deficit would therefore open up during bad times, which 
is reversed when the economy improves. At the same time, numerous studies suggest that the 
                                                
43 This is indeed what Gudmundsson et al. (2000) find using a structural VAR (see also Daníelsson, 2008). 
Although our focus is mainly on the largest downturns, the business cycle chronology presented here corresponds 
quite well to conventional wisdom, such as Jónsson (2004), Magnússon and Einarsson (1985) and Pétursson 
(2000). Pétursson uses Hamilton’s (1989) Markov-switching model to identify cyclical downturns in the post-
WWII period, finding similar results over the period in question but additional downturns in the mid-1970s and 
early- to mid-1980s. Using this Markov-switching model over the extended period analysed here gives broadly 
similar results, although it misses the pre-WWII downturns in the late 1880s and 1890s, and the ones in 1920 and 
1930s identified by the turning point approach, but as in Pétursson (2000) also adding the slow post-WWII growth 
periods in 1956-57 and 1961, and the short-lived contraction in 1983. Einarsson et al. (2013) focus on the post-
1970 period where quarterly data is available and find broadly similar results, although the quarterly data allows 
them to identify a larger number of short downturns which are missed using annual data. 
44 We use per capita domestic demand as consumption data is not available before 1945. Using domestic demand 
(the bulk of which is private consumption) gives almost identical disaster dates (also identified by Barro and Ursúa, 
2008) as using consumption does in the period where both series are available (the episodes are identical but start 




current account and capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical and fuel asset price and financial boom-
bust cycles, in particular among emerging market economies (cf. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, 
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007, and Korinek, 2011).45  
 
Figure 2 Trade balance 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
With no data on the current account available for the whole period, we use the trade 
balance as a proxy for this net capital flow cycle (see also Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).46 This 
is shown in Figure 2 together with the previously identified business cycle downturns (the trade 
balance data we use is obtained from Jónsson, 1999, as described above). One noteworthy 
feature of the data is the shift from persistent trade surpluses in the first half of our sample to 
persistent deficits after WWII. This is also borne out in Table 1 which shows how the average 
balance goes from a surplus of 3.6% of GDP in the first period to a deficit of 1.8% in the second. 
Another striking feature is the general tendency for large deficits to build up in the period 
leading into recessions only to be reversed around the time a cyclical downturn starts (of which 
the latest crisis period is a notable example). Exceptions to this, where the temporal order is 
reversed, i.e. from a surplus leading into the recession reversing into a deficit, emerge in the 
period prior to 1922, during Iceland’s membership in a monetary union with Denmark. In that 
period there was a limited role for nominal exchange rate adjustment and hence deflationary 
pressures often emerged during downturns and in turn reinforced them (see the discussion in 
the next section). Most of the trade balance reversals in our sample are therefore consistent with 
a build-up of deficits leading into the recessions with the accompanying capital inflows, which 
reverse once the economy weakens. Trade deficits therefore tend to be pro-cyclical and to 
reinforce the cycle rather than being used to absorb shocks and smooth output, consistent with 
                                                
45 Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that this emerging market phenomenon is strongly linked to an unusually high 
ratio of permanent to temporary shocks. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue, policymakers in these countries 
seem to have a tendency to interpret favourable shocks as being permanent, leading to spending sprees and 
borrowing binges that ultimately lead to sudden stops in funding and a sharp recessions and a reversal in the current 
account. 
46 In Section 2.6 below, we also consider gross capital flows in the form of cross-border banking liabilities, which 
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the findings in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). We will return 
to this theme in the context of our discussion of currency crises below. 
 
2.3 Exchange rate, terms of trade, and inflation 
Another way for a small open economy to absorb external shocks is through adjustments in its 
exchange rate. Thus, the currency depreciates in bad times and supports net exports and reduces 
real economic volatility. At the same time, the results from Breedon et al. (2012) suggest that 
exchange rates in very small open economies such as Iceland have in fact not served as a shock 
absorber but rather as an important source of shocks and therefore as an amplifier of the 
business cycle. The exchange rate cycle is also of interest in our analysis of the financial boom-
bust cycle as a number of studies have found the real exchange rate to be a leading indicator of 
currency and banking crises (cf. Kaminsky et al., 1998, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, 
Goldstein et al., 2000, and Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). Bruno and Shin (2014) provide a 
model consistent with these finding and emphasise the interactions between currency 
appreciations, borrowers’ balance sheet strength, and greater risk-taking by banks in driving 
financial cycles in small open economies (see also Korinek, 2011).  
  
Figure 3 Exchange rate, terms of trade, and inflation 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
  
Figure 3 shows the development of the nominal (number of US dollars per 1 unit of 
Icelandic króna) and real exchange rate together with the business cycle downturns from above 
(data sources and how the data is constructed is described in Appendix 3). The nominal 
exchange rate remains tightly pegged to the US dollar up to WWI within the gold standard 
regime through Iceland’s monetary union with Denmark and the rest of the Nordic countries 
within the Scandinavian Monetary Union. This breaks down during the war and in 1922 Iceland 
exits the monetary union with Denmark and establishes its own currency, which starts its long 
and arduous downward slide to its most recent collapse in 2008.47 As shown in Table 1, this 
                                                
47 See Gudmundsson et al. (2000) for a description of the history of Icelandic exchange rate regimes leading up to 
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depreciation bias has been particularly strong in the post-WWII period with exchange rate 
volatility also increasing – in part reflecting the greater exchange rate flexibility over the last 
two decades. The real exchange rate has remained more stable around a broadly fixed level, 
notwithstanding some extreme real exchange rate adjustments, in particular during the two 
World Wars, the start of the 1950s and 1960s, and the financial crisis in 2008-9.  
While exchange rate volatility has increased in the post-WWII period, terms of trade 
shocks (a key driver of the Icelandic business cycle as one can gather from Section 2.1) have in 
fact been more moderate as shown in Table 1 and Figure 3 (data sources described in Appendix 
3). Improvements in terms of trade played an important role in the previously discussed 
modernisation and catch-up of the Icelandic economy relative to other advanced economies, 
with terms of trade improving by no less than 274% over the period 1886-1915. After a sharp 
deterioration during WWI and again after WWII, terms of trade improved again and peaked in 
the early 1970s. They remained relatively stable up to the recent global crisis which has seen 
terms of trade deteriorate by 20% from its 2006 peak. 
Finally, Figure 3 reports the development of inflation (data sources described in 
Appendix 3), highlighting some wild fluctuations in the rate of price changes, both during 
deflationary periods in the pre-WWII period (in particular the years following WWI) and 
frequent inflationary bouts, especially during the World Wars and in the post-WWII period (in 
particular in the 1970s and 1980s). The high and volatile inflation is much more apparent in the 
latter half of the sample period, as reflected in the nominal exchange rate developments. These 
exchange rate and inflation developments will be revisited in our discussion of currency and 
inflation crises below.  
 
2.4 Residential house prices 
Residential house price cycles are usually at the centre of any financial boom-bust cycle. In fact 
a number of studies have established the prominent role of house prices in the run-up to and 
aftermath of banking crises, with a house price boom leading into the crises (particularly if its 
debt-driven), followed by a substantial and persistent decline after the bust (see e.g. Bordo and 
Jeanne, 2002, and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Furthermore, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find 
that real house prices are a robust leading indicator of financial crises, banking crises in 
particular. 
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue, large house price declines can have marked real 
economic consequences even if they do not coincide with banking crises, and indeed this is 
borne out by the Icelandic data (see Figure 4):48 while the large declines in real house prices in 
1917-19 (cumulative decline of 12.5%) and 2008-10 (cumulative decline of 31.5%) coincide 
with systemic banking crises (see the discussion on banking crises below), the sharp decline in 
1950-51 (cumulative decline of 20%) did not, although all three coincide with a cyclical 
downturn and a demand disaster (see Table 2 above). The figure also clearly shows the pro-
cyclical nature of real house prices in Iceland, with booms in the run-up to recessions followed 
                                                
48 House price data (described in Appendix 3) is only available from 1900, which coincides with the beginning of 




by declines just before, during or shortly after the business cycle turns. Interestingly, unlike 
inflation and the exchange rate, the comparison of real house prices over the two subsamples in 
Table 1 does not suggest that real house prices have become more volatile in the post-WWII 
period. We will discuss this house price cycle in more detail in Section 4.2.  
 
Figure 4 Real house prices 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
  
2.5 Money and credit 
Credit aggregates are the measurable results of the credit creation process where liquidity 
conditions and perceptions of value and risk interact and lead to changes in exposure and 
financing capacity. Surges and shortfalls of liquidity and their accompanying balance sheet 
expansions and deleveraging can have severe repercussions for economic activity and overall 
macroeconomic stability.49 Hence, studies of financial boom-bust cycles logically include 
credit aggregates as one of the key elements capturing the nexus between the financial system 
and the real economy (Claessens et al., 2011, 2012, Drehmann et al., 2012, and Aikman et al., 
2015). Other studies examine to what extent monetary aggregates, or the ratio of total credit to 
money (which captures the extent of non-monetary funding of credit creation), can serve as 
indicators for the state of the financial cycle or signal increasing vulnerabilities in the latter 
stages of financial cycle upswings (Borio and Lowe, 2004, and Shin and Shin, 2011).  
To capture these aspects of the financial cycle and its link to financial crises we consider 
both credit and broad money measures. Our credit aggregate is based on data on total lending 
and bond holdings of the credit system. We use total credit as data availability does not allow 
us to focus solely on credit to the non-financial private sector over such a long period. Our 
broad money measure is M3. The data is available from 1886 when the first commercial bank 
                                                
49 Liquidity is an unobservable property of the financial system and refers to the ease of financing in financial 
markets and encompasses both funding liquidity (the ease of raising cash by selling new obligations to investors) 
and market liquidity (the ease of raising cash by selling assets). Liquidity depends on actions of private investors, 
financial institutions, and monetary authorities, and is best understood as a flow variable, which can disappear 
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(the state-owned Landsbanki) was founded. Hence, our series extend back for 128 years (further 
details are in Appendix 3). 
 Figure 5 shows credit and money in levels (in real terms), their shares in nominal GDP, 
and the money-to-credit ratio. As Table 1 shows, average annual real credit and money growth 
has been similar over the whole sample although money growth was considerably higher in the 
first half of the sample than in the post-WWII period, mainly due to high growth during the two 
World Wars. The credit-to-money ratio decreased sharply during the occupation of Iceland in 
WWII when cash holdings rose considerably following a large influx of foreign soldiers, while 
lending remained weak.  
Iceland’s rapid financial catch-up is also evident in Figure 5 in the marked rise in money 
and credit relative to GDP, especially after the creation of the country’s first and only foreign-
owned commercial bank in 1904 (Íslandsbanki). The money-to-GDP ratio remained within 40-
50% range from 1916-40, which is close to the average ratio reported for developed economies 
in Schularick and Taylor (2012). The credit ratio settled at an even higher level, or 
approximately 100% of GDP, which in part reflected the important role of non-money financed 
bank credit in Iceland and the importance of credit extension by investment credit funds at the 
time.  
 
Figure 5 Money and credit 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
  
Iceland’s financial catch-up proved short-lived, however, and the financial system 
deteriorated consistently until the end of the 1970s due to chronic macroeconomic instability 
and mismanagement of the then almost fully state-owned banking system. This is apparent in 
the steady decline of savings in the chronic high inflation era when real interest rates were 
negative for years and the money-to-GDP ratio reached a low of 23½% in 1978. Credit 
remained close to 100% of GDP on average, however, so the credit-to-money ratio was 
increasing and bank credit extension relied on increased leverage within the banking sector, as 
will be discussed in the next section. Widespread indexation of savings and loans to inflation 
was formally introduced in 1979 and this marked the beginning of a new catch-up phase where 
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system was liberalised and integrated with international financial markets. Finally, the run-up 
to and aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 is clearly evident from the break-neck pace in 
pre-crisis credit expansion, with the credit ratio peaking at a whopping 400% of GDP in 2007, 
and the accompanying large post-crisis deleveraging, with the credit-to-GDP ratio collapsing 
by half and the credit-to-money ratio by almost two-thirds.  
 
2.6 Banking system balance sheet 
Financial boom-bust cycles reflect changes in the ease of managing balance sheets, in particular 
those of financial intermediaries. During boom phases, economies often experience a self-
enforcing feedback loop of increased capital inflows, appreciating exchange rates, asset price 
surges, and apparently strengthening balance sheets – all of which contribute to boosting 
economic activity. Market participants are often inclined to take on too much debt and rely on 
excessively risky form of finance during such episodes, giving rise to excessive levels of 
financial fragility. These individual agents do not internalise the overall effects of their 
borrowing decisions through exchange rate and asset price changes, making financial fragility 
a by-product of external borrowing in small open economies with imperfect financial markets. 
During busts, adverse spirals kick in and induce deleveraging in the financial sector: obtaining 
funding becomes more difficult, capital inflows turn to outflows, exchange rates depreciate, 
currency mismatches increase, and asset price booms unwind; all of which can lead banks and 
other market agents to respond by fire-selling their assets, which reduces their net worth further, 
and reinforces the balance sheet constraints. These amplification effects lead to pecuniary 
externalities as the destabilising macroeconomic conditions cause adverse effects for the whole 
economy (e.g. Brunnermeier et al., 2009, Bianchi, 2011, Jeanne and Korinek, 2010, and 
Korinek, 2011). We therefore want to look beyond the traditional financial variables analysed 
in the literature, i.e. credit, money, and asset prices, and analyse the role of the entire banking 
system balance sheet (total assets, leverage, and the composition of liabilities) in the build-up 
of financial imbalances and their subsequent unwinding.50 
First, we construct a measure of the size of the banking system relative to GDP to capture 
systemic risk arising from mismatches between the domestic authorities’ capacity and the 
banking system’s possible need for support in times of financial stress. This measure can also 
function as a proxy for market liquidity of the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet, as assets 
may become more difficult to sell with limited price impact once the banking sector becomes 
very large relative to the economy. This variable can therefore be an important part in the 
financial boom-bust cycle and in determining the economic impact of the crisis (as found by 
Ólafsson and Pétursson, 2011, in a cross-country analysis of the latest global financial crisis).  
The second balance sheet variable we construct is a measure of banking system leverage 
(the ratio of banking system assets to book-value equity) to capture to what extent assets are 
being financed with debt. This variable is often emphasised but missing in the literature due to 
limited data availability over sufficiently long periods (cf. Drehmann et al., 2012). This leverage 
                                                
50 See Pálmason (1994) for a brief history of the development of Iceland’s banking system since the late 19 th 




measure is more general than the credit-to-money ratio discussed above as it encompasses a 
greater number of assets and liabilities, and can therefore provide additional information for 
analysing the financial boom-bust cycle.  
Our final banking system balance sheet variable is the ratio of non-core liabilities to 
total liabilities, which reflects the claims on the domestic banks not held by the ultimate 
domestic creditors. This measure is a proxy for the funding liquidity position of the banking 
system and aims to capture to what extent banks shift towards more unsustainable funding 
sources as the traditional (monetary) ones are exhausted in financial booms. This measure has 
been emphasised by Hahm et al. (2013) and Borio et al. (2011) but their studies cover a much 
shorter time period than ours. We also distinguish between foreign and total non-core liabilities 
to capture the possible distinctive vulnerabilities of relying on cross-border funding and their 
relation to banking and currency crises which could play an important role in the financial 
boom-bust cycle of a small open economy, such as Iceland. A particular benefit of the length 
of our data series is that it allows us to analyse cross-border funding during the first phase of 
globalisation in the pre-WWII period (see discussion in Borio et al., 2014).51  
As shown in Table 1, the size of the banking system increased almost threefold in terms 
of GDP to roughly one times GDP in the post-WWII period. The leverage ratio shows that this 
expansion was largely accomplished through borrowing rather than increased equity, while the 
non-core financing ratio suggests that an important source of this funding was through foreign 
borrowing. The different development phases of Iceland’s banking system, discussed in the 
previous section are also apparent in Figure 6 in the evolution of the size of the banking system: 
the financial catch-up early on when bank assets reached a level of over 75% of GDP, followed 
by a lengthy stagnation and deterioration until 1978 when assets reached a post-WWII trough 
below 40% of GDP. In fact, the bank asset-to-GDP ratio was similar in Iceland as the median 
case documented in Schularick and Taylor (2012) from 1920 to the late 1960s, but the rate of 
balance sheet expansion was very different from 1970-1995 and the asset ratio did not reach its 
pre-WWII peak until 1998. However, the balance sheet expansion reached an unprecedented 
level following the liberalisation of capital flows and privatisation of the state-owned banks, 
resulting in bank assets peaking at close to a staggering 940% of GDP in 2007 with cross-border 
assets and liabilities making up a large share of the balance sheet. Hence, this is an example of 
total banking system assets far exceeding the domestic credit-to-GDP ratio due to cross-border 
activities and asset holdings. 
Another noteworthy feature of Figure 6 is that during the post-WWII period, leverage 
has peaked at times of balance sheet stagnation or reduction, rather than expansions. Hence, 
changes in leverage over this period may to a larger extent reflect the banks’ response to 
declining deposit funding (discussed above) rather than increased willingness to expand and 
take on more risk.52 This comes with a caveat: although the sharp expansion in the run-up to 
                                                
51 Our four balance sheet measures are based on various sources of balance sheet data for commercial banks and 
savings banks, with banking system assets and leverage available from 1875 while the two non-core liability 
measures are available from 1886 (see Appendix 3 for details). 
52 The peak in leverage in the 1920s is different, however, as it was driven by the Icelandic authorities’ efforts to 
expand the poorly capitalised state-owned Landsbanki and dismantle the foreign-owned Íslandsbanki after the 




the financial crisis in 2008 was not reflected in large increases in leverage based on book value, 
de facto quality and quantity of bank capital in this period has been seriously questioned 
(Rannsóknarnefnd Althingis, 2010). 
 
Figure 6 Banking system balance sheet 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Finally, Figure 6 shows the evolution of non-core liabilities, which mainly consist of 
bond issuance and credit from other financial institutions, both domestically and on foreign 
wholesale markets.53 The two phases of financial globalisation are apparent as cross-border 
funding plays an important role prior to the Great Depression and again from the 1970s and 
onwards. In 1906-08, approximately 15% of the banking system’s borrowings came from 
abroad but the scale of foreign funding was actually larger as Íslandsbanki had foreign equity 
amounting to close to 10% of GDP. Access to foreign funding became more restricted following 
the global bank panic in 1907 and during WWI, but opened up again after WWI reaching a pre-
WWII peak of 18% of total liabilities in 1923, but only after the government had intermediated 
state-guaranteed foreign funds to the banking system following the foreign liquidity crisis in 
1920-21. After the collapse of Íslandsbanki in 1930 (see Section 3.2), a state-controlled banking 
system was resurrected, although only after foreign creditors agreed to swap a share of their 
claims into bank equity which was subsequently paid down. From WWII and until the mid-
1970s, non-core liabilities played a limited role in the banks’ funding.  
Access to foreign funding increased again in 1970 after Landsbanki joined a cross-
national consortium of Nordic banks to gain an easier access to global wholesale markets 
(Jacobsen and Tschoegl, 1999). A short-lived decrease in cross-border funding took place 
following the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s, only to skyrocket after the liberalisation 
of capital flows in 1995 and Iceland’s participation in the European “passport” system through 
its membership in the European Economic Area, which enabled the recently privatised 
                                                
in law in 1921 forcing Íslandsbanki to sell its base metal reserves to Landsbanki at a discount, the state-owned 
bank expanded and became the country’s central bank with a further capital injection, and an explicit state-
guarantee on all its liabilities in 1927 and 1928 (Björnsson, 1961, 1981). 
53 The split between domestic and foreign is not clear-cut in the pre-WWII period as some foreign borrowing may 
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commercial banks to expand their cross-border operations and thus sow the seeds of their own 
destruction (Gudmundsson, 2013). Non-core banking liabilities peaked at over 50% of total 
banking system liabilities prior to the latest financial crisis (the bulk of it being in foreign 
currency) before collapsing to its 1970s level of 4% in 2012. 
 
3 Different types of financial crises 
Although financial crises come in many shapes and forms, and can be defined in several ways, 
they share a number of commonalities that allow us to define them as episodes involving, inter 
alia, severe disruptions in financial intermediation that typically include large collapses in asset 
prices and credit volumes, serious strains on balance sheets, and collapses of financial 
institutions. Government intervention is often required in an attempt to contain these disruptions 
which often involves the use of fiscal resources and central bank balance sheets. These events 
can often spread over national borders and become global, either through common sources or 
through contagion across countries. 
 The fact that financial crises can take on many guises requires an identification of 
different types of financial crises. In this section we therefore aim to identify the most common 
types: currency crises (and their close relatives, inflation crises) and banking crises.54 As 
financial crises often come in waves, we also construct a “multiple financial crisis indicator” in 
Section 4 to capture the clustering nature of the most severe crisis episodes in a single indicator.  
 
3.1 Currency and inflation crises 
Currency crises usually involve a speculative attack that can lead to a large devaluation or 
depreciation of the currency. They can also involve large interest rate hikes, a rapid depletion 
of foreign reserves, or restrictions on capital outflows as the authorities attempt to halt the 
collapse of the currency. These crises are often triggered by unsustainable economic 
fundamentals, but can also be triggered by a self-fulfilling panic in a multiple equilibria context 








                                                
54 The literature has identified other types of financial crises, mainly stock market, debt, and sudden-stop crises 
(cf. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, and Claessens and Kose, 2014). We do not cover stock market crises in Iceland as 
stock market data does not extend further back than the mid-1980s, while no incidences of sovereign debt crises 
are recorded for Iceland (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011), although the introduction of capital controls and frequent 
inflationary bouts are certainly versions of default – although default through inflation holds less clout for Iceland 
as a significant chunk of government debt is indexed to inflation. Sudden-stop crises are discussed in the main text 
in the context of other crises, mainly currency and banking crises, as these tend to be closely intertwined in such a 




Table 3 Currency and inflation crises in Iceland 
     
Currency crises  Inflation crises 














1919-20 2 0.526 0.263  1916-18 3 0.383 
1932 1 0.219 0.219     
1939 1 0.211 0.211  1940-43 4 0.291 
1950 1 0.508 0.508  1950-51 2 0.335 
1960 1 0.535 0.535     
1968-69 2 0.497 0.248  1969 1 0.241 
1974-85 12 0.978 0.082  1973-89 17 0.392 
1988-89 2 0.324 0.162     
1993 1 0.151 0.151     
2001 1 0.194 0.194     
2008-9 2 0.482 0.241     
        
Averages 
11 episodes 2.4 0.420 0.256  5 episodes 5.4 0.328 
The table reports the dates of currency and inflation crises as identified by the numerical thresholds suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 
2011): exchange rate crises are defined as episodes where annual depreciations is greater than 15% per annum and inflation crises as episodes 
where annual inflation is in excess of 20% per annum (there are a few exceptions though explained in the main text).  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
  
To identify currency and inflation crises, we adopt the numerical criteria suggested by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011): for currency crises the threshold value is an annual 
depreciation of more than 15% per annum, while the threshold for inflation crises is an annual 
inflation rate of more than 20% per annum.55 This criteria gives eleven episodes of currency 
crises in Iceland in our sample period with an average duration of 2.4 years (see Table 3 and 
Figure 7).56 As can be seen, most of the currency crises identified are short-lived with more 
than half of the episodes lasting a year. One episode stands out in terms of its longevity: the 
currency crisis starting in the mid-1970s which lasts for more than a decade with a cumulative 
depreciation amounting to almost 98%. Some of the shorter crisis episodes are also nastier than 
others: the crises in the early 1920s, in 1950, the two crises in the 1960s, and the latest one, all 
saw a collapse of close to 50%.  
                                                
55 The currency threshold is similar to the 25% threshold proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996) but the inflation 
threshold is somewhat lower than what is sometimes used in similar studies (with 40% a common threshold), but 
as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011) point out inflation is usually well below the 20% during the gold standard 
period and a higher threshold would lead us to miss some potentially important crisis episodes. The threshold 
chosen is also well below standard definitions of hyperinflation but our interest goes beyond such extreme 
episodes. In fact, the use of standard definitions of hyperinflation would turn up zero events for Iceland. In 
Appendix 2 we analyse how sensitive our dating results are to variations in the threshold levels for currency and 
inflation crisis. Unsurprisingly, we find that the number of crisis episodes declines when the threshold level is 
increased: for currency crises the number of episodes falls to seven or eight when the threshold is raised to 30-
50%, while the number of inflation crises falls to three when the inflation threshold is doubled to 40%. 
56 Although the average currency depreciation falls just short of the 15% threshold in 1974, we decide to start the 
currency crisis in that year rather than in 1975 as the currency was already depreciating by 20-40% in the latter 
half of 1974. For the same reason we decide to start the crisis in 1988 rather than in 1989 (with the currency already 
declining by 20% in the latter half of 1988). With the average depreciation in 1977 just shy of 10%, the simple 





Another noteworthy feature is that all but the last episode occur during a period which 
Iceland was following some type of an exchange rate peg (see Gudmundsson et al., 2000). 
Many of these episodes reflect attempts to depreciate an overvalued currency following a sharp 
deterioration of terms of trade or a collapse in export demand (1950, 1960, 1968-69, and 1993), 
while some also reflect capital flow reversals and foreign currency shortages (1919-20, 1932, 
and 2008-09). In all too many of these cases the peg proved unsustainable, with monetary policy 
too accommodative, fiscal policy too expansive, and domestic demand unsustainably high. A 
clear example of this is the chronic crisis episode in the mid-1970s to late 1980s, and the episode 
culminating in a currency attack on the fixed exchange rate regime in 2001 that finally brought 
an end to any attempt to peg the currency. Although the latest currency crisis occurs within a 
floating exchange rate regime, most of the characteristics described above also came together 
during this crisis: unsustainable level of demand and a large current account deficit, a sharp 
deterioration of external conditions following the global financial crisis, and large and 
vulnerable balance sheets following the enormous asset price and credit booms in the preceding 
years. We will return to this theme in our discussion of multiple financial crises in Sections 4 
and 5. 
 
Figure 7 Currency and inflation crises 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Not surprisingly, the dating of inflation crises closely follows those of currency crises.57 
Our criteria gives five inflation crisis episodes with an average duration of 5.4 years. All the 
inflation crisis episodes coincide with currency crisis episodes, with the temporal sequence 
usually from a currency crisis to an inflation crisis, although it can be argued that the key source 
                                                
57 The simple correlation between these two types of fiat-money crises is 0.51, while the concordance index (see 
Table 5 below), which measures the relative frequency of both indicators giving the same signal, is 0.85. A close 
connection between inflation and currency crises is also found in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). As with the currency 
crisis dates, we also need to make a judgement call on the inflation crisis dates as average inflation for 1987 falls 
just below the 20% threshold (measures 18.9%), but we decided to include that year in our chronic inflation crisis 
episode in the 1980s rather than having the crisis end in 1986 and resume in 1988 (with inflation ranging between 








1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
USD/ISK exchange rate














for the high real exchange rate and its subsequent correction is usually to be found in the chronic 
inflation throughout a large part of the period.  
 
Currency crises and sudden stops 
Currency crises frequently occur during periods of sharp current account reversals as funding 
of large current account deficits suddenly halts and capital starts flowing out of the country 
leading to strong pressures on the currency. Sudden stop crises (or balance of payment or capital 
account crises) therefore often go hand in hand with currency crises (see Claessens and Kose, 
2014, for an overview). Although we do not have data on aggregate capital flows for the whole 
sample period, we see this pattern clearly in the trade balance data discussed previously (see 
Figure 8). All of the currency crisis episodes coincide with an improvement in the trade balance 
and seven of the eleven currency crises coincide with relatively large improvements (more than 
one standard deviation): the three first episodes in the 1920s and 1930s, the one in the late-
1960s, the chronic episode in the 1970s to 1980s, the 2001 episode, and the latest 2008-9 crisis.  
 
Figure 8 Trade balance and foreign funding of domestic banks 
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Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Sudden stop crises are commonly defined as episodes where large capital flow reversals 
(using a threshold value of two standard deviations) coincide with output collapses (cf. Calvo 
et al., 2008, and Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Applying this definition to our trade balance data 
narrows this down to two episodes: the 1919-20 crisis and the most recent 2008-9 crisis. Both 
led to a very large depreciation of the currency and a reversal of the trade balance amounting 
to 20-30% of GDP from peak to trough. It is also interesting that widespread capital controls 
were introduced in both instances: temporary controls on current account and capital account 
movements in the first episode, while widespread capital account restrictions were introduced 




and capital account controls were also introduced in the early 1930s, but that episode falls just 
shy of the two standard deviation threshold.58 
This pattern of currency crises and sharp capital flow reversals is less clear when looking 
at foreign currency funding of local banks (Figure 8): although the foreign funding share usually 
declines following a financial crisis, these are usually relatively small and only in the last 
episode do we see a clear reversal when the foreign currency share plummets from a historical 
record high of 48% of total banking liabilities in 2007 to 7% in 2010. The domestic banks 
nevertheless faced severe foreign funding pressures in the crises in the 1920s and 1930s, but in 
both instances the government intervened and foreign funding was maintained. Despite the 
sequence of currency crises in the 1970s, the banks’ foreign funding rose throughout this period. 
This probably reflects Landsbanki’s membership of a cross-national consortium of Nordic 
banks, which was discussed in Section 2.6. 
 
3.2 Banking crises 
Banking crises are the type of financial crises which often have the most profound effects on 
the real economy in terms of lost output and jobs (see e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, and 
Frydl, 1999). They can arise for a multitude of reasons through weaknesses on either the asset 
or liability sides of bank’s balance sheets (Claessens and Kose, 2014, give an overview of the 
literature). These weaknesses can be system-wide or start in an individual bank and spread 
through panic to a significant part of the banking system. They can end with outright failures 
of banks or a significant restructuring – often through costly government interventions.  
Unlike the numerical criteria for dating currency and inflation crises, the criteria for 
identifying banking crises is more subjective which often makes the specification of the exact 
start and finish of the crises elusive. This reflects the fact that a specific and unified numerical 
measure to signal an onset of a banking crisis is hard to come by as they tend to vary in how 
they develop. We therefore follow the standard practice in the literature in basing our event 
criteria on identifying dates were there are significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system, as reflected in large-scale bank runs (be that a conventional run on deposits or a more 
“modern” run on wholesale funding) that lead to the closure, merging, or public sector takeover 
of a significant share of the banking system (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, and Laeven 
and Valencia, 2013). We also identify the less onerous banking crises that do not lead to large-
scale banking collapses but still require some type of restructuring and capital injection from 
the public sector to some important financial institution as being non-systemic. The fact that 
banking crises in Iceland from the 1970s to the present day have already been identified by 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
makes life somewhat easier for us. Our task therefore basically involves extending the already 
existing dates back to the start of our sample period in 1875. 
                                                
58 The 1939 crisis also sees a trade reversal that exceeds the two standard deviation threshold but in that case we 
observe a large increase in domestic demand and output rather than a contraction due to the positive effects from 




Using these criteria, we identify five banking crisis episodes, covering 10 years (or 
7.2%) of our 139 year sample period. Thus, banking crises occur on average every 22 years and 
last for 2 years (see Table 4). The 7.2% share of years in a banking crisis is very close to the 
average share found in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, Table 10.5) for other European countries 
(6.3%) and advanced economies in general (7.2%) for the period 1800 to 2008. The average 
duration of 2 years also closely matches what they find for other European countries and 
advanced economies in general (2.1 and 2.2 years, respectively). 
We follow Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) in defining two of these as non-systemic (see 
also Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2011). The first of the two occurs in 1985-86 when one of the 
three state-owned banks (Útvegsbanki), with a market share of roughly 7% of total lending at 
the time, became insolvent following a bankruptcy of a major borrower, eventually leading to 
a government-led merger of the bank with three private banks in 1990. The second non-
systemic banking crisis occurs in 1993 when the larger of two state-owned banks (Landsbanki), 
with a market share of roughly 17% of total lending at the time, needed a capital injection 
amounting to 1% of GDP due to large loan losses following the recession in the years leading 
up to the crisis. As Table 4 shows, neither of these two non-systemic banking crises led to a 
contraction in the aggregate supply of real credit to the economy or had a very large impact on 
government finances. 
 
















1920-21 Systemic 2 0.798 -0.172 -0.033 0.136 
1930-31 Systemic 2 0.664 -0.097 -0.028 0.115 
1985-86 Non-systemic 2 0.074 0.091 -0.053 0.039 
1993 Non-systemic 1 0.172 0.015 -0.009 0.088 
2008-10 Systemic 3 0.935 -0.813 -0.160 0.640 
       
Average  2.0 0.529 -0.195 -0.057 0.204 
The table reports the dates of banking crises used in this study. The dates identified for the 1985-86 and 1993 crises are obtained from 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) (also used by Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2011), while we use Laeven and Valencia (2013) to date the start 
of the latest crisis. To date the two pre-WWII crises we used archived documentation (see the main text). 1. Share of distressed financial 
institutions in total credit by deposit money banks and other lending institutions in year T – 1, where T is the starting year of the banking 
crisis. 2. Change in total real credit between year T – 1 and T. 3. Change in central government fiscal balance between year T – 1 and the 
post-crisis trough in years T to T + 3 (ratio to GDP). 4. Change in central government debt between year T – 1 and the post-crisis peak in 
years T to T + 3 (ratio to GDP). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
The three remaining crises were much more serious and left larger footprints on the real 
economy and none more so than the latest one, which hit in late 2008. Iceland’s three large 
cross-border commercial banks collapsed following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in the 
autumn of 2008 (amounting to roughly 85% of the financial system), shortly followed by the 
failure of most of the smaller saving banks and other financial institutions, eventually leading 
to failure of more than 90% of the total financial system. We follow Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
and date the start of the crisis in 2008 rather than a year earlier as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 




bank failures when the three largest savings banks were taken over by the financial supervisory 
authorities. The macroeconomic consequences of the crisis were huge: per capita domestic 
demand collapsed by almost 28% and GDP lost 8% from 2008 to 2010. The fiscal impact was 
also enormous: the fiscal balance deteriorated by 16% of GDP and central government debt 
rose by 64% of GDP.  
The other two systemic crises were not as severe and fell upon a banking system that 
was dwarfed in terms of sheer size compared to the latest episode, but would still register on 
any banking crisis barometer. The former occurred in the start of the 1920s when the banking 
system ran into loan losses and foreign currency shortages that led to a seizure of cross-border 
payments for some months. The government eventually bailed out the two large commercial 
banks (Íslandsbanki and Landsbanki), suppliers of almost 80% of total lending, by guaranteeing 
a large foreign loan amounting to 8% of GDP (see Ísleifsson, 1986, Nordal, 1997, and Jónsson 
2009).59 The fiscal impact is sizeable, with government debt rising by almost 14% of GDP. The 
second crisis takes place in the early 1930s and is slightly smaller than the previous one. It starts 
when Íslandsbanki (with a market share of 30%) again ran into loan losses and foreign currency 
liquidity problems, which eventually led to its bankruptcy in 1930. Landsbanki (with a market 
share of roughly 35%) also experienced severe foreign currency shortages in 1931, which led 
to the introduction of limits to current account trades and related foreign exchange transactions 
(see Björnsson, 1961, and Nordal, 1997).  
 




Change in government fiscal balance between year T – 1 and the post-crisis trough in years T to T + 3 (ratio to GDP) and change in 
government debt between year T – 1 and the post crisis peak in years T to T + 3 (ratio to GDP). The countries are Argentina (ARG), 
Columbia (COL), Finland (FIN), Iceland (ICE), Ireland (IRE), Indonesia (IND), Korea (KOR), Latvia (LAT), Norway (NOR), Sweden 
(SWE) and Thailand (THA). Year of start of crisis in parenthesis. 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (WEO database), Laeven and Valencia (2013) and Table 4. 
 
The average share of roughly half of the financial system in distress over the five 
episodes is slightly higher than the 40% share that Caprio et al. (2005) find for banking crises 
since 1970 among medium and high income countries. The average increase in government 
                                                
59 This also coincided with a number of bank collapses in Scandinavian during the 1920s, including some of the 































































debt of 20% of GDP is also comparable to the 24% increase Laeven and Valencia (2013) find 
for advanced economies for the period 1970-2011. Comparing average values, however, masks 
how the latest episode stands out in terms of severity. Caprio et al. (2005) record only seven 
instances where 90% or more of the banking system fails (Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea 
and Tanzania in the late 1980s, and the Central African Republic, Costa Rica and Poland in the 
early 1990s), while very few financial crises have left a larger hole in government finances as 
seen in Figure 9. 
 
4 Multiple financial crises 
 
4.1 Identifying multiple crises 
In Table 5 we summarise the key statistical properties of the indicator variables we have 
constructed to capture the dates of different types of financial crises and economic downturns 
(both regular cyclical downturns and the more serious demand disaster episodes). We report the 
number of years in a given crises, the number of crisis episodes, and the average duration of 
each crisis for the whole sample period and for the two subsamples. The first thing to notice is 
that the incidence of currency and inflation crises is mostly concentrated in the post-WWII 
period, both in terms of number of episodes and the number of years in a state of crisis. Currency 
and inflation crises have also tended to last longer in the second period, but no such difference 
is apparent for banking crises, whose relative incidence and duration is very similar across the 
two subsamples. The table also shows that while regular cyclical downturns have become 
slightly less common in the post-WWII period (albeit lasting longer) in line with declining 
economic volatility reported in Table 1, the incidence of the more catastrophic demand disaster 
has actually increased. 
Finally, Table 5 reports the concordance index originally suggested by Harding and 
Pagan (2002) adopted here to capture the co-movement of any two crisis indicators (i.e. the 
relative number of years when a pair of two indicators gives the same signal). Thus, the currency 
and inflation crisis indicators give an identical signal in 85% of the time, with the index in 
general ranging from 0.7-0.9 for other indicator combinations, suggesting that the indicators 
tend to give the same signal most of the time. This measure, however, overstates the coincidence 
of our crisis signals as the relatively frequent “no crisis” signal inflates the statistics.  
At the same time, the concordance index may provide a too narrow measure for 
capturing the typical clustering behaviour of different types of financial crises (a common 
finding in the literature, see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, for an overview) as it only captures 
crisis episodes occurring within the same year. The concordance index therefore does not 
capture the possibility of crises that come in a sequence over a period of some years. For 
example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that currency and banking crises often go hand in 
hand (a so-called twin crisis) with problems in the banking sector usually predating the currency 
crisis, as problems in the banking system lead to a collapse in overall confidence in the economy 
and a run on the currency. An inflation crisis would typically follow the currency crisis, 




sequence is of course also possible, with a currency collapse wreaking havoc in private non-
financial sector balance sheets (especially if they are characterised by currency mismatches), 
leading to large loan losses and eventually to bank collapses.60 Finally, financial turbulences 
can also be triggered by adverse events in the real economy, such as a sharp deterioration of 
terms of trade and a marked slowdown of growth. The financial crisis can therefore amplify the 
economic downturn instead of triggering it. Indeed, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that this 
amplifying nature of financial crises is quite common. Furthermore, these crisis clusters 
typically lead to deeper and longer recessions (see also Bordo et al., 2001) and are usually 
associated with severe disaster episodes as defined by Barro and Ursúa (2008). 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics for crises and downturns 















       
 Total sample (1875-2013) 
Number of years 26 27 10 22 23 25 
Share of sample 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.18 
Number of episodes 11 5 5 6 11 9 
Duration (in years) 2.4 5.4 2.0 3.7 2.1 2.8 
       
 First subsample (1875-1944) 
Number of years 4 7 4 10 13 7 
Share of sample 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.10 
Number of episodes 3 2 2 2 7 4 
Duration (in years) 1.3 3.5 2.0 5.0 1.9 1.8 
       
 Second subsample (1945-2013) 
Number of years 22 20 6 12 10 18 
Share of sample 0.32 0.29 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.26 
Number of episodes 8 3 3 4 4 5 
Duration (in years) 2.8 6.7 2.0 3.0 2.5 3.6 
       
 Concordance index (total sample) 
Currency crises 1.00 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.72 0.79 
Inflation crises  1.00 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.74 
Banking crises   1.00 0.87 0.82 0.82 
Multiple financial crises   1.00 0.91 0.91 
Cyclical downturns    1.00 0.84 
Demand disasters      1.00 
The table reports the number of years in a given crisis and the relative share of years in a crisis state (the number of years in crisis divided 
by total or subsample size). The table also reports the number of crisis episodes and the average duration of each crisis in years. The dates 
for currency and inflation crises can be found in Table 3, while the dates for banking crisis can be found in Table 4 and dates for the multiple 
financial crises indicator in Table 6 below. Dates for cyclical downturns and demand disasters are reported in Table 2. The table reports 
summary statistics for the total sample from 1875-2013 (139 years) and for two subsamples: the period 1875-1944 (70 years) and the period 
1945-2013 (69 years). The concordance index of Harding and Pagan (2002) measures the fraction of time each pair of indicators gives the 
same signal. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
To capture this clustering nature of financial crises in a single “multiple financial crisis 
indicator”, we apply a version of the Harding and Pagan (2006) non-parametric common cycle 
                                                
60 A currency crisis that goes hand in hand with loss of cross-border funding and limited domestic lender of last 




algorithm in an attempt to identify episodes where our different indicators signal a common 
crisis. Specifically, we calculate the end-date of a crisis for the three financial crisis indicators 
and our two macroeconomic measures capturing cyclical downturns and the more punishing 
demand disaster episodes, as we want to concentrate on the more severe crisis episodes. For 
each indicator we then calculate the minimum distance at each point of time to the end-date of 
the next crisis and from that we construct a single common end-date indicator as the median of 
the calculated distances for the five indicators. A common crisis is then identified when the 
following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) there is a local minimum in the common indicator; 
(2) there is as cluster of end-dates, identified when at least 4 of the 5 indicators have an end-
date within two years from the common end-date. If the common end-date is not uniquely 
determined using the above algorithm we use the date which gives the lowest average distance 
to the end-date of the individual indicator, as in Drehmann et al. (2012).  
 
Table 6 Multiple financial crises in Iceland 




contraction   Coinciding crises and economic downturns 






















1931-32 2 0.179 0.034  1932  1930-31 1931-32 1931-32 
 
1948-51 4 0.309 0.043  1950 1950-51  1948-51 1949-52 
 
1968-69 2 0.155 0.045  1968-69 1969  1968-69 1967-68 
 
1991-93 3 0.075 0.023  1993 1973-89 1993 1988-93 1991-92 
 
2008-10 3 0.266 0.069  2008-9  2008-10 2007-10 2009-10 
The table reports the dates of multiple financial crises identified and the currency, inflation and banking crises, and demand disasters and 
cyclical downturns previously identified around these financial crisis episodes (see Tables 2-4). Also reported is the duration of these financial 
crises and the cumulative loss in per capita domestic demand and output in these episodes. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
This algorithm gives us six common crisis episodes with end-dates in 1918, 1932, 1951, 
1969, 1993, and 2010.61 We adopt these end-dates for the common multiple crisis indicator 
                                                
61 Thus, our algorithm excludes the currency and inflation crises in the 1970s and 1980s and the non-systemic 
banking crisis in the mid-1980s as output and domestic demand were actually growing robustly throughout most 
of the period. Extending the cluster width to 3 years as in Drehmann et al. (2012) does not alter our results. Neither 
does adding turning point censoring rules as suggested by Harding and Pagan (2006). We also tried specifying the 
algorithm in terms of common starting dates. This gave us the same six common crisis episodes, except that the 
one in the early 1990s becomes only weakly identified (only identified by three of the five indicators or needing 
an extension of the window to 4 years). The common starting dates, although not as tightly identified as the 
common end-dates in the main text, are also very similar to those chosen. We also applied the algorithm exclusively 
to the financial crisis indicators where a cluster is identified when at least two of the three have an end-date within 
two years from the common end-date. This gave us the same six episodes with broadly the same end-dates but also 
included three additional end-dates (1941, 1986, and 1989). However, the first two additional dates can hardly be 
categorised as severe financial crises as they coincided with robust economic activity (average GDP growth ranged 




(although extending the first one to 1921, as explained below), while looking at each episode 
in turn to define the start dates according to the corresponding start-dates of individual financial 
crisis episodes or a demand disaster (explained below). Table 6 summarises key statistics for 
the six episodes. 
 
4.2 The anatomy of the six multiple crisis episodes 
In this subsection we discuss our six crisis episodes in more detail, both in terms of the exact 
timing of the crises and the sequence of events. We also discuss the development of our 
macroeconomic and financial variables, shown in Figure 10, in the run-up to and aftermath of 
each episode. To analyse their behaviour, we look at each variable relative to its long-term 
trend. The pattern we are interested in is whether our variables, the financial variables in 
particular, tend to grow faster than what is implied by their trend in the lead up to the crisis and 
fall below their trend once the crisis unfolds. If a set of particular variables shows such 
behaviour systematically in the run-up to financial crises, they might serve as useful early-
warning indicators for future financial crises. Alternatively, we may find that each episode is 
different and that an alternative set of variables signals an upcoming crisis in each case. 
To estimate the long-run trend of each variable we need to strike a balance between 
allowing a relatively smooth trend that can still capture possible changes in the trend due to 
structural breaks over the long period we analyse, for example due to financial deepening and 
shifting degree of financial globalisation, against simply matching the actual variable too 
closely. We therefore use the Hodrick-Prescott (1980, 1997) filter, which is a standard method 
for estimating flexible trends in economic data. This approach has also been used for analysing 
financial cycles in a number of studies, such as Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Mendoza and 
Terrones (2008), and is recommended by the Basel Committee (2010) for estimating financial 
gaps for establishing capital buffers (see also Drehmann et al., 2010). 
When using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, one must choose the value of λ, which 
determines how much weight to put on minimising the variability in the cyclical component of 
the series relative to the smoothness of the trend component (a higher value of λ imposes more 
smoothness on the estimated trend). Hodrick and Prescott recommend using λ = 1,600 for 
quarterly data, which has become a standard value for business cycle analysis with quarterly 
data and can be shown to correspond to a business cycle frequency of roughly 7.5 years. As 
financial cycles are thought to be longer than regular business cycles, the Basel Committee 
(2010) recommends using a higher λ value.62 In particular, based on the results in Drehmann et 
al. (2010), they recommend using the value 400,000 for quarterly data which corresponds to a 
financial cycle that is four times longer than the regular business cycle [≈ 44 × 1,600)]. To derive 
the corresponding weight for annual data, we follow Ravn and Uhlig (2002) who show that the 
optimal transformation involves multiplying the quarterly λ weight with the fourth power of the 
observation frequency ratio. This gives us a λ value of 1,563 [= (¼)4 × 400,000)] which we use 
                                                




in this paper.63 Finally, as in Mendoza and Terrones (2008), we choose to base our trend 
estimate on the full sample estimate rather than using recursive estimate as in Gourinchas et al. 
(2001) or a fixed rolling window estimate in the run up to each crises as in D’Ariccia et al. 
(2012) as our annual observations would leave us with too few observations to estimate the 
trend with any precision in the early part of the sample or in the run-up to crisis that follow fast 
on the heels of one another. 
 
Figure 10 Multiple financial crises in Iceland 




Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
  
                                                
63 For the regular business cycle weight of 1,600 for quarterly data this corresponds to a value of 6.25 [= (¼)4 × 
1,600)] for annual data. This is a much lower than the value of 100 originally suggested by Hodrick and Prescott 
for annual data (obtained as (¼)2 × 1,600, which Ravn and Uhlig show is a sub-optimal transformation). Our λ 
value is close to the λ value of 1,000 used by Gourinchas et al. (2001) but higher than the value of 100 used by 
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Tables 7.a-c summarise the results in terms of heat maps for each of the six crisis 
episodes for the period [T – 5 to T + 5], where T is the first year of the crisis. The upper panel 
of each table shows the financial variables included in our sample and the lower panel the 
macroeconomic variables. Each heat map shows the deviations of a given variable from its 
long-term trend in terms of the number of standard deviations of the cyclical component of each 
variable. Red colours denote that the variable is above trend, while blue colours denote that the 
variable is below trend, with darker shades denoting larger deviations from trend. We now 
proceed to discuss each episode in turn. 
 
The 1914-1921 crisis 
We assume that the first multiple financial crisis starts in 1914 with the onset of WWI, which 
marked the beginning of a period of prolonged economic hardship and a sequence of financial 
crises. The Icelandic economy was especially vulnerable to the outbreak of WWI due to its 
heavy reliance on foreign trade. The country’s export ratio was among the highest in Europe 
and most manufacturing goods and approximately half of food consumption were imported 
(Jónsson, 2004). Trade restrictions and enforced trade agreements associated with WWI 
therefore caused widespread shortages of imported goods and loss of important export markets. 
These negative external shocks led to a collapse in domestic demand and output, as well as 
rampant inflation as import prices rose steeply and convertibility of the currency was 
suspended. As peace resumed and foreign trade was restored in 1919 the economy experienced 
a brief recovery, but havoc returned as export prices collapsed in the global post-WWI crisis, 
resulting in extensive bankruptcies of heavily indebted fisheries companies and the emergence 
of a black market for the overvalued domestic currency. Hence, the economy underwent a 
sudden stop and a currency crisis and eventually a systemic banking crisis in 1920. The end-
date of this crisis episode is assumed to be in 1921 when the banking crisis was brought to an 
end with the government’s foreign-funded bail-out of the two largest banks.64 Over this 8 year 
period, output fell by 8.6% and per capita demand by just under 13%, and it took a staggering 
11 years for output to reclaim its pre-crisis peak again (13 years for demand), making this the 
deepest and most protracted recession of the 20th century.65 
As Table 7.a shows, it is mainly output and domestic demand, as well as credit and, to 
some extent, non-core banking liabilities, which were above their long-term trend in the run-up 
to the crisis and subsequently fall below trend. The pattern in the run-up to the crisis reflects 
the export-led growth period spurred by the adaptation of credit-financed advanced fishing 
technology. The Achilles’ heel of this growth strategy was that it was based on a narrow export 
base, concentration of credit risk, and the presence of liberalised cross-border flows of goods 
and capital. All of these factors were tested during WWI and these macro-financial linkages 
remained strong throughout this period. This is, for instance, reflected in real credit remaining 
                                                
64 We decided to date the end of the crisis in 1921 although demand contracted again in 1923-24, due to the strong 
growth recorded in output and demand in the intervening year.  
65 Kjartansson (2003) refers to the period 1914-1923 as “the long economic downturn in Iceland’s 20th century 
history”. Note that both output and, in particular, demand experience a few repeated relapses after temporary 




below its trend for 11 years after the onset of the crisis and output for even longer.66 Hence, real 
credit only returned to its trend 5 years after the banking crisis was resolved and even then it 
was based on bank leverage rising significantly above trend, which played a role in the next 
crisis in the early 1930s.  
 
Table 7.a Financial and macroeconomic variables in the 1914-21 and 1931-32 crises 
                        
 The 1914-21 crisis  The 1931-32 crisis 
                        
 T-5    T    T+5  T-5    T    T+5 
Real house prices                        
Real credit                        
Credit-to-GDP ratio                        
Real M3                        
M3-to-GDP ratio                        
Credit-to-M3 ratio                        
Assets-to-GDP ratio                        
Leverage ratio                        
Foreign non-core liabil.                        
Total non-core liabil.                        
                        
Real GDP                        
Real domestic demand                        
Trade deficit-to-GDP                        
Nominal exchange rate                        
Real exchange rate                        
Terms of trade                        
Inflation                        
                        
The table shows the development of each variable compared to its long-term trend for the five years in the run-up to and in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis, where T indicates the first year of the crisis. The long-term trend is estimated for the whole sample period using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1,563 (see the main text for explanation). Red cells indicate that a variable was 
above trend in a given year with darker red cells indicating ever larger deviations above trend (■ indicates more than 1 standard deviation 
above trend, ■ more than 2 standard deviations above trend, and ■ more than 3 standard deviations above trend). Blue cells indicate that a 
variable was below trend in a given year with darker blue cells indicating ever larger deviations below trend (■ indicates more than 1 
standard deviation below trend, ■ more than 2 standard deviations below trend, and ■ more than 3 standard deviations below trend). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
The 1931-1932 crisis 
The Great Depression did not make its mark on economic growth in Iceland until 1931 when 
export prices collapsed. This year marks the beginning of our second multiple financial crisis, 
which is much shorter than the previous one, lasting only from 1931-32.67 Although short, it 
includes both a systemic banking crisis and currency crisis and its macroeconomic 
consequences are large: per capita demand falls by almost 18% and output by more than 3%. 
The effects of the crisis (and its resolution) are even to a larger degree reflected in the weak 
                                                
66 The credit-to-money ratio, as well as the total non-core financing ratio, also remained below trend for 8 and 9 
years, respectively, as money financing increased during this period after convertibility of the currency was 
suspended. The terms of trade deterioration, the rise in inflation and the accompanying real exchange rate 
appreciation and worsening of the trade balance during the crisis are also evident from the heat map in Table 7.a. 
67 We choose to start this financial crisis in 1931 although we have previously dated the start of the banking crisis 




recovery in its aftermath with 11 years passing before per capita domestic demand reaches its 
pre-crisis level.  
 The macro-financial linkages at work in the run-up to and aftermath of this crisis seem 
broadly similar to the previous one. Just as in the run-up to the 1914-21 crisis, output and 
demand were above their long-term trend levels (see Table 7.a) supported by robust export 
growth related to credit-financed technological improvements in the fisheries sector, reflected 
in real credit rising above its long-term trend. Iceland’s golden age as world-leading salt fish 
supplier reached its peak in the late 1920s, but following the outbreak of the Great Depression, 
fish prices collapsed, tariffs were introduced, followed by the collapse of the important export 
market in Spain during its civil war. Widespread financial distress and a series of bankruptcies 
followed. Hence, the narrow export base, concentration of credit risk, and reliance on foreign 
trade (and funding) proved a precarious combination once again.  
Financial stability was further undermined this time around by the fact that the banking 
sector had not been put on a firm footing in the 1920s: many of the banks’ borrowers remained 
in financial distress (due to a difficult mix of high debt, price deflation, high real interest rates, 
and the revaluation of the króna), the banks’ equity position deteriorated (as reflected in bank 
leverage rising markedly above trend in Table 7.a). Hence, a twin currency and banking crisis 
occurred shortly after the effects of the Great Depression hit the domestic economy. 
 Just as in the previous crisis, the immediate policy response neither included a change 
in interest rates nor the abandoning of the fixed exchange rate peg, but relied instead on the 
introduction of capital and current account restrictions and a government-led intervention in the 
banks’ foreign funding (the króna depreciated against the US dollar but remained fixed against 
the pound sterling until 1939). However, the restrictions were not short-lived this time around 
and the financial restructuring resulted in a state-controlled banking (and corporate) sector – 
both of which proved to be much more enduring in Iceland than in most other advanced 
economies. 
 
The 1948-1951 crisis 
Our third multiple financial crisis follows the demand collapse in 1948 related to a negative 
terms of trade shock and loss of market share as European fisheries recovered after WWII. The 
weakening real economy eventually led to currency and inflation crises in 1950 and a further 
collapse of demand lasting into 1951. Per capita domestic demand fell by a staggering 31% (the 
largest contraction in per capita demand recorded in Iceland) while output fell by just above 4% 
– with output taking 6 years to reclaim its pre-crisis level and per capita demand an eye-popping 
16 years to reclaim its pre-crisis level. 
The crisis must be but into context with WWII, which had profound effects on the 
Icelandic economy. Demand for exports was exceptionally strong during WWII and domestic 
demand was stimulated further by the presence of the occupation forces of 20-30 thousand 
soldiers (or approximately 20% of the total population at the time). Average annual GDP 
growth during the war period was 10%, with domestic demand growing even more rapidly, and 
inflation was rampant. At the end of WWII, income levels were at an all-time high, banking 




However, extensive macro-financial imbalances had built up and they increased considerably 
in the run-up to the crisis when a government-led investment boom took place, exhausting the 
foreign reserves by 1947.  
 
Table 7.b Financial and macroeconomic variables in the 1948-51 and 1968-69 crises 
                        
 The 1948-51 crisis  The 1968-69 crisis 
                        
 T-5    T    T+5  T-5    T    T+5 
Real house prices                        
Real credit                        
Credit-to-GDP ratio                        
Real M3                        
M3-to-GDP ratio                        
Credit-to-M3 ratio                        
Assets-to-GDP ratio                        
Leverage ratio                        
Foreign non-core liabil.                        
Total non-core liabil.                        
                        
Real GDP                        
Real domestic demand                        
Trade deficit-to-GDP                        
Nominal exchange rate                        
Real exchange rate                        
Terms of trade                        
Inflation                        
                        
The table shows the development of each variable compared to its long-term trend for the five years in the run-up to and in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis, where T indicates the first year of the crisis. The long-term trend is estimated for the whole sample period using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1,563 (see the main text for explanation). Red cells indicate that a variable was 
above trend in a given year with darker red cells indicating ever larger deviations above trend (■ indicates more than 1 standard deviation 
above trend, ■ more than 2 standard deviations above trend, and ■ more than 3 standard deviations above trend). Blue cells indicate that a 
variable was below trend in a given year with darker blue cells indicating ever larger deviations below trend (■ indicates more than 1 
standard deviation below trend, ■ more than 2 standard deviations below trend, and ■ more than 3 standard deviations below trend). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Hence, once again, the conditions were ripe for a negative feedback loop between an 
external shock, an overextended domestic economy, and a banking system lacking the 
necessary resilience. These conditions are clearly evident in Table 7.b, for instance, in a 
significantly overvalued real exchange rate and a rapidly growing trade deficit. Warning signs 
are also clear in the financial system with money balances rising well above its trend level, bank 
leverage increasing in a poorly capitalised banking system, signs of overextension in the 
housing market, and credit rising above its long-term trend. Just as in previous crises, the 
authorities were reluctant to use the exchange rate and interest rate when responding to the 
crisis, but instead reinforced capital and current account restrictions, increased the 
government’s role within the economy, and reintroduced substantial subsidies to the troubled 
export sector.  
 
The 1968-1969 crisis 
The fourth multiple financial crisis follows the natural resource crash in 1968 with collapsing 




crisis in 1969. Per capita demand fell by almost 15.5% but output by less or 3%, while both 
took 4 years to reclaim their pre-crisis levels.  
 The negative (real) external shock to the economy was no less severe than in the 
previous crisis but the extent of macro-financial imbalances heading into the crisis were 
considerably smaller this time around as clearly reflected in Table 7.b. That probably played an 
important role in making this a relatively short-lived crisis compared to the previous ones. 
 
The 1991-1993 crisis 
The fifth multiple financial crisis is assumed to start in 1991 with a weakening of the real 
economy eventually leading to currency and non-systemic banking crises in 1993, with per 
capita demand falling by 7.5% and output by more than 2% – and taking 4 and 6 years 
respectively to reclaim their pre-crisis levels. Here, we needed to make a judgement call as the 
demand disaster identified in Section 2.1 is assumed to start earlier, or in 1988. That followed 
a sharp increase in real interest rates to bring the persistent inflation and currency crises 
discussed in Section 3.1 to a halt. However, we decided to date this crisis only from 1991 as 
output continued to grow until 1990 and only started to contract in 1991 when we assume the 
crisis starts. By then a global economic downturn reinforced the domestic disinflationary 
pressures resulting in a recession. But just as in the 1968-69, the extent of macro-financial 
imbalances heading into the crisis were limited (see Table 7.c) and the crisis proved relatively 
short-lived.68  
 
The 2008-2010 crisis 
The sixth and final multiple financial crisis in our sample is truly the perfect storm. We assume 
that it starts in 2008 with a sudden stop and twin currency and systemic banking crises, and a 
collapse in demand lasting into 2010. The economic consequences are devastating: per capita 
domestic demand falls by a whopping 26.6% and output by 8% (based on annual data). 
Although output had almost regained its pre-crisis level in 2013, per capita domestic demand 
remained almost 25% below its 2007-level and will take years to reclaim that level based on 
any reasonable growth assumptions. 
The extent of financial imbalances in the run-up to the 2008-2010 crisis is 
unprecedented and red lights blink across the board well before the crisis hits: all financial 
variables examined in Table 7.c exceeded their long-term trend levels by multiple standard 
deviations and many do so already 4 or 5 years before the start of the crisis. For example, in the 
year before the crisis (in 2007), we find that house prices and non-core bank funding are almost 
4 standard deviations above trend, the credit-to-GDP ratio almost 6 standard deviations above 
trend, and bank assets-to-GDP a staggering 8 standard deviations above trend (the deviations 
of bank leverage from trend is smaller, or “only” just under 2 standard deviations above trend 
but that is probably due to an overvaluation of book-value equity as discussed in Section 2.6). 
The degree of (internal and external) macroeconomic imbalances are also evident from Table 
7.c with output and demand well above trend, a very large trade deficit, and an overvalued 
                                                





currency. Hence, the severity of this crisis episode does not come as a surprise in light of these 
imbalances and the size of the external shock in the form of the global financial crisis and 
accompanying global recession.69 
 
Table 7.c Financial and macroeconomic variables in the 1991-93 and 2008-10 crises 
                        
 The 1991-93 crisis  The 2008-10 crisis 
                        
 T-5    T    T+5  T-5    T    T+5 
Real house prices                        
Real credit                        
Credit-to-GDP ratio                        
Real M3                        
M3-to-GDP ratio                        
Credit-to-M3 ratio                        
Assets-to-GDP ratio                        
Leverage ratio                        
Foreign non-core liabil.                        
Total non-core liabil.                        
                        
Real GDP                        
Real domestic demand                        
Trade deficit-to-GDP                        
Nominal exchange rate                        
Real exchange rate                        
Terms of trade                        
Inflation                        
                        
The table shows the development of each variable compared to its long-term trend for the five years in the run-up to and in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis, where T indicates the first year of the crisis. The long-term trend is estimated for the whole sample period using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1,563 (see the main text for explanation). Red cells indicate that a variable was 
above trend in a given year with darker red cells indicating ever larger deviations above trend (■ indicates more than 1 standard deviation 
above trend, ■ more than 2 standard deviations above trend, and ■ more than 3 standard deviations above trend). Blue cells indicate that a 
variable was below trend in a given year with darker blue cells indicating ever larger deviations below trend (■ indicates more than 1 
standard deviation below trend, ■ more than 2 standard deviations below trend, and ■ more than 3 standard deviations below trend). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
5 General properties of financial crises in Iceland 
Although our identification of these six multiple crisis episodes involves some degree of 
judgement, it allows us to capture the clustering nature of these different types of financial 
crises while concentrating on the more serious ones. It also allows us to highlight some common 
features among these episodes. We see, for example, that a serious financial crisis occurs every 
15½ years on average and although the incidence of these multiple crises is broadly the same 
in the two subsamples (see Table 5 above), the duration is greater in the first half of our sample 
period. We also note that all the episodes involve a demand disaster and in most cases this 
serves as a trigger for the ensuing financial crisis. Furthermore, all six cases involve a currency 
crisis that follows or coincides with the demand disaster. In all but two cases does a banking 
                                                
69 An extensive literature on this crisis, its sources and how it spread world-wide has emerged in recent years, see 
Bordo and Landon-Lane (2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) to name but few. Many aspects of the Icelandic 
crisis are discussed earlier in this paper but also in papers such as Gudmundsson (2013), Rannsóknarnefnd 




crisis emerge – usually towards the end of the crisis episode. We also note that three of the 
multiple crisis episodes involve a twin crisis with a currency crisis and a systemic banking 
collapse (two of which also involve a sudden stop crisis) and these lead to the largest output 
loss and take the longest time to recover from (this is less clear for demand due to the unusually 
large contraction in 1948-51). Interestingly, those episodes are concentrated in the two periods 
of financial globalisation where foreign funding pressures of the domestic banks coincided with 
similar problems among their main foreign creditors, while the two non-banking crisis episodes 
occur in periods where external funding of the domestic banking system was very limited. 
 




Deviations from long-term trend (estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter) for the period [T – 5 to T + 5], where T = 0 is the first year of the 
financial crisis. The figure shows the average and median values across the six financial crises in Table 6. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 11 summarises the typical behaviour of our financial variables in the run-up to 
and aftermath of the six multiple financial crises. On average we find that real house prices 
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the crisis unfolds. However, the average behaviour of real house prices is somewhat dominated 
by the latest crisis episode, as reflected in the median path. This also holds true for some of the 
other financial variables, such as the ratios of banking system assets, credit, and money to GDP 
and the credit-to-money ratio. For other financial variables, the average and median paths are 
more similar. Thus, we see imbalances consistently build up in real credit and money in the 
years leading up to a crisis, with rising bank leverage and non-core funding. Real credit typically 
peaks shortly before the crisis, while real money and leverage peak 2-3 years prior to the crisis 
and non-core funding even earlier. The post-crisis pattern of the financial variables is even 
clearer: all (except bank assets perhaps) fall markedly below trend, thus magnifying the ensuing 
economic contraction. We will return to this issue in our comparison of economic consequences 
of financial crises and regular business cycle downturns in Section 5.2. 
 
5.1 Early-warning signals 
The analysis above suggests that no single financial indicator consistently warns of an ensuing 
financial crisis over all the crisis episodes. While there were clear warning signals across the 
whole spectrum of financial variables leading into the latest crisis, we find cases where each 
financial variable is relatively silent in the run-up to some of the earlier crises and, in two of the 
episodes (in the late 1960s and early 1990s) none of the financial variables gave a clear warning 
signal heading into the crisis. A simple way to summarise the ability of our data to consistently 
give an early-warning signal of an upcoming financial crisis is the non-parametric signal 
extraction approach originally suggested by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), reported in Table 
8. This approach is based on monitoring the evolution of a number of variables in the run-up to 
a financial crisis and interpreting a pattern of behaviour were a variable deviates sufficiently 
from its trend as a warning signal about an upcoming crisis within a specified period of time. 
A variable that frequently sends a correct signal about future crises, while seldom sending a 
false signal – either by signalling a crisis when no crisis follows or missing an upcoming crisis 
– is deemed as having good signalling properties. 
To make this operational, we first define a signal indicator for each variable which is 1 
when the variable deviates by more than 1.5 standard deviations from its long-term trend, 
defined by the Hodrick-Prescott trend previously discussed, and zero otherwise.70 The use of a 
1.5 standard deviation threshold is motivated by its common usage in defining credit booms 
(cf. D’Ariccia et al., 2012, and Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). A lower threshold would increase 
the frequency of crisis signals and thus increase the probability of an indicator signalling a crisis 
while increasing the risk of Type 2 errors (wrongfully signalling a crisis). A higher threshold 
would however increase the risk of Type 1 errors (failure to signal an actual crisis). Having 
defined the signal indicator for each variable, we judge a signal of 1 (0) to be correct if a crisis 
(no crisis) occurs any time within a three-year horizon (Drehmann et al., 2010, also use a three 
year horizon, while Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, use a two-year horizon in a data set of 
monthly frequency). Thus, signals that occur prior to the three-year window are not counted, 
                                                
70 We use the year 1900 as our starting point as that is the first observation for house prices – the variable available 




nor are signals that occur once a crisis has started. Table 8 reports various measures of the 
signalling properties of our financial and macroeconomic variables. 
 
Table 8 Early-warning signals for multiple financial crises 

















Real house prices 0.167 0.167 0.031 0.188 0.342 
Real credit 0.167 0.167 0.063 0.375 0.175 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.842 
Real M3 0.333 0.167 0.031 0.188 0.342 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.333 0.111 0.021 0.188 0.342 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.167 0.111 0.052 0.469 0.128 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.842 
Leverage ratio 0.500 0.222 0.083 0.375 0.175 
Foreign non-core liabilities 0.167 0.167 0.063 0.375 0.175 
Total non-core liabilities 0.333 0.222 0.073 0.328 0.206 
      
Real GDP 0.667 0.333 0.010 0.031 0.699 
Real domestic demand 0.500 0.389 0.010 0.027 0.717 
Trade deficit-to-GDP 0.500 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.842 
Nominal exchange rate 0.167 0.111 0.083 0.750 0.042 
Real exchange rate 0.333 0.278 0.052 0.188 0.342 
Terms of trade 0.500 0.167 0.031 0.188 0.342 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.073 – -0.158 
      
 Averages 
Financial variables 0.250 0.167 0.042 0.248 0.357 
Macroeconomic variables 0.381 0.230 0.037 0.197 0.404 
All variables 0.304 0.193 0.040 0.229 0.376 
The table reports the signalling properties of each variable based on deviations from its Hodrick-Prescott trend that are larger than a 
threshold value of 1.5 standard deviations over a three-year window in the run-up to each of the six financial crises identified. The second 
column gives the fraction of crisis episodes correctly signalled by each variable. The third column reports the number of correct crisis 
signals as a fraction of years in which a crisis signal could have been issued (1 – Type 1 errors). The fourth column reports the number of 
false crisis signals as a fraction of years in which a no-crisis signal could have been issued (Type 2 errors). The fifth column reports the 
ratio between the fractions of good and false signals (the third column divided by the second column). The sixth column gives the difference 
between the conditional probability of a crisis (the fraction of signals issued that were followed by a crisis in the subsequent three years) 
and the unconditional probability of a crisis (i.e. the relative number of crisis years in our sample). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
First, the table reports the success of each variable in signalling crisis episodes, i.e. the 
relative success of signalling the six crises identified within the three year window. Second, the 
table shows the relative number of “good” signals, i.e. the fraction of crises predicted by correct 
signals – for a perfect signalling variable, this measure would be 1 (the variable would signal a 
crisis in all three years up to all the six crisis episodes). Third, the table shows the relative 
number of “false” signals, i.e. the fraction of time a crisis is signalled when no crisis occurs – 
for a perfect signal, this measure would be 0 (the variable would never signal a crisis that does 
not occur). The table also reports the noise-to-signal ratio, i.e. the ratio of the fractions of false 
to good signals. Although the best early-warning indicators are often chosen on the basis of 
minimising the noise-to-signal ratio, we also want variables that correctly signal an upcoming 
crisis, even though they would sometimes give a false signal: policymakers are likely to assign 




occur (Type 2 errors), cf. Borio and Drehmann (2009).71 Finally, the table compares the 
conditional probability of a crisis (i.e. the fraction of signals issued by the variable that were 
followed by a crisis in the subsequent three years) to the unconditional probability of a crisis 
(the relative number of years in crises identified in our sample). For a variable containing useful 
information, the conditional probability should be higher than the unconditional one while 
variables with poor signalling properties would record a low or even a negative value – 
indicating that they contain no useful information. 
Not surprisingly, given the outcomes in Tables 7.a-c, we find that the financial variables 
have given relatively few good signals across the six crisis episodes and some of them have a 
relatively high noise ratio. At first sight, variables such as the bank assets-to-GDP ratio may 
seem as a relatively good indicator, as it has a zero noise ratio, but at the same time it has a 
track record of only signalling one of the six crises. At a cost of a slightly higher noise ratio, 
the leverage ratio, total non-core bank funding and real money growth score higher on 
predicting future crises and might therefore prove more valuable as early-warning indicators 
despite some false signals. 
While the financial variables seem somewhat underwhelming in their ability to 
consistently signal a crisis across the six episodes identified here, the macroeconomic variables, 
in particular output, domestic demand and the trade deficit, seem to do somewhat better: these 
three variables have a low noise ratio while being able to signal half to two-thirds of the crisis 
episodes and sending a correct signal 30-40% of the time. The real exchange rate and terms of 
trade also seem to contain some valuable information, while the nominal exchange rate and 
inflation do not seem to be very valuable early-warning indicators. It should be noted, that the 
trade deficit serves a dual role in our analysis as both an indicator of macroeconomic imbalances 
and financial fragility due to reliance on cross-border capital flows. Hence, its ability to warn 
of an ensuing crisis may reflect the fact that it captures the fragile reliance of booms being 
financed from abroad within such a small open economy.  
Comparing the average scores across financial and macroeconomic variables suggests 
that while the frequency of false signals is roughly equal across both sets of variables, the main 
difference lies in the ability of the macroeconomic variables to correctly signal an upcoming 
crisis. This leads to a lower noise ratio for the macroeconomic variables and ties in well with 
the analysis above on their importance in triggering a crisis. The financial variables then play 
an important role in amplifying the crisis and the ensuing contraction (see the discussion 
below).72 But as the latest episode so clearly shows, the financial variables can also serve as 
early-warning signals, especially when so many of them send an identical signal over such an 
extended period. It is also important to note that the latest episode is the only financial crisis in 
Iceland’s history where both the real economy and the financial system are relatively advanced 
                                                
71 This is presumably why we value insights of people, such as one renowned economist who was once said to 
have foreseen ten of the last five financial crises. 
72 The importance of macroeconomic variables as early-warning indicators is also found in other studies, see for 
example Davis and Karim (2008) and the summary in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). See, for example, Rose and 





and modern. The latest episode might therefore be of more relevance than past episodes in 
constructing early-warning indicators to warn against possible future financial crises.73 
 
5.2 Real effects of multiple financial crises 
The discussion above suggests that financial crises in Iceland have been costly in terms of lost 
economic activity. But as crises usually coincide with “regular” business cycle downturns (and 
are indeed often triggered by these as discussed above), we also want to establish whether they 
simply reflect output losses related to the business cycle downturns or whether financial crises 
actually make the associated recessions more severe. Failure to distinguish between output 
losses in financial crises to those in regular business cycle downturns would suggest that 
financial crises are not that special in terms of economic consequences. Larger output losses in 
financial crises would, however, suggest that they trigger some macro-financial linkages that 
amplify the hardship of the recession (e.g. leading to financial disintermediation, liquidity 
spirals, rising risk premia, reducing access to working capital and external finance in general). 
Indeed, this is what is commonly found in the literature (cf. Bordo et al., 2001, Bordo and 
Landon-Lane, 2012, and Claessens et al., 2012) and is clearly visible in our data too, cf. Table 
9. 
First, the table reports the average cumulative contraction in GDP during business cycle 
downturns and in per capita demand during demand disasters from Table 2: the average 
contraction is 7.6% in GDP and 18.4% in per capita demand, respectively, with the downturns 
lasting for roughly 2-3 years. It is clear, however, from the table that downturns that overlap 
with financial crises are worse both in terms of accumulated losses and duration: output and 
demand contract by roughly 1½ times more on average during financial crises than during 
downturns that do not coincide with financial crises and these downturns last for about a year 
longer on average. 
The table shows that most of the eleven business cycle downturns and nine demand 
disasters previously identified coincide with financial crises: business cycle downturns that 
coincide with financial crisis account for roughly two-thirds of all business cycle downturns. 
This is somewhat higher than the 50% share reported by Claessens et al. (2012) for a sample of 
61 countries over the period 1960-2011 and may reflect the fact that our criteria for identifying 
business cycles possibly leaves out some of smaller downturns that have less to do with 
financial crises. Not surprisingly, the share in demand disasters is even higher, or almost 80%, 
creating some potential problems in comparing average outcomes over the two types of 
episodes due to the small number of observations in the case where no financial crises take 
                                                
73 The robustness analysis in Appendix 1 suggests that this overall finding of somewhat underwhelming success 
of giving early-warning signals of financial crises continues to hold when looking at the currency and banking 
crises separately. The ability to signal an upcoming crisis tends to deteriorate compared to what we find for the 
multiple financial crises, in particular the ability of the macroeconomic variables to predict an upcoming banking 
crisis. The robustness analysis in Appendix 2 also shows that the early-warning ability of the financial and 
macroeconomic variables continues to be somewhat underwhelming when the multiple financial crises that some 
might argue are real economic shocks rather than true financial crises are excluded from the analysis. The 
signalling performance tends to improve marginally when crises episodes that our variables fail to flag are left out, 




place. The lower panel of Table 9 therefore also compares outcomes for the average of all 
contractions in both series and the cumulative contraction and duration in years of subsequent 
contractions. Again, the data suggests that financial crises are particularly nasty: the average 
per-year contraction is 1½-2½ times larger while the cumulative contraction is roughly 3 times 
larger and the contractions last for up to a year longer on average. In Appendix 2 we show that 
these results continue to hold when the multiple financial crises that some might argue are real 
economic shocks rather than true financial crises are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Table 9 Comparison of recessions with and without financial crises 
        
 Business cycle downturns and demand disasters 
        
 GDP  Per capita domestic demand 















Cumulative contraction 0.076 0.087 0.059  0.184 0.202 0.121 
Average duration 2.1 2.6 1.3  2.8 3.0 2.0 
Frequency 11 7 4  9 7 2 
        
 Yearly contractions 
        
 GDP  Per capita domestic demand 















Average contraction 0.032 0.037 0.025  0.057 0.094 0.039 
Cumulative contraction 0.052 0.084 0.027  0.092 0.162 0.060 
Average duration 1.7 2.3 1.3  1.7 1.9 1.6 
Frequency 30 16 14  50 16 34 
The upper panel of the table reports outcomes for the identified business cycle downturns and demand disaster episodes (see Table 2). Reported 
are the average cumulative contraction in GDP and per capita demand during these episodes, their average duration (in years) and the number 
of episodes. The table also compares episodes that coincide with multiple financial crises (see Table 6) and those that do not. The lower panel 
of the table similarly reports the outcomes for all contractionary years in GDP and per capita demand. Reported are the average yearly 
contractions and the average cumulative contractions over years of subsequent contractions, the average duration of periods of subsequent 
contractions (in years) and the number of years of contraction for the whole sample and years that coincide with multiple financial crises and 
years that do not.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
5.3 Are there important spillover effects of global financial crises to Iceland? 
It is well known that financial crises often have an important international dimension of some 
kind, be that due to common sources of vulnerability in a financially integrated global economy, 
such as the credit and asset price bubbles experienced by many advanced economies in the run-
up to the most recent crisis, or due to the transmission of crises from one country (often a global 
financial centre) to another as a result of cross-border contagion working through both financial 
and trade channels (see, for example, Kaminsky et al., 2003, and Borio et al., 2014). Both types 
of channels were at work in the recent global crisis but also played a part in many earlier 
episodes (cf. Bordo and Murshid, 2001). Not surprisingly, these global crises tend to be more 




To measure the global incidence of financial crises, we use the aggregate indices for 70 
countries constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) for banking crises and for general 
financial crises which also include currency, inflation, debt, and stock market crises (with equal 
weights for each indicator). Figure 12 shows the data for the period 1875-2010 (the last 
observation in Reinhart’s and Rogoff’s sample). To reflect the fact that a crisis in a large 
economy is more likely to resonate on a global scale than a crisis in a small economy, we also 
construct GDP-weighted indicators using PPP-adjusted GDP weights.74  
 




Share of 70 countries in a given crisis from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). The weighted series use each country’s average 1950-2010 share 
in total GDP using PPP-adjusted nominal GDP in Geary-Khamis US dollars (from Penn World Tables). The multiple global financial 
crisis measure is obtained as the sum of currency, inflation, sovereign external debt, banking, and stock market crises indicators in Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2011). Horizontal broken lines denote 3 standard deviations from the whole-sample average share. 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Penn World Tables, and authors’ calculations. 
 
The figure also shows horizontal lines representing 3 standard deviations from the 
sample average of the country shares to capture the most serious global crises (see also Bordo 
and Landon-Lane, 2012). Looking at the GDP-weighted series, this allows us to identify four 
severe global bank-specific crises and six others of a more general nature.75 The first crisis 
occurs in 1914 with the outbreak of WWI which led to a global liquidity crisis, stock market 
closings and widespread banking collapses. Another global financial crisis follows soon at the 
                                                
74 As weights, we use each country‘s average 1950-2010 share in PPP-adjusted nominal GDP in Geary-Khamis 
US dollars from the Penn World Tables using Reinhart and Rogoff‘s (2011) 70 country sample to proxy world 
output (the total share amounts to 82% of world output over the period 1950-2010). This is a slightly different 
weighting system from what Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011) use but the difference should by minor. The index 
for overall global financial crises should therefore closely match the BCDI+-index constructed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009). 
75 The banking panic of 1907 that began in the US following the San Francisco earthquake in 1906 and quickly 
spread out to a number of other industrial countries comes close to exceeding the threshold but just misses out. 
The Barings Bank crisis in the early 1890s and the Latin America debt crisis in the mid-1980s also come close. 
The higher values for the GDP-weighted series than the unweighted series over most of the sample period reflects 
the relative concentration of crisis episodes among the larger economies. The exception is the financial crisis in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, which was more concentrated among smaller, emerging market economies. See 
Kindleberger and Aliber (2011), Eichengreen and Bordo (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Bordo and 
Landon-Lane (2012) for a more detailed description of these and other global financial crisis episodes discussed 
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start of the 1920s with widespread currency crises and a global recession when international 
monetary conditions were tightened to rein in the inflation that had built up following WWI, 
with banking crises occurring in many small European countries (including the Scandinavian 
countries). This crisis was, however, dwarfed by what followed by the end of the decade with 
the onset of the Great Depression triggered by the stock market collapse in the US. Soon other 
market collapses followed, with a record number of bank failures and a sharp increase in 
sovereign defaults. There is another cluster of crises around the start and end of WWII, and 
extending into the late 1940s – mostly related to sovereign defaults and inflation crises (the 
latter period has also been identified as a global financial crisis episode by Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011, and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2011). The next episode relates to the banking 
crises of the early 1990s starting with the Scandinavian and Japanese crises at the beginning of 
the decade, followed by the Tequila crisis in 1994 and Asian crisis in 1997-98. The final episode 
is the most recent global crisis starting in the US but spreading rapidly throughout most of the 
world, in particular through widespread funding and asset market collapses and bank panics. In 
terms of its impact on real economic activity and asset markets and the ferocity with which it 
spread globally it stands out as the most serious global financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. 
A quick comparison of the dates of these global episodes and the crisis dates for Iceland 
identified in Sections 3 and 4 suggests an important contagion effect from the global episodes 
to Iceland and this is further highlighted by the simple regression results shown in Table 10. 
The probit estimates suggest strong international contagion effects in the case of banking and 
multiple financial crises but less so for currency and inflation crises. Icelandic banking and 
general financial crises therefore seem to have a strong international component while domestic 
currency and inflation crises seem to be dominated by local factors (a common finding in the 
literature, cf. Joy et al., 2015). The significance of the lagged dependent variable, suggests 
furthermore that financial crisis in Iceland tend to be highly persistent.76 
The estimation results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the share of 
countries in a financial crisis (which represents roughly a doubling of the share of countries in 
a crisis) increases the probability of a financial crisis in Iceland by 5-7 percentage points.77 
Since the sample frequency of these crises in Iceland is relatively low (just above 7% for 
banking crisis and just under 16% for multiple financial crisis), this represents a significant 
increase in crisis probabilities within a range of plausible shocks to the global share of countries 
in a crisis. A more extreme shock of three standard deviations (our criteria for identifying the 
most serious global episodes) would correspondingly lead to a sharper rise in the crisis 
probability: the probability of a banking crisis in Iceland would rise by 17 percentage points, 
                                                
76 Thus, for any given year the probability of a crisis increases by about 50-75% if there is a crisis in the preceding 
year compared to if there is no crisis in the preceding year, other things kept constant. This persistence of financial 
crises is commonly found in the literature, cf. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
77 A one standard deviation increase in the share of countries in a banking crisis represents an increase from the 
average share of 11.3% to 25.7%. A similar rise in the share of countries in a general financial crisis represents an 




while the probability of a multiple financial crisis would rise by more than 20 percentage points, 
thus leading to a two- to threefold increase in the probability of a financial crisis in Iceland.78  
 
Table 10 International financial crises and the probability of a financial crisis in Iceland 
          
 Different types of financial crises in Iceland 
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Marginal effects – – 0.056 0.049  – – – 0.069 
          
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.516 0.394 0.482  0.214 0.511 0.271 0.528 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The table reports the outcomes of probit regressions of different financial crisis indicators for Iceland (see dates in Tables 2-4, 6) on its own 
one-year lag and the GDP-weighted share of countries in banking crises and general financial crises, respectively, from Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) (see note to Figure 12). The estimation period is 1875-2010 (135 observations). Numbers in parenthesis are robust (Hubert-White) 
standard errors and parameters significant at the 5% critical level are in italics. The LR test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the 
parameters (except the constant) in the probit regression equal zero. The table also reports the marginal effect of increasing the share of countries 
in crises by one standard deviation, evaluating the regressors at their sample mean. The table only reports the marginal effects where the global 
share is found to be statistically significant from zero. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Finally, Figure 13 compares the dates of banking and multiple financial crises in Iceland 
discussed previously to their global counterparts, again confirming visually how strongly linked 
most of the Icelandic crises are to the above global events. In fact, it can be argued that the only 
true Iceland-specific crisis is the 1968-69 episode, which does not seem to have an international 
counterpart. The others can, to a different degree, all be linked to some international crisis 
episode: the impact of WWI; the financial crisis of 1920-21 and the Scandinavian banking crisis 
of the same period; the Great Depression; the global trade collapse and the Korean war by the 





                                                
78 The robustness analysis in Appendix 2 shows that these results continue to hold when the multiple financial 
crises that some might argue are real economic shocks rather than true financial crises are excluded from the 
analysis. Appendix 2 also shows that our findings that global factors play less of a role for currency and inflation 
crises are found to be robust to variation in the currency and inflation crisis dates. 
79 Even the relatively small banking crisis of the mid-1980s has an international angle, with the Latin American 
debt crisis at the beginning of the decade followed by widespread banking problems, although it may not have 




Figure 13 International spillover of global financial crises to Iceland 




Share of 70 countries in a given crisis from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) weighted by their average 1950-2010 share in total GDP of these 
countries using PPP-adjusted nominal GDP in Geary-Khamis US dollars (from Penn World Tables). The multiple global financial crisis 
measure is obtained as the sum of currency, inflation, sovereign external debt, banking, and stock market crises indicators in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011). Horizontal lines denote 3 standard deviations from the whole-sample average share. 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Penn World Tables, and authors’ calculations. 
 
6 Conclusions  
In this paper we analyse financial crises in Iceland over a period spanning almost one and a half 
century. For this purpose, we construct a dataset that includes measures of overall economic 
activity (output and domestic demand) and macroeconomic variables capturing the small, open, 
commodity-based nature of the Icelandic economy (trade balance, nominal and real exchange 
rate, and terms of trade) for the period 1875-2013. We also include inflation to take account of 
the chronic inflation crises of the Icelandic economy. From our data on output and domestic 
demand we identify dates of regular business cycle downturns and the more punishing episodes 
of large collapses in per capita domestic demand (identified in the same way as Barro and Ursúa, 
2008, define consumption disasters) which we use to analyse the interaction of economic 
downturns and financial busts. 
Our dataset includes several financial variables as well. The key variables in any 
analysis of financial booms and busts: money, credit, and house prices, are included but also 
variables reflecting the banking system balance sheet to uncover additional sources of financial 
imbalances. On the asset side, we include banking system total assets relative to GDP as a 
general measure of financial vulnerabilities (reflecting both systemic risk and market liquidity). 
On the liability side, we include the banking system leverage ratio to capture the extent to which 
bank assets are being financed with debt, and the share of banking system non-core funding 
(both in foreign currency and in total) in overall funding to capture the stability of the funding 
position of the banking system. Our dataset therefore includes macroeconomic variables that 
reflect the structure of the economy and some financial variables that are rarely found in the 
literature on financial crises due to lack of data availability over sufficiently long periods to be 
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We identify three types of financial crises. First, we identify eleven currency crises, 
ranging from some short, but nasty, episodes in the early 1920s, in 1950, 1960, and 2008, to the 
chronic crisis lasting from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. Two of these episodes (the one in 
the early 1920s and the latest episode; with the one in the early 1930s coming close) involve a 
sudden stop of capital inflows that eventually leads to the introduction of capital controls. We 
also identify five episodes of the closely related inflation crises, all of which coincide with a 
currency crisis (either lead to or, more commonly, follow). Finally, we identify five banking 
crises – of which three are adjudged to be systemic (in the early 1920s, early 1930s and in 
2008), while two are non-systemic and therefore leave smaller footprints on the real economy 
(in the mid-1980s and in 1993). 
Recognising that different types of financial crises tend to come in clusters, we also 
construct a single “multiple financial crisis indicator” using a non-parametric common cycle 
algorithm. This allows us to identify six major financial crises occurring every fifteen years 
with each lasting almost four years on average. The first episode coincides with the outbreak of 
World War I and lasts into the early 1920s. The second crisis starts in the early 1930s, 
coinciding with the Great Depression. While the third crisis has a clear link with the global 
financial crisis in the late 1940s following the collapse of global trade and the Korean War, the 
fourth crisis in the late 1960s has almost exclusively Iceland-specific sources related to 
collapsing fish catch. The fifth crisis episode occurs in the early 1990s, coinciding with 
numerous financial crises abroad, and was related to falling economic activity following 
attempts to rein in the chronic inflation of the 1970s and the 1980s. The final episode starts in 
2008 and coincides with a serious global financial crisis. It turns out to be the largest financial 
crisis in the country’s history with over 90% of the financial system collapsing. All but one of 
these six episodes therefore coincide with a serious global financial crisis and our empirical 
results, indeed, suggest that the most serious global episodes coincide with a two- to threefold 
increase in the probability of a financial crisis in Iceland. 
We find that these six crisis episodes have many things in common. All, for example, 
involve a serious demand disaster and in most cases this serves as a trigger for the ensuing 
financial crisis. In all six cases does the crisis also involve a currency crisis that follows or 
coincides with the demand disaster. In all but two cases does a banking crisis emerge – usually 
towards the end of the crisis. We also find that these crises tend to have serious economic 
consequences: economic contractions coinciding with these episodes tend to be about twice as 
deep as regular business cycle downturns and last almost twice as long. 
 But at the same time we also find that each episode is unique in some way. Financial 
imbalances played an important role in the first three financial crises, with broad money, credit 
and bank leverage (and to a lesser extent, house prices) rising markedly above trend in the run 
up to these episodes. No clear signs of financial imbalances in the build-up to the crises in the 
late 1960s and early 1990s can be detected, however, suggesting that these episodes had pure 
real economy sources. Finally, we see a build-up of financial imbalances leading into the latest 
crisis episode that are truly unprecedented: most of the financial variables rise above their trend 
level by an eye-popping 4-8 standard deviations, while we also detect a build-up of significant 




importance of financial imbalances in these six crises, we are unable to find robust financial 
early-warning signals across all six episodes. However, we find that macroeconomic variables, 
such as output, domestic demand, the trade balance and, to a lesser extent, the real exchange 
rate, give a somewhat more robust warning signal. 
Our analysis of financial crises naturally raises the question of whether our financial 
variables tend to move together in long “financial cycles”, and if so, how these common cycles 
interact with regular business cycles and, more importantly, whether the peaks and troughs of 
these financial cycles tend to coincide with financial turbulences. This is the topic of the second 







Appendix 1 Early-warning signals for currency and banking 
crises? 
The results in Table 8 in the main text suggest that no single financial variable succeeds in 
providing an early-warning signal on a consistent basis for the six multiple financial crises we 
identify. However, our results suggest that some of the macroeconomic variables, such as 
output, domestic demand, the trade balance, and, to a lesser extent, the real exchange rate, do a 
somewhat better job. Here we redo our analysis separately for the currency and banking crises 
we identify in Section 3. Overall, we see no improvement in the signalling properties of our set 
of financial and macroeconomic variables compared to those reported in the main text. The 
noise ratio rises on average, especially for the macroeconomic variables in the case of banking 
crises. The somewhat underwhelming early-warning properties of our variables found in the 
main text for the six multiple financial crises therefore continue to hold for the currency and 
banking crises we identify. 
 
Table A.1.1 Early-warning signals for currency crises 

















Real house prices 0.091 0.091 0.025 0.272 0.311 
Real credit 0.091 0.091 0.074 0.815 0.044 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.091 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.711 
Real M3 0.091 0.030 0.062 2.037 -0.123 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.182 0.091 0.037 0.407 0.211 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.091 0.061 0.037 0.611 0.111 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.091 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.711 
Leverage ratio 0.091 0.061 0.086 1.426 -0.067 
Foreign non-core liabilities 0.182 0.121 0.049 0.407 0.211 
Total non-core liabilities 0.273 0.182 0.062 0.340 0.256 
      
Real GDP 0.273 0.121 0.049 0.407 0.211 
Real domestic demand 0.273 0.152 0.025 0.163 0.425 
Trade deficit-to-GDP 0.364 0.182 0.012 0.068 0.568 
Nominal exchange rate 0.182 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.711 
Real exchange rate 0.364 0.242 0.049 0.204 0.377 
Terms of trade 0.182 0.061 0.086 1.426 -0.067 
Inflation 0.091 0.091 0.062 0.679 0.086 
      
 Averages 
Financial variables 0.127 0.091 0.043 0.631 0.237 
Macroeconomic variables 0.247 0.139 0.041 0.421 0.330 
All variables 0.176 0.111 0.042 0.545 0.275 
The table reports the signalling properties of each variable based on deviations from its Hodrick-Prescott trend that are larger than a 
threshold value of 1.5 standard deviations over a three-year window in the run-up to each of the eleven currency crises identified in Table 
3. The second column gives the fraction of crisis episodes correctly signalled by each variable. The third column reports the number of 
correct crisis signals as a fraction of years in which a crisis signal could have been issued (1 – Type 1 errors). The fourth column reports 
the number of false crisis signals as a fraction of years in which a no-crisis signal could have been issued (Type 2 errors). The fifth column 
reports the ratio between the fractions of good and false signals (the third column divided by the second column). The sixth column gives 
the difference between the conditional probability of a crisis (the fraction of signals issued that were followed by a crisis in the subsequent 
three years) and the unconditional probability of a crisis (i.e. the relative number of crisis years in our sample). 
 





Table A.1.1 reports the average signalling properties of the financial and 
macroeconomic variables for the eleven currency crises identified in Table 3. Compared to the 
results in the main text, we find that the signalling properties of individual financial variables 
deteriorate in most cases through a combination of a declining fraction of good signals and a 
rising fraction of bad signals. The same applies for the macroeconomic variables, except for the 
nominal exchange rate where the noise ratio declines. The overall signalling properties of both 
sets of variables tends to deteriorate but the relative success of the financial and macroeconomic 
variables remains unchanged.  
 
Table A.1.2 Early-warning signals for banking crises 

















Real house prices 0.200 0.200 0.030 0.152 0.368 
Real credit 0.200 0.200 0.061 0.303 0.202 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.868 
Real M3 0.200 0.067 0.051 0.758 0.035 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.400 0.200 0.030 0.152 0.368 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.200 0.133 0.051 0.379 0.154 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.868 
Leverage ratio 0.400 0.267 0.081 0.303 0.202 
Foreign non-core liabilities 0.200 0.200 0.061 0.303 0.202 
Total non-core liabilities 0.200 0.200 0.081 0.404 0.141 
      
Real GDP 0.200 0.067 0.061 0.909 0.011 
Real domestic demand 0.200 0.200 0.040 0.202 0.297 
Trade deficit-to-GDP 0.400 0.267 0.020 0.076 0.535 
Nominal exchange rate 0.200 0.133 0.081 0.606 0.068 
Real exchange rate 0.400 0.333 0.081 0.242 0.253 
Terms of trade 0.200 0.067 0.081 1.212 -0.020 
Inflation 0.400 0.200 0.091 0.455 0.118 
      
 Averages 
Financial variables 0.240 0.187 0.044 0.275 0.341 
Macroeconomic variables 0.286 0.181 0.065 0.529 0.180 
All variables 0.259 0.184 0.053 0.380 0.275 
The table reports the signalling properties of each variable based on deviations from its Hodrick-Prescott trend that are larger than a 
threshold value of 1.5 standard deviations over a three-year window in the run-up to each of the five banking crises identified in Table 4. 
The second column gives the fraction of crisis episodes correctly signalled by each variable. The third column reports the number of correct 
crisis signals as a fraction of years in which a crisis signal could have been issued (1 – Type 1 errors). The fourth column reports the number 
of false crisis signals as a fraction of years in which a no-crisis signal could have been issued (Type 2 errors). The fifth column reports the 
ratio between the fractions of good and false signals (the third column divided by the second column). The sixth column gives the difference 
between the conditional probability of a crisis (the fraction of signals issued that were followed by a crisis in the subsequent three years) 
and the unconditional probability of a crisis (i.e. the relative number of crisis years in our sample). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Table A.1.2 repeats the exercise for the five banking crises in Table 4. For the individual 
financial variables we tend to see a slight improvement, mainly through a rising fraction of 
good signals, although the average noise ratio for the financial variables rises marginally 
compared to what we find in Table 8. The signalling power of most of the macroeconomic 
variables deteriorates significantly, however, mainly through a declining fraction of good 




can also be seen in domestic demand and the terms of trade. Although the signalling power of 
the trade balance deteriorates as well, it still retains some of its early-warning information. But 
the overall signalling properties of the macroeconomic variables deteriorate markedly and 






Appendix 2 To be or not to be a financial crisis: how robust are the 
results to different crisis definitions? 
In an economy as volatile as the Icelandic one, where large currency and inflation fluctuations 
have historically been common, it can be debated whether all the episodes we identify as 
currency and inflation crises constitute true crisis episodes or whether they are simply a part of 
the economy’s normal, albeit volatile, business cycle. By the same token, it can also be debated 
whether all the multiple financial crises we identify in Section 4 are truly financial crisis 
episodes or whether some of them simply reflect the large real economy adjustments to external 
shocks this very small and open resource-based economy has commonly faced throughout the 
period. 
 In this Appendix, we check whether our key results are robust to different definitions of 
our financial crisis episodes. We start by looking at different threshold levels for identifying 
currency and inflation crises. In the second half of the Appendix, we test whether our analysis 
of the multiple financial crises are altered when excluding what may be viewed as the most 
contentious episodes from our crisis sample. We find that all of our key results are robust to 
these variations in crisis definitions. 
 
A.2.1 Raising the threshold definition for currency and inflation crises 
We start by documenting how our identification of currency and inflation crises changes when 
the threshold criteria is raised from the 15% per annum depreciation used by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009, 2011). The first panel of Table A.2.1 shows the currency crises identified when 
the threshold is doubled to a 30% per annum depreciation. In this case, the number of currency 
crisis declines to eight episodes from the original eleven episodes. Four episodes drop out of 
the original list: the episodes in 1932, 1939, 1993, and 2001, while the long crisis episode 
originally identified as starting in 1974 and ending in 1985 is now split into two episodes: one 
in 1975 and the other from 1978-85. The average duration of the currency crises remains almost 
identical to that using the original threshold level, however. The second panel of the table shows 
what happens when we raise the threshold even further. Here, we only include episodes where 
the currency depreciates by more than 50% per annum, but also retaining episodes that have 
depreciations over two consecutive years that exceed 50%. In this case the number of currency 
crises falls to seven, with the episode in the late 1980s dropping out and the long crisis episode 
starting in 1978 now ending in 1983 rather than 1985 as when the 30% threshold level is used. 
Other than that, the results are identical to those using the 30% threshold level.  
The third panel of Table A.2.1 shows what happens when we similarly double the 
threshold level for inflation crises to a 40% per annum level of inflation. In this case, the number 
of episodes falls from five to three, with the two episodes in the early 1940s and 1950s and the 
episode in the late 1960s dropping out, while the chronic inflation crisis originally identified 
from 1973 to 1989 is now split into two shorter episodes from 1974-75 and 1978-83. Finally, 
the first episode, originally identified as starting in 1916 and lasting into 1918, is now 





Table A.2.1 Currency and inflation crisis dates: robustness analysis 
           
Currency crises  
threshold raised to 30%  
Currency crises  
threshold raised to 50%  
Inflation crises  
threshold raised to 40% 















1919-20 2 0.263  1919-20 2 0.263  1917 1 0.536 
1950 1 0.508  1950 1 0.508     
1960 1 0.535  1960 1 0.535     
1968-69 2 0.248  1968-69 2 0.248     
1975 1 0.348  1975 1 0.348  1974-75 2 0.462 
1978-85 8 0.119  1978-83 6 0.153  1978-83 6 0.561 
1989 1 0.246         
2008-9 2 0.241  2008-9 2 0.241     
           
Average 2.3 0.313  Average 2.1 0.328  Average 3.0 0.520 
The table reports the dates of currency and inflation crises identified by different thresholds to those used in the main text. The first panel 
shows the dates for currency crises when the threshold for currency depreciations is doubled to 30% per annum. The second panel shows the 
dates for currency crises when the threshold for currency deprecations is raised to 50% per annum while also including dates that do not fulfil 
that criteria but have deprecations over two consecutive years that exceed 50%. The third panel shows the dates for inflation crises when the 
threshold for annual inflation is doubled to 40% per annum.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
A.2.2 Excluding some of the multiple financial crises 
In the second part of this Appendix, we test whether the results in Section 5 are robust to 
variations in the identification of the six multiple financial crises. Specifically, we test our 
results on the early-warning signal properties of our macroeconomic and financial variables in 
Section 5.1, our comparison of downturns coinciding with these financial crisis episodes and 
those downturns that do not in Section 5.2, and the extent of global spillovers in Section 5.3, to 
sequentially leaving out the financial crises in 1948-51, 1968-69, and 1991-93. These three 
episodes are chosen as they do not coincide with a banking crisis (the 1948-51 and 1968-69 
episodes) and could therefore rather be viewed as real economy crises, albeit serious ones, 
rather than outright financial crises. We also test whether excluding the 1991-93 crisis changes 
our results as that crisis does not include a systemic banking crisis (although it does include a 
non-systemic one).  
 We start by analysing the robustness of the early-warning signals properties shown in 
Table 8 in the main text. Table A.2.2 shows the average signalling properties of the financial 
and macroeconomic variables for each case. Compared to the baseline case in Table 8, we find 
that the signalling performance tends to improve marginally when the 1968-69 and 1991-93 
episodes are left out, as all our variables failed to flag these episodes beforehand. The relative 
comparison of the signalling properties of the macroeconomic and financial variables remains 
intact, however, with the macroeconomic variables continuing to outperform the financial 
variables on average, although neither group of variables does a sterling job over all the crisis 
episodes. The only case where the relative performance of these two groups changes somewhat 
is when the 1948-51 crisis is left out. In this case, the financial variables do a slightly better job 




the macroeconomic variables rather than a marked improvement in the signalling properties of 
the financial variables. 
 
Table A.2.2 Early-warning signals: robustness analysis 
        
 Excluding the 1948-51 crisis  Excluding the 1968-69 crisis 













Fract. of crises called 0.240 0.314 0.271  0.300 0.457 0.365 
Fract. of good signals 0.173 0.162 0.169  0.200 0.276 0.231 
Fract. of false signals 0.044 0.058 0.050  0.040 0.036 0.039 
Noise-to-signal ratio 0.307 0.332 0.316  0.201 0.159 0.185 
        
 Excluding the 1991-93 crisis  
Excluding the 1948-51  
and 1968-69 crises 













Fract. of crises called 0.300 0.457 0.365  0.300 0.393 0.338 
Fract. of good signals 0.200 0.276 0.231  0.217 0.202 0.211 
Fract. of false signals 0.040 0.036 0.039  0.043 0.056 0.048 
Noise-to-signal ratio 0.201 0.159 0.185  0.238 0.258 0.246 
The table reports the average signalling properties of the financial and macroeconomic variables when the financial crises in 1948-51, 1968-
69 and 1991-93 are not defined as a multiple financial crises. See Tables 6 and 8 for details. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (data sources described in Appendix 3). 
 
Next, we move on to testing whether economic downturns coinciding with financial 
crises tend to be deeper and longer than those that do not coincide with financial crises. Table 
A.2.3 compares all contractionary years in GDP and per capita domestic demand (to be 
compared to the lower panel of Table 9), again after leaving out the 1948-51, 1968-69, and 
1991-93 crises, and the 1948-51 and 1968-69 episodes combined. The results turn out to be 
very similar to those reported in the main text: contractions tend to be close to twice as deep 
when coinciding with financial crises and last almost twice as long. 
Finally, the upper panel of Table A.2.4 reports the results from the probit regressions in 
Table 10 in the main text when leaving out the 1948-51, 1968-69, and 1991-93 crises, and the 
1948-51 and 1968-69 episodes combined. As the table shows, the global country share remains 
statistically significant for each variant of the crisis definitions and the marginal effects are very 
similar to those reported in Table 10. The lower panel of the table shows what happens when 
we use the currency and inflation crisis dates in Table A.2.1 as the dependent variable instead 
of those used in the main text. Again, we find that the global country share has no statistically 










Table A.2.3 Economic contractions with and without financial crises: robustness analysis 
          
 Excluding the 1948-51 crisis  Excluding the 1968-69 crisis 
          
 
GDP 




Per capita  
domestic demand 























Aver. contr. 0.041 0.025 0.089 0.046  0.036 0.027 0.096 0.042 
Cum. contr. 0.087 0.031 0.159 0.069  0.088 0.031 0.162 0.064 
Aver. dur. 2.3 1.3 2.0 1.6  2.4 1.4 1.9 1.6 
          
 Excluding the 1991-93 crisis  Excluding the 1948-51 and 1968-69 crises 
          
 GDP 




Per capita  
domestic demand 
























Aver. contr. 0.040 0.024 0.101 0.040  0.040 0.026 0.090 0.047 
Cum. contr. 0.091 0.027 0.170 0.061  0.094 0.036 0.159 0.073 
Aver. dur. 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.6  2.4 1.4 2.0 1.6 
The table compares contractions in GDP and per capita domestic demand for years that coincide with multiple financial crises and years that do 
not when the financial crises in 1948-51, 1968-69 and 1991-93 are not defined as a multiple financial crises. Reported are the average and 
cumulative contractions over years of subsequent contractions (in years), and the average duration of periods of subsequent contractions (in 
years). See Table 9 for further details. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. (data sources described in Appendix 3) 
 
 Table A.2.4 International linkages of financial crises: robustness analysis 
       
 Multiple financial crises excluded 
     






1948-51 and  
1968-69 crises 
Coeff. est. 5.590 9.761 6.791 8.510 
P-value 0.022 0.000 0.020 0.000 
Marg. eff. 0.053 0.072 0.060 0.054 
  
 Currency and inflation crises threshold raised 
       
 
Currency crises threshold 
raised to 30% 
Currency crises threshold 
raised to 50% 
Inflation crises threshold 
raised to 40% 



















Coeff. est. 0.293 1.624 -0.379 1.359 -1.532 1.231 
P-value 0.786 0.335 0.771 0.450 0.216 0.433 
The table reports the outcomes of probit regressions of different financial crisis indicators for Iceland on the GDP-weighted share of countries 
in banking crises and general financial crises, respectively, from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). The regressions also include a one-year lag of 
the dependent variable (not reported). The estimation period is 1875-2010 (135 observations). The p-values reported are based on robust 
(Hubert-White) standard errors. The upper panel of the table reports the outcomes of probit regressions in Table 10 when the financial crises 
in 1948-51, 1968-69 and 1991-93 are not defined as a multiple financial crises. The marginal effects reported are based on a one standard 
deviation increase in the country share, evaluating the regressors at their sample mean. The lower panel of the table reports the outcomes of 
probit regressions in Table 10 when the dates for currency and inflation crises in Table A.2.1 are used instead of those in Table 3. See Tables 
3, 6 and 10 for further details. 
 









Banking system assets (1875-2013) 
For savings banks in the period from 1875-1990 we use data on total assets (Hagskinna: 
Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.7). This is only available at five-year intervals and we 
therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the intervening years. For commercial banks 
we use data on total assets for the period 1964-1990 (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, 
Table 13.6b-c) and for the period 1875-1929 we use data on total assets of Landsbanki (founded 
in 1885) and Íslandsbanki (founded in 1904) (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 
13.2 and 13.3). For the period 1930-1963, we use data on “total” assets of commercial banks, 
which is only available at five-year intervals until 1950 (annual data from 1953) and we 
therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the intervening years (Hagskinna: Icelandic 
Historical Statistics, Table 13.6a). However, we adjust “total” commercial banks assets in this 
period from 1930-1963 as data on foreign assets is only provided in net terms. This is done by 
using data on foreign assets of Landsbanki from Björnsson (1961, tables on p. 126-127) and 
data on base metal reserves, claims on foreign banks, and assets in foreign currency for 
Íslandsbanki and its successor, Útvegsbanki, from Björnsson (1981, tables on p. 106, 119, and 
129). Data from Björnsson (1961) is only available at three-year intervals until 1954 and two-
year intervals until 1960 and we therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the 
intervening years. Data from Björnsson (1981) is available annually for 1938-1946 and then for 
the years 1930, 1950, 1954, and 1957 and we therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data 
for the intervening years. Furthermore, we assume that total foreign assets of the banking 
system in 1957-1960 developed in line with the developments of the foreign assets of 
Landsbanki (excluding its Central Bank division). For the period 1997-2012, we use data on 
total assets of commercial banks and savings banks from the Financial Supervisory Authorities. 
For the remaining years (1991-1996 and 2013), total banking system assets are assumed to 
develop in line with total assets of deposit money banks (data from Central Bank of Iceland 
Annual Reports).  
 
Banking system equity (1875-2013) 
For savings banks in the period from 1875-1990 we use data on reserve funds, retained earnings, 
and other equity capital (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.7). This is only 
available at five-year intervals and we therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the 
intervening years. For commercial banks in the period 1886-1929 we use data on initial capital 
reserves, retained earnings, and reserve funds of Landsbanki and data on share capital and 
reserve fund of Íslandsbanki (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 13.2 and 13.3). 
For the period 1930-1990 we use data on commercial bank share capital and capital 




Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 13.6a-c). This data is only available at five-year intervals 
until 1950 (annual data from 1953) and we therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for 
the intervening years. We correct values for 1963 and 1966-1967 where data on other equity 
has mistakenly been used as data on total equity in Table 13.6b. For 1963 we use data from 
Table XVI on p. 186 in Fjármálatíðindi September-December 1965 and for 1966-67 we use 
data from Table 1 in Gudnason (1972). For the period 1997-2012, we use data on total equity 
from the Financial Supervisory Authorities’ website for commercial banks and savings banks. 
For the remaining years (1991-1996 and 2013), banking system equity is assumed to develop 
in line with deposit money bank total equity (data from Central Bank of Iceland Annual 
Reports).  
 
Broad money (M3) (1886-2013) 
Data for the period 1991-2013 is obtained from the Central Bank of Iceland (data for 1991-
1993 from the Bank’s Annual Report in 2007). For the period 1886-1990 we use data from 
Statistics Iceland (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.1).  
 
Credit (1886-2013) 
For the period 1970-2007 we use total lending and bond holdings of the credit system, obtained 
from the Central Bank of Iceland. This series is extended to 2013 using total lending and bond 
holdings of financial firms from the new financial accounts from the Central Bank of Iceland. 
For the period 1886-1969 we use data on total credit from Statistics Iceland for deposit 
institutions (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.9) and investment credit funds 
(Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.12). Data on investment credit funds is 
only available at five-year intervals until 1950 and we therefore use linear interpolation to 
obtain data for the intervening years (the same applies for missing data in 1951, 1963, and 1971-
1972). 
 
Non-core banking system liabilities (1886-2013) 
 
Domestic non-core liabilities 
For the period 1991-2013 we use data on domestic bond issuance of deposit money banks 
obtained from the Central Bank of Iceland. For savings banks in the period from 1875-1990 we 
use data on credit from other financial institutions (excluding the Central Bank) and sundry 
liabilities (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.7), which is only available at 
five-year intervals. We therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the intervening years. 
For commercial banks in the period 1930-1973 we use data on credit from other domestic 
financial institutions (excluding the Central Bank) and sundry liabilities (Hagskinna: Icelandic 
Historical Statistics, Tables 13.6a-b and 13.7), for the period 1974-1990 we add data on 
domestic bond issuance. For commercial banks in the period 1886-1929 we use data on bank 
bonds, sundry liabilities, credit from the mortgage department (which was a legally separate 




liabilities, funds awaiting disbursements and rediscounted bills of exchange for Íslandsbanki 
(Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 13.2 and 13.3).  
 
Foreign non-core liabilities 
For the period 1964-1990 we use data on foreign liabilities of commercial banks (Hagskinna: 
Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 13.6b-c). For the period 1991-2013 we use data on total 
foreign liabilities of deposit money banks obtained from the Central Bank of Iceland. For the 
period 1886-1929 we use data on credit from foreign banks, the so-called “English long-term 
loans”, and bank bills of exchange for Landsbanki and data on credit from foreign banks for 
Íslandsbanki (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 13.2 and 13.3). Hagskinna: 
Icelandic Historical Statistics does not provide data on commercial banks’ foreign liabilities 
for the period 1930-1963, only data on net foreign assets. For the period 1930-1960 we therefore 
use data on foreign liabilities of Landsbanki from Björnsson (1961, tables on p. 126-127) and 
data on credit from foreign banks and the English loans from 1921 and 1935 for Íslandsbanki 
and its successor Útvegsbanki from Björnsson (1981, tables on p. 106, 119, and 129). Other 
commercial banks did not have foreign liabilities during this period. Data from Björnsson 
(1961) is only available at three-year intervals until 1954 and two-year intervals until 1960 and 
we therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the intervening years. Data from 
Björnsson (1981) is only available annually for 1938-1946 and then for the years 1930, 1950, 
1954, and 1957 and we therefore use linear interpolation to obtain data for the intervening years. 
Furthermore, we assume that total foreign liabilities of banking system in 1957-1960 developed 
in line with the development of the foreign liabilities of Landsbanki (excluding its Central Bank 
division). For Íslandsbanki and its successor Útvegsbanki in the period 1930-1960, we exclude 
foreign equity (also the part of foreign debt, mainly from the Danish Post Office, which was 
swapped into equity of Útvegsbanki after the collapse of Íslandsbanki) and categorise bank 
bonds issued by Íslandsbanki as domestic debt as was done in the bank’s accounts although the 
Supreme Court ruled after the bank’s collapse that they should be defined as foreign debt. For 
the period 1961-1963 we use linear interpolation between our constructed series for the period 
1930-1960 and the data from Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Tables 13.6c, for 1964 
to obtain data for these three years. 
 
Total non-core liabilities 
Total non-core banking system liabilities are given by the sum of our two constructed series for 
foreign and domestic non-core banking system liabilities. 
 
Exchange rates, terms of trade and prices 
 
Domestic price level (1875-2013) 
The domestic price level is constructed using annual averages of the consumer price index 
(excluding housing) from Statistics Iceland for the period 1914-2013. For the period 1875-1913 
we use a “general price level” obtained from Statistics Iceland (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical 






House prices (1900-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use the annual average of the housing stock implicit price deflator 
from Statistics Iceland. For the period 1900-1944 we use the building cost index from Statistics 
Iceland as these series match almost perfectly for the period for which they are both available, 
up to 1993, when Statistics Iceland changed the way they measured house prices. 
 
Nominal exchange rate (1875-2013) 
We use the exchange rate of the króna vis-á-vis the US dollar. The annual average exchange 
rate for 1961-2013 is obtained from the Central Bank of Iceland. For the period 1914-1960 we 
use data from Statistics Iceland (Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.16). For 
the period 1875-1913 we use data on the exchange rate of the Danish króna vis-á-vis the US 
dollar (as Iceland was in a monetary union with Denmark in that period) from Abildgren (2004). 
 
Real exchange rate (1875-2013) 
We use an annual average of a real exchange rate index from the Central Bank of Iceland for 
the period 1960-2013 (relative consumer prices). For the period 1875-1959 we follow Nordal 
and Tómasson (1985) in calculating a real exchange rate using a simple average of real 
exchange rates vis-á-vis the US, UK and Denmark (by far the three most important trading 
partners in that period). The nominal exchange rates are obtained from Statistics Iceland (for 
1914-1959; Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, Table 13.16) and Abildgren (2004) (for 
1875-1913). The domestic price series is explained above, while the price series for the three 
other countries for the period 1875-1959 are obtained from Abildgren (2004). 
 
Terms of trade (1875-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use annual averages obtained from Statistics Iceland (adjusting 
for the structural break in the data in 1997 due to a methodological change related to the 
introduction of the ESA-2010 national accounts standards introduced in September 2014). Data 




Nominal GDP (1875-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use annual averages obtained from Statistics Iceland (adjusting 
for the structural break in the data in 1997 due to a methodological change related to the 
introduction of the ESA-2010 national accounts standards introduced in September 2014). Data 
for the period 1875-1944 is taken from a statistics publication of the National Economic 







Real GDP (1875-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use annual averages obtained from Statistics Iceland (adjusting 
for the structural break in the data in 1997 due to a methodological change related to the 
introduction of the ESA-2010 national accounts standards introduced in September 2014). Data 
for the period 1875-1944 is taken from a statistics publication of the National Economic 
Institute (Jónsson, 1999; Table V.14.6). 
 
Nominal domestic demand (1875-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use annual averages obtained from Statistics Iceland (adjusting 
for the structural break in the data in 1997 due to a methodological change related to the 
introduction of the ESA-2010 national accounts standards introduced in September 2014). Data 
for the period 1875-1944 is constructed by backing out domestic demand using nominal GDP, 
imports and exports taken from a statistics publication of the National Economic Institute 
(Jónsson, 1999; Tables V.14.6 and V.15.4). 
 
Real domestic demand (1875-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use annual averages obtained from Statistics Iceland (adjusting 
for the structural break in the data in 1997 due to a methodological change related to the 
introduction of the ESA-2010 national accounts standards introduced in September 2014). Data 
for the period 1875-1944 is constructed by deflating nominal domestic demand explained above 
with the implicit GDP price deflator obtained from the data on nominal and real GDP explained 
above. 
 
Trade deficit as a % of nominal GDP (1875-2013) 
For the period 1945-2013 we use annual averages obtained from Statistics Iceland. Data for the 
period 1875-1944 is constructed by using nominal GDP, imports and exports taken from a 





Data related to banking crises in Table 4 
For measuring the market share of distressed financial institutions, we use credit supplied by 
institutions which are adjudged to fall into distress (either fail or need a major recapitalisation) 
as a share of total credit of commercial and savings banks and other credit institutions (including 
the government mortgage lender Íbúðalánasjóður). For the 1920 and 1930 crises, we use data 
for the years 1919 and 1929, respectively (from Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics, 
Tables 13.2 and 13.3). For the 1985 and 1993 crises, we use data for the years 1984 and 1992, 
respectively (from Central Bank of Iceland Annual Reports, Tables 25 and 29 in the 1986 
Report and Table 21 in the 1994 Report). Finally, for the 2008 crisis, we use data from the 
Financial Supervisory Authority (Heildarniðurstöður ársreikninga fjármálafyrirtækja og 





For measuring the impact of banking crises in Iceland on the fiscal balance in Table 4, we use 
data on the central government income and expenditure from Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, Tables 15.3 and 15.4 for the period 1875-1944, Table 15.9 for the period 1945-1979, 
and the Statistics Iceland database for the period 1980-2013. For measuring the impact on 
government debt, we use data on central government debt from Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical 




To obtain per capita domestic demand, we use population data obtained from Statistics Iceland. 
The data reports population at 1 January each year – which we use as a measure of the 
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Claudio Borio recently quipped that “macroeconomics without the financial cycle is like 
Hamlet without the Prince” (Borio, 2014, p. 183). We rise to his call to arms and tackle the 
Prince’s existential question head-on. Our findings suggest that there exists a well-defined 
financial cycle in Iceland that has gradually become more prominent as the financial deepening 
and sophistication of the Icelandic economy has increased. We find that this financial cycle has 
played a key role in the country’s macroeconomic developments and, in particular, the financial 
crises that have regularly hit the economy over a period spanning more than a century. We also 
find that Iceland is no island in the vast ocean of global high finance, uncovering extremely 
strong spillover effects from the global financial cycle. 
 To analyse the financial cycle we use a database which spans the period 1875-2013 and 
contains annual data on financial prices and volumes, as well as banking system assets, 
leverage, and liability composition. Here, we focus on the lower frequency properties of our 
financial variables, i.e. cycles that are longer than typical business cycles. For this, we follow 
the approach in the growing literature on financial cycles (cf. Drehmann et al., 2012, and 
Aikman et al., 2015) and filter the data using a band-pass filter to extract cycles with a duration 
of eight to thirty years. We show that these medium-term cycles dominate typical business 
cycles in explaining the developments of our financial variables and most of the 
macroeconomic variables that we also include in our study. 
 While there is no agreed upon definition of the financial cycle, the term generally refers 
to the co-movement of a set of financial variables including both quantities and prices (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2014). Accordingly, Borio (2014, p. 183) characterises the 
financial cycle as the “self-reinforcing interactions between perceptions of value and risk, 
attitudes towards risk and financing constraints, which translate into booms followed by busts”, 
making the term closely tied to the concept of the financial system’s pro-cyclicality (cf. Borio 
et al., 2001, and Daníelsson et al., 2004).  
To capture the aggregate financial cycle, Borio (2014) argues that its most parsimonious 
representation is in terms of the interaction between credit and property prices. We include a 
broader set of variables to attain further insights into the properties of the cycle and to expose 
potentially important small open economy features of the cycle and its interactions with the 
domestic economy. To make this operational, we aggregate the medium-term cycles in our 
financial variables using a principal component approach, which gives the linear combination 
of the variables that explains most of the combined variability of the individual cycles. We find 
that not all of our financial variables contribute to this aggregate financial cycle, but the ones 
that do attain roughly equal weights. This aggregate cycle is found to capture more than 60% 
of the variability of the aggregate financial data over the whole sample period, rising to 75% in 




increased financial liberalisation and integration into the global financial system. We identify 
seven complete cycles in this aggregate measure with a median duration of sixteen years, which 
incidentally is almost identical to the 15½ year average interval between serious multiple 
financial crisis episodes found in Einarsson et al. (2015). The financial cycle in Iceland is 
therefore found to be much longer than the typical business cycle and its intensity and length is 
found to have increased over time relative to the business cycle. There is also a large difference 
in economic performance over different phases of the financial cycle: the average growth rate 
of output and domestic demand is almost three times higher in the expansionary phase of the 
financial cycle than in its contractionary phase (rising to almost four times higher in the post-
WWII period).  
This large difference in economic activity over different phases of the financial cycle 
shows how important the financial cycle is for understanding macroeconomic dynamics in 
Iceland. This is never as clear as in the latter stages of the expansionary phase of the cycle, 
when balance sheets become overextended and asset prices peak, and the subsequent bust when 
these imbalances are unwound, which can have severe effects on economic activity and even 
lead to a financial crisis. We find indeed that almost all of the cyclical peaks coincide with some 
type of a financial crisis. We also find that expansions in the financial cycle provide a robust 
early-warning signal for subsequent financial crises and that the aggregate cycle provides an 
improvement over individual financial and macroeconomic variables in signalling ensuing 
financial crises, highlighting the importance of the interaction of different financial variables in 
amplifying financial imbalances.  
 Previous studies have consistently failed to find important links between the Icelandic 
business cycle and the business cycles of other developed economies (e.g. Gudmundsson et al., 
2000, and Einarsson et al., 2013). The prevalent view has therefore been that the Icelandic 
business cycle is dominated by country-specific supply shocks, such as idiosyncratic shocks to 
its important resource sectors. Our results suggest that this consensus may need to be revisited 
as it overlooks the importance of the financial channel through which global spillovers penetrate 
the Icelandic economy. We find strikingly strong ties between the Icelandic financial cycle and 
its global counterpart, which is proxied by the US financial cycle (captured by a composite 
measure of medium-term cycles in credit and house prices): over the whole sample period these 
two financial cycles spend close to 75% of the time in the same cyclical phase and almost all 
of the cyclical peaks in the Icelandic financial cycle occur close to peaks in the global cycle, 
with the peaks usually coinciding or the Icelandic cyclical peak lagging by a year or two. There 
is also evidence that these spillover effects have been growing stronger over time. We test 
whether there are additional regional spillover effects captured by the financial cycles in 
Denmark and Norway, both of which have strong political, economic, and cultural ties with 
Iceland, and the UK, given the strong and long-standing trade and financial links between the 
two countries (and UKs leading role in global finance in the early part of our sample period). 
We find limited evidence for such regional effects beyond the strong global spillover effects 
captured by the US financial cycle. There is, however, some evidence of additional regional 
spillover effects from the Danish credit cycle in the first half of the 20th century, consistent with 




 Our results are very much in the spirit of the findings of recent papers on the importance 
of the financial cycle in other industrial countries, such as Claessens et al. (2011, 2012), 
Drehmann et al. (2012), and Aikman et al. (2015). Our study adds to this growing literature by 
adding yet another country to the sample of countries studied, a country that has been exposed 
to numerous financial crises of various types over a period spanning over a century, of which 
the most recent financial tsunami is only the latest example. But our paper also contributes to 
the literature by showing how more detailed data on bank balance sheets can provide further 
insights into the analysis of the financial cycle and by highlighting important small open 
economy features of the cycle and its interactions with the domestic economy, including the 
importance of contagion from the global financial cycle. We also present a simple way to 
aggregate individual financial variables that captures their relative importance to the aggregate 
cycle which allows us to document the importance of individual components to a given cyclical 
episode. 
Our findings highlight the overarching importance of the financial cycle for economic 
fluctuations in Iceland. The strikingly high co-movement of the Icelandic financial cycle with 
its global counterpart and the strong coincidence of the cycle and financial crises have already 
been discussed, but our results show that the cycle’s reach goes beyond that. They suggest that 
it is hard to understand fluctuations in capital flows, the surprisingly high volatility of private 
consumption in Iceland, and fiscal policy dynamics, to name only three important issues in the 
domestic economic debate, without understanding the financial cycle. Our results also raise 
some fundamental policy questions, such as how to design a policy framework that takes the 
financial cycle into account and its tendency to amplify volatility in real economic activity over 
its boom and bust phases. The strong global spillover effects may also suggest the need for 
capital flow management measures that compliment other policy tools and may even raise new 
questions concerning the optimal exchange rate regime for Iceland. We discuss each of these 
issues in turn, but it is clear to us that this can only be viewed as a first attempt and that further 
analysis is likely to be needed to explore the full implications of our findings. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
motivation for their inclusion in our study. In Section 3 we analyse the key properties of 
medium-term cycles of individual financial and macroeconomic variables. In Section 4 we use 
evidence from the previous section to construct a composite measure of the financial cycle in 
Iceland and discuss its main properties. Here we also discuss its relation with the conventional 
business cycle and how different phases of the financial cycle interact with economic activity. 
In Section 5 we look at possible spillover effects from the global financial cycle and whether 
there are possible additional regional spillover effects from Scandinavia and the UK. Section 6 
moves on to analyse the interaction of the Icelandic financial cycle and domestic financial crises 
and in Section 7 we highlight some policy implications coming out of our analysis. Section 8 





2 The data 
To estimate the financial cycle in Iceland, we use a range of financial variables that cover 
aggregate financial prices and volumes on the one hand and bank balance sheets on the other 
hand. We also include a number of key macroeconomic variables which are used to analyse the 
development of the real economy over the financial cycle and how it interacts through various 
macro-financial linkages with the cycle. These variables and their motivation are further 
discussed below while Appendix 1 provides information on data sources and summarises the 
data graphically. 
The fact that financial cycles usually take a long time to complete – decades even – calls 
for a longer data span than is usually required for analysing most other macroeconomic 
phenomena. We have therefore constructed a database based on annual data over a period 
spanning 139 years (1875-2013). As is often the case, the need for a long data span necessitates 
the use of annual data which comes at the cost of losing higher frequency information on 
financial cycles found in quarterly data. However, by covering such a long time period we gain 
some unique insight into the domestic financial cycle that would be lost by focusing on a shorter 
sample period. Our long sample also brings the tragic but universal truth that “we’ve been there 
before” when it comes to financial boom-bust cycles sharply into focus. 
 
2.1 Financial variables 
 
Credit, money, and house prices 
The first set of financial variables includes the variables which are central to any analysis of 
financial cycles, i.e. credit, money, and house prices.81 The credit cycle, as reflected in surges 
and shortfalls of liquidity, easing and tightening of financial constraints, and their 
accompanying balance sheet expansions and deleveraging can have severe repercussions for 
economic activity and overall macroeconomic stability. Hence, studies of financial cycles 
logically include credit aggregates as one of the key elements capturing the nexus between the 
financial system and the real economy (Claessens et al., 2011, 2012, Drehmann et al., 2012, 
Jordà et al., 2013, 2014, 2015, Aikman et al., 2015, and Taylor, 2015). As our credit measure 
we use total lending and bond holdings of the credit system (data on credit to the non-financial 
private sector over the whole sample period is not available). We also include broad money 
(M3) in line with a number of studies examining to what extent monetary aggregates can serve 
as indicators for the state of the financial cycle or signal increasing vulnerabilities in the latter 
stages of financial cycle upswings (Borio and Lowe, 2004, Shin and Shin, 2011, and Kim et al., 
2013). The credit and money series are included in real terms and as a ratio to GDP as different 
                                                
81 Our analysis does not include stock prices as stock market data does not extend further back than the mid-1980s 
(Drehmann et al., 2012, find that stock prices do not help explaining the financial cycle in a number of developed 
economies) but the medium-term cycle in stock prices does show a strong co-movement with the financial cycle 
over the short period available, in particular in the latest boom-bust episode. Juselius and Drehmann (2015) also 
emphasise the role of the aggregate debt service burden (interest payments plus amortisations relative to income) 
in addition to aggregate leverage (the stock of credit relative to asset prices). Historical data or estimates on debt 




data transformations may reveal alternative information on the financial cycle. The credit-to-
money ratio is also included to capture the extent of non-monetary funding of credit creation 
(for instance, through bond issuance or cross-border loans). 
 Real residential house prices is another key variable of any analysis of the self-
reinforcing interaction between financing constraints and perceptions of value and risk. House 
prices are usually at the centre of any financial boom-bust cycle and a number of studies have 
established the prominent role of house price booms and busts (particularly if it is debt-driven) 
during financial cycle peaks and troughs and in the run-up to and aftermath of banking crises, 
with a house price boom leading into the crises, followed by a substantial and persistent decline 
after the bust (e.g. Bordo and Jeanne, 2002, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, and Jordà et al., 2015).  
 
Banking system balance sheet 
The second set of financial variables aims to capture the potentially important role of financial 
institutions’ balance sheets in fuelling financial cycles. During booms, for example, financial 
constraints are generally loose due to abundant liquidity and rising net worth, allowing for 
balance sheet expansion of banks and other sectors within the economy. This is reversed in 
busts, where adverse spirals can kick in and induce disorderly deleveraging in the financial 
sector: obtaining funding becomes more difficult, pushing banks and other economic agents to 
respond by fire-selling their assets, which reduces their net worth, and reinforces the balance 
sheet constraints (cf. Brunnermeier et al., 2013). Hence, information on the banks’ balance 
sheets can potentially reveal additional insights into their role in amplifying shocks through 
various macro-financial linkages and financial sector interconnectedness (cf. Adrian and Shin, 
2011, and the International Monetary Fund, 2013).  
Our first balance sheet variable focuses on the asset side of the balance sheet, as 
measured by the ratio of total banking system assets to GDP. This measure provides insights 
into how banks’ risk appetite with regards to channelling of funds to the real economy evolves 
over the financial cycle (Schularick and Taylor, 2012, and Kim et al., 2013). At the same time, 
it can also serve as a proxy for market liquidity of the banking system assets as they may become 
more difficult to sell with limited price impact once the banking system becomes large relative 
to the economy. Finally, it can also capture the potential mismatch between the domestic 
authorities’ capacity and the banking system’s possible need for support in times of distress. 
The second balance sheet variable we construct is a measure of banking system leverage 
(the ratio of banking system assets to bank equity) to capture to what extent the expansion of 
banks’ balance sheets is being financed with debt (cf. Drehmann et al., 2012). This leverage 
measure is more general than the credit-to-money ratio discussed above as it encompasses a 
greater number of assets and liabilities, and can therefore provide additional information for 
analysing the financial cycle (although this variable is also subject to some measurement 
disadvantages, as we discuss below).  
Our final banking system balance sheet variable is the ratio of non-core banking 
liabilities to total liabilities, which reflects the claims on domestic banks not held by the ultimate 
domestic creditors. This measure serves as a proxy for the funding liquidity position of the 




sources of funding, such as wholesale funding, as traditional (monetary) ones are exhausted (cf. 
Borio et al., 2011, Hahm et al., 2013, and Kim et al., 2013). We also distinguish between foreign 
and total non-core liabilities to capture the possible distinctive vulnerabilities of relying on 
cross-border funding and their relation to banking and currency crises which could play an 
important role in the financial cycle of a small open (and at times tightly financially integrated) 
economy, such as Iceland.  
 
2.2 Macroeconomic variables 
We include seven macroeconomic variables to capture the multifaceted linkages between the 
financial cycle and economic developments in a small open economy such as Iceland. We use 
real GDP as our measure of overall economic activity but to capture the ability of the external 
account to serve both as a source and absorber of shocks, we also include the trade balance and 
real domestic demand.82 This allows us to shed important additional light on the interactions 
between the financial cycle, cross-border capital flows, and domestic spending in small open 
economies. Our approach is inspired by numerous studies suggesting that current account 
deficits and capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical and fuel asset price and financial boom-bust 
cycles (cf. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007, Korinek, 2011, and 
Broner et al., 2013).83  
We also include the exchange rate which can play a pivotal role in the real-financial 
nexus in small open economies. Some studies suggest that the exchange rate in very small open 
economies such as Iceland can be a source of shocks rather than a shock absorber (cf. Breedon 
et al., 2012) and others find the real exchange rate to be a leading indicator of currency and 
banking crises (cf. Kaminsky et al., 1998, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, Goldstein et al., 2000, 
and Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). Bruno and Shin (2015a, b) provide theoretical and 
empirical evidence consistent with these findings and emphasise the interactions between 
currency appreciations, borrowers’ balance sheet strength, and greater risk-taking by banks in 
driving financial cycles and thereby affecting economic activity in small open economies. We 
include both the nominal (vis-à-vis the US dollar as emphasised by Avdjiev et al., 2015) and 
real (trade weighted relative consumer prices) value of the currency. 
                                                
82 Although cross-border banking liabilities can also serve as a proxy for (gross) capital flows, the findings in 
Einarsson et al. (2015) suggest that the capital flow cycle over the whole period is better captured by the trade 
balance data (see also Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). This probably reflects the tight management of the capital 
account for a large part of the sample period and that our cross-border banking liabilities measure does not capture 
the role played by the government and its investment funds in intermediating foreign credit to the domestic 
economy, especially during the post-WWII period up until 1970 when the banks’ access to foreign funding 
remained severely restricted. 
83 Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that this emerging market phenomenon is strongly linked to an unusually high 
ratio of permanent to temporary shocks. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue, policymakers in these countries 
seem to have a tendency to interpret favourable shocks as being permanent, leading to spending sprees and 
borrowing binges that ultimately lead to sudden stops in funding and sharp recessions and reversals in the current 
account. Korinek (2011) argues that exposure to international capital flows imposes externalities on countries in 
the form of financial instability arising from risky external debt accumulation by market participants who do not 




Finally, our set of macroeconomic variables includes inflation to capture the chronic 
inflation episodes and frequent inflation crises throughout Iceland’s economic history and the 
terms of trade which have historically been found to be an important source of business cycle 
fluctuations and an important trigger of financial crises (cf. Gudmundsson et al., 2000, 
Daníelsson, 2008, and Einarsson et al., 2015). 
  
3 Cycles in financial and macroeconomic variables 
Early economic writers drew lessons from the financial boom-bust episodes which they 
experienced in their lifetime with regard to the factors affecting economic developments. Parts 
of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations were thus inspired by the 1772 banking crisis and the 
pioneers of analysis into economic cycles, Sismondi and Dunoyer, used the first modern 
international financial crisis in 1825 to champion their argument for the importance of 
endogenous economic cycles (Sowell, 1972, and Benkemoune, 2009). Subsequent series of 
banking crises led to further analysis into the role of credit creation in the macroeconomy, 
especially by Knut Wicksell and the Austrian School. Emphasis on the role of financial factors 
in economic fluctuations and the presence of self-reinforcing interaction between medium-term 
“financial” cycles and the general business cycle culminated in the works of the Great 
Depression-era economists, such as Irving Fisher and Alvin Hansen. For example, writing about 
business cycles and lessons to be drawn from the Great Depression, Hansen (1941, p. 25) 
emphasised the importance of “building construction cycles” (a cycle closely related to the 
financial cycle due to its duration and the role played by credit and property prices) for 
understanding the Great Depression and business cycles in general: 
 
“It is […] not possible to give an adequate analysis of the major business cycle […] 
without taking account of the impact on that cycle of the longer cycle of building 
construction. This factor is one of the most profound of the various influences which 
cause one major business cycle to differ from another. And in this factor we are able to 
see against the background of earlier American experience a part of the explanation of 
the severity of the Great Depression starting in 1929.” 
 
However, financial features gradually lost their prominent role within macroeconomics 
in the post-WWII period and the lessons of the past were all but forgotten (Gertler, 1988). The 
recent global financial crisis, however, swiftly shifted the focus once again to the role of macro-
financial linkages in explaining macroeconomic phenomena. A rapidly expanding literature has 
since emerged attempting to account for the importance of these financial features (cf. 
Brunnermeier et al., 2013, Taylor, 2015) and uncover the salient features of the financial cycle. 
In particular, Claessens et al. (2011, 2012), Drehmann et al. (2012), and Aikman et al. (2015) 
all find evidence of cycles in financial variables that tend to be longer and of greater amplitude 




evidence of important links between these lower-frequency cycles and financial crises, 
suggesting an important role of these cycles in explaining such episodes. 
 
3.1 Extracting cyclical components from the data 
To identify short- and medium-term cycles in our data, we follow Aikman et al. (2015) and use 
the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) asymmetric band-pass filter to isolate the pre-specified 
frequency range of the data.84 The short-term cycles we aim to identify coincide with typical 
business cycles, which are commonly thought to last between 5 quarters and 8 years. However, 
our use of annual data dictates that we restrict the minimum phase of these short-term cycles to 
2 years. Following Drehmann et al. (2012), we identify the medium-term cycles as those that 
have a duration between 8 and 30 years. While the upper bound in their paper is dictated by 
data limitations, our earlier study (Einarsson et al., 2015) finds that major financial crisis occur 
in Iceland on average every 15½ years indicating that 8 to 30 years should be a sufficiently 
large window to focus on when identifying the financial cycle in Iceland.85 As has become 
standard in this literature (cf. Comin and Gertler, 2006, and Drehmann et al., 2012), we apply 
the frequency filter to log-differences of the original variables, which under the common 
assumption that growth rates of economic series are stationary implies a zero trend in the filter. 
To construct the medium-term cycles in the original variables we then cumulate these growth 
series into log-levels starting from zero at the first observation of the variable.86  
 
3.2 Key cyclical characteristics of individual series 
We start by looking at some key cyclical properties of our financial and macroeconomic 
variables, applying the terminology commonly applied in business cycle analysis. We report 
results on the typical length and intensity of medium-term cycles in each variable and how they 
have evolved over time. We also compare the volatility of medium-term cycles to that of the 
corresponding short-term (business) cycles in the data to establish which cyclical component 
has been the key driver of the behaviour of each series. Finally, we look at how the medium-
term cyclical components of the data correlate with each other, interpreting evidence of cyclical 
co-movement of the financial variables as suggesting the presence of an aggregate financial 
cycle.  
 
                                                
84 Claessens et al. (2011, 2012) use the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm, while Drehmann et al. 
(2012) apply both the band-pass filter and the turning-point approach. In Einarsson et al. (2015), we use the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a high smoothing parameter to analyse the cyclical behaviour of our financial and 
macroeconomic variables in the run-up to and aftermath of financial crises. Using the Hodrick-Prescott filter here 
to extract the medium-term cycles in the data gave broadly similar results to the band-pass filter but tended to 
identify more frequent and shorter cycles. 
85 Aikman et al. (2015) use an upper range of 20 years, while Comin and Gertler (2006) use an upper range of 50 
years. Our results are found to be robust to variations in the upper range of duration of medium-term cycles. 
86 For the trade deficit and inflation (which can take both positive and negative values) and the two non-core bank 




Duration and intensity of medium-term cycles 
The upper panel of Table 1 reports the key properties of the medium-term cyclical component 
of all our variables. We show the median duration and amplitude of the expansionary and 
contractionary phases of the medium-term cycles, and the median duration of a complete cycle 
(measured from peak to peak). In addition, we report the median “slope” (defined as the ratio 
of amplitude to duration) of expansionary and contractionary phases which measures how 
violent each cyclical phase is. The table shows that all the financial variables have a cyclical 
phase lasting 5 years or more. A complete cycle therefore lasts 10 years or more (with an 
average cycle of almost 12 years). GDP, and most of the other macroeconomic variables, have 
cycles with a duration of 10 years and therefore tend to be shorter than the corresponding cycles 
in most of the financial variables. This is consistent with other studies, such as Claessens et al. 
(2011) and Drehmann et al. (2012). Our finding that the expansionary phase of the cycles in the 
financial variables tend to be longer than the contractionary phase is also consistent with these 
studies. 
We also find that medium-term cycles in the financial variables tend to have greater 
amplitude than the corresponding cycles in the macroeconomic variables. On average, the 
financial variables rise by 25% during the expansionary phase of the cycle and fall by 22% 
during the contractionary phase, which is roughly double that of the macroeconomic variables. 
Looking at individual variables, we find that cycles in house prices and the two non-core bank 
liability measures tend to be relatively less intense than in the other financial variables, while 
the cyclical intensity of the nominal exchange rate is a particularly distinctive feature among 
the macroeconomic variables, to some extent reflecting its asset price characteristics. 
 In the lower panel of Table 1 we repeat the exercise for three different subsamples. First, 
we split the sample in half with the first half covering the period up to the end of WWII and the 
second half covering the post-WWII period. The first subsample therefore covers the 
modernisation of the Icelandic economy, beginning around 1890, when increased foreign 
demand, technological innovation, and financial deepening paved the way for export-oriented 
industrialisation and ends with a “great leap forward” in terms of the modernisation of the 
economy during WWII (Jónsson, 2004), while the second subsample covers the period from 
which Iceland had caught up with other advanced economies in terms of income levels. The 
post-WWII subsample also corresponds to a period of rising homeownership and increasing 
importance of mortgage financing. The third subsample covers the post-1980 period, which 
splits the post-WWII subsample in half and roughly coincides with the modernisation of the 
Icelandic financial system and liberalisation of domestic financial markets (cf. Central Bank of 
Iceland, 2005 (Table 5.1), 2016), while also coinciding with a period of significant international 
financial liberalisation and globalisation (cf. Claessens et al., 2011, and Drehmann et al., 2012) 
and the global real estate lending boom of the last thirty years (Jordà et al., 2014).87 
                                                
87 We only report the subsample results for the aggregate data groups but the same development in the cyclical 
properties can be found for most of the individual variables. To simplify the presentation of our results, we only 
report subsample results for the duration of a complete cycle and the average of the expansionary and 




Overall, we find that medium-term cycles in our financial variables have on average 
lengthened by 3½ years compared to the first subsample to just under 16 years in the post-1980 
period. The medium-term cycles in the macroeconomic variables have become shorter and 
more intense, however. The intensity of the cyclical components has also increased for some of 
the financial variables, although it remains broadly stable on average. 
 
Table 1 Key characteristics of medium-term cycles 
          
 Duration  Amplitude  Slope 
















Real house prices  6.00 5.00 10.00  0.14 -0.12  0.03 -0.02 
Real credit 6.00 5.00 13.00  0.41 -0.38  0.04 -0.04 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 8.00 5.00 13.00  0.29 -0.21  0.04 -0.03 
Real M3 6.00 5.50 10.00  0.30 -0.23  0.04 -0.04 
M3-to-GDP ratio 7.00 6.00 12.00  0.30 -0.29  0.04 -0.03 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 10.00 7.00 14.00  0.45 -0.40  0.04 -0.04 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 6.00 6.00 12.00  0.20 -0.22  0.03 -0.04 
Bank leverage ratio 6.00 6.00 12.00  0.34 -0.27  0.04 -0.05 
Foreign non-core liab. 6.00 5.50 11.00  0.04 -0.04  0.01 0.00 
Total non-core liab. 5.50 6.00 11.50  0.07 -0.04  0.01 -0.01 
          
Real GDP 5.00 5.00 10.00  0.11 -0.14  0.02 -0.02 
Real domestic dem. 5.00 5.50 10.00  0.16 -0.14  0.03 -0.03 
Trade deficit-to-GDP 5.00 6.00 10.00  0.04 -0.05  0.01 -0.01 
USD exchange rate 5.00 5.00 10.00  0.26 -0.25  0.05 -0.05 
Real exchange rate 5.00 4.50 10.00  0.09 -0.16  0.02 -0.03 
Terms of trade 5.00 4.00 8.50  0.12 -0.11  0.02 -0.02 
Inflation 5.00 4.00 8.50  0.08 -0.07  0.01 -0.01 
          
 Averages 
Financial variables 6.65 5.70 11.85  0.25 -0.22  0.03 -0.03 
Macro variables 5.00 4.86 9.57  0.12 -0.13  0.02 -0.02 
All variables 5.97 5.35 10.91  0.20 -0.18  0.03 -0.03 
          
 Different subsamples (group averages) 
          
 Duration Amplitude Slope 




















Financial variables 12.25 13.40 15.70 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Macro variables 11.21 9.43 10.07 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.02 
All variables 11.82 11.76 13.38 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.03 
The upper panel of the table reports summary statistics for the medium-term cyclical component of each variable for the total sample (1875-
2013). Duration is the number of years between trough and peak (for expansions) or peak and trough (for contractions). The duration of the 
full cycle is measured from peak to peak. Amplitude is the change from trough to peak (for expansions) or peak to trough (for contractions). 
Slope denotes the ratio between amplitude and duration. For the three subsamples reported in the lower panel of the table, the duration of a 
full cycle (from peak to peak), the average amplitude (average of expansionary and absolute value of contractionary phases) and average slope 
(average of expansionary and absolute value of contractionary phases) are given. Duration, amplitude and slope are in all cases obtained using 
sample medians.  
 





Relative volatility of medium- and short-term cycles 
Table 2 reports the relative volatility of the medium- and short-term cyclical components for 
each series across different sample periods, which gives an idea of the relative importance of 
the medium- and short-term cyclical components in explaining the overall behaviour of each 
variable. As the table shows, it seems that the financial series are dominated by cycles at the 
medium-term frequency, with the standard deviation of medium-term cycles being more than 
double that of cycles at the business cycle frequency. The same holds for the macroeconomic 
variables, although the difference is smaller in most cases. The relative importance of the two 
components remains broadly stable over time for the financial variables, but the importance of 
medium-term cycles seems to be increasing for the macroeconomic variables and by the post-
1980 period they have in all cases become more volatile than cycles at the business cycle 
frequency. The dominance of medium-term cycles in explaining the overall behaviour of the 
financial and macroeconomic variables can also be gauged from the figures in Appendix 2, 
which compare medium-term cycles in each variable with complete 2-30 year cycles. As the 
figures clearly show, the medium-term cycles capture a large part of the complete cycles in 
most of the series, suggesting that the business cycle (the difference between the two) plays a 
smaller role in explaining the overall variation in the data. This is consistent with what 
Drehmann et al. (2012) and Aikman et al. (2015) find for financial variables in several advanced 
economies and to what Comin and Gertler (2006) find for a range of macroeconomic variables 
in the US. 
  
Table 2 Relative volatility of short- and medium-term cycles 
     
 Total sample 1875-1944 1945-2013 1980-2013 
Real house prices  2.28 2.33 2.16 2.30 
Real credit 2.67 2.66 2.64 2.81 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 2.21 2.20 2.20 2.24 
Real M3 2.61 2.64 2.59 2.53 
M3-to-GDP ratio 2.33 2.01 2.65 2.81 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 2.99 3.71 2.32 1.68 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 1.86 2.24 1.75 1.77 
Bank leverage ratio 2.45 2.73 1.93 1.24 
Foreign non-core liabilities 2.22 1.40 2.66 2.78 
Total non-core liabilities 2.13 2.04 2.20 2.26 
     
Real GDP 2.13 2.15 2.09 2.39 
Real domestic demand 1.54 1.27 1.83 1.97 
Trade deficit-to-GDP ratio 0.82 0.65 1.21 1.35 
USD exchange rate 2.08 1.65 2.21 2.59 
Real exchange rate 1.50 1.72 1.39 1.57 
Terms of trade 0.93 0.85 1.30 1.96 
Inflation 1.03 1.10 0.91 1.07 
     
 Averages 
Financial variables 2.38 2.52 2.21 2.04 
Macro variables 1.44 1.25 1.64 1.95 
All variables 2.01 2.02 2.00 2.01 
The table reports the relative standard deviations of medium-term (8 to 30 years) and short-term (2 to 8 years) cycles for each variable. A 
number above (below) unity indicates that the medium-term cyclical component is more (less) volatile than the short-term component. 
 





Correlations of medium-term cycles in financial variables 
The final part of our analysis of cyclical properties of individual variables looks at 
contemporaneous correlation coefficients of medium-term cycles in our financial variables over 
the whole sample and the three different subsamples.88 Table 3 shows that medium-term cycles 
in most of the financial variables tend to co-move over time. The co-movement of credit, house 
prices, and wholesale bank funding is strong, while medium-term cycles in money and leverage 
do not seem well aligned with the corresponding cycles in the other financial variables.  
 
Table 3 Correlations of medium-term cyclical component of financial variables 
































Real house prices  1.00 0.72 0.42 0.22 -0.22 0.41 0.41 -0.16 0.39 0.57 
Real credit  1.00 0.87 0.08 -0.21 0.72 0.51 -0.31 0.55 0.72 
Credit-to-GDP   1.00 -0.26 -0.29 0.86 0.48 -0.49 0.49 0.72 
Real M3    1.00 0.84 -0.63 0.16 0.36 0.05 -0.20 
M3-to-GDP     1.00 -0.74 0.10 0.27 -0.10 -0.38 
Credit-to-M3      1.00 0.29 -0.49 0.40 0.71 
Assets-to-GDP       1.00 -0.13 0.72 0.66 
Bank leverage        1.00 0.08 -0.51 
For. non-core liab.         1.00 0.71 
Total non-core liab.          1.00 
The table gives the contemporaneous correlations of the medium-term cyclical component of the financial variables for the total sample period. 
Shaded sells highlight correlation coefficients larger than or equal to 0.7. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Looking at different subsamples in Table 4 shows that the cyclical co-movement of most 
of the financial variables has strengthened over time: the number of correlation coefficients 
exceeding 0.7 increases from seven in the 1875-1944 period to twelve (eighteen) in the post-
WWII (post-1980) period and the number of coefficients exceeding 0.8 rises from five in the 
1875-1944 period to eleven in the post-1980 period.89 The medium-term cycles of house prices, 
credit, bank assets, and bank wholesale funding become increasingly aligned, while the cycles 
in money and bank leverage continue to be out of sync with cycles in the other variables.  
 
 
                                                
88 We look at cyclical correlations of our macroeconomic variables in the context of our analysis of the aggregate 
financial cycle in Section 4.2 below. 
89 The simple average of correlation coefficients rises from 0.09 in the 1875-1944 period to 0.36 in the post-WWII 
period and further to 0.55 in the post-1980 period (excluding the two money measures and bank leverage gives an 
average correlation coefficient that rises from 0.50 in the first period to 0.70 in the post-WWII period and to 0.80 
in the post-1980 period). It is important to note that the increasingly strong co-movement of the cyclical 
components does not rely on the inclusion of the latest boom-bust cycle (i.e. the results continue to hold if we end 




Table 4 Subsample correlations of medium-term cyclical component of financial variables 
































           
 1875-1944 
Real house prices  1.00 0.64 0.27 0.16 -0.45 0.39 0.17 -0.29 0.19 0.55 
Real credit  1.00 0.86 -0.23 -0.55 0.85 0.24 -0.54 0.48 0.79 
Credit-to-GDP   1.00 -0.56 -0.50 0.93 0.36 -0.65 0.50 0.80 
Real M3    1.00 0.71 -0.70 -0.16 0.45 0.10 -0.44 
M3-to-GDP     1.00 -0.78 -0.02 0.41 0.14 -0.56 
Credit-to-M3      1.00 0.26 -0.64 0.30 0.82 
Assets-to-GDP       1.00 -0.50 0.36 0.49 
Bank leverage        1.00 -0.03 -0.90 
For. non-core liab.         1.00 0.23 
Total non-core liab.          1.00 
 1945-2013 
Real house prices  1.00 0.94 0.80 0.36 0.08 0.47 0.81 0.24 0.70 0.70 
Real credit  1.00 0.89 0.37 0.11 0.52 0.76 0.13 0.68 0.69 
Credit-to-GDP   1.00 0.06 -0.06 0.71 0.69 -0.11 0.62 0.67 
Real M3    1.00 0.92 -0.61 0.32 0.28 0.03 -0.04 
M3-to-GDP     1.00 -0.75 0.16 0.11 -0.19 -0.26 
Credit-to-M3      1.00 0.35 -0.15 0.55 0.62 
Assets-to-GDP       1.00 0.27 0.83 0.76 
Bank leverage        1.00 0.19 0.00 
For. non-core liab.         1.00 0.94 
Total non-core liab.          1.00 
 1980-2013 
Real house prices  1.00 0.98 0.94 0.67 0.39 0.58 0.93 0.53 0.76 0.75 
Real credit  1.00 0.97 0.70 0.44 0.58 0.90 0.50 0.76 0.75 
Credit-to-GDP   1.00 0.63 0.42 0.62 0.88 0.40 0.73 0.69 
Real M3    1.00 0.92 -0.18 0.50 0.34 0.17 0.21 
M3-to-GDP     1.00 -0.45 0.23 0.10 -0.16 -0.13 
Credit-to-M3      1.00 0.67 0.30 0.86 0.80 
Assets-to-GDP       1.00 0.55 0.85 0.83 
Bank leverage        1.00 0.51 0.53 
For. non-core liab.         1.00 0.98 
Total non-core liab.          1.00 
The table gives the contemporaneous correlations of the medium-term cyclical component of the financial variables for three different 
subsamples. Shaded sells highlight correlation coefficients larger than or equal to 0.7. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
As an example, Figure 1 shows how tightly the medium-term cycles in real house prices 
and real credit (the two financial variables Borio, 2014, argues most parsimoniously describe 
the financial cycle) have moved together over most of the sample period. Together with the 
results in Tables 3 and 4, it shows a clear tendency of medium-term cycles in the financial 
variables to move together over time.90 Such co-movement is what the financial cycle aims to 
capture. 
                                                
90 A temporary breakdown in the relationship between house prices and credit during WWII, evident in Figure 1, 






Figure 1 Medium-term cycles in house prices and credit 




Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4 The aggregate financial cycle 
 
4.1 Estimating the financial cycle 
The results from the previous section suggest that there exists an aggregate financial cycle in 
Iceland over a sample period spanning more than a century. Similar to Drehmann et al. (2012) 
and drawing on Borio’s (2014) characterisation of the financial cycle as the inherent pro-
cyclicality of the financial system, we define this aggregate cycle as the low-frequency (here 
specified as cycles lasting from 8 to 30 years) cyclical co-movement of a set of financial 
variables including both quantities and prices. This definition is conceptually similar to the 
standard approach of defining the business cycle as the recurrent and broad-based co-movement 
of macroeconomic variables over a frequency typically specified as lasting from just over a year 
to 8 years (cf. Burns and Mitchell, 1946).  
 To obtain our estimate of the aggregate financial cycle we simply take a weighted 
average of the medium-term cycles in the ten financial variables included in our analysis. For 
this we use principal component analysis where we identify the aggregate financial cycle as the 
first principal component, i.e. the one that explains most of the combined variability in the 
medium-term cycles of financial variables. We therefore take a broader approach of measuring 
the financial cycle than, for example, Aikman et al. (2015) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) 
(who focus exclusively on the credit cycle) and Drehmann et al. (2012) (who focus on a cycle 
comprising credit and house prices). Our approach is more akin to that taken in the literature on 
the “financial conditions index” (although the focus there is more on short-term co-movement 
in financial variables rather than trying to estimate a lower-frequency composite cycle as we 
do), cf. Swiston (2008) and Angelopoulou et al. (2013). This approach allows us to attain 
additional insights into the nature of the financial cycle in such a small open economy by, for 
instance, exposing the potential feedback mechanisms from one component of the financial 


























borrower’s collateral constraints, and banks’ balance sheets, as well as its multifaceted relations 
with the domestic economy and its external account.91 Table 5 shows the results. 
 
Table 5 Principal component estimation of the financial cycle 
       
 First principal component 
       
 Unrestricted  Restricted 
       
 Total sample  Total sample 1875-1944 1945-2013 1980-2013 
Proportion of variance 0.50  0.65 0.60 0.75 0.83 
       
 Normalised factor loadings 
Real house prices  0.15  0.12 0.11 0.15 0.15 
Real credit 0.21  0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.21  0.15 0.18 0.15 0.14 
Real M3 -0.07  – – – – 
M3-to-GDP ratio -0.12  – – – – 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.21  0.14 0.17 0.11 0.12 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.15  0.13 0.09 0.14 0.15 
Bank leverage ratio -0.12  – – – – 
Foreign non-core liabilities 0.16  0.13 0.10 0.15 0.15 
Total non-core liabilities 0.22  0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 
       
Total 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
The table reports the proportion of variance explained by the first principal component of the medium-term cyclical components of the 
financial variables and the individual factor loadings of each financial variable. Column 2 reports the first principal component for all the ten 
financial variables, while columns 3-6 report the first principal component for the restricted set of seven financial variables that excludes the 
three variables that obtain negative loadings in column 2 (the two money measures and the leverage ratio) over the total sample period and 
three subsamples. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
First, we show the unrestricted estimate over the full sample period, i.e. where all the 
ten financial variables are included. The normalised factor loadings suggest broadly similar 
weights for all the variables in the aggregate cyclical measure, except for the three found to be 
weakly correlated to the other variables in Tables 3 and 4 above. While the relatively weak role 
of money in driving the financial cycle is consistent with the declining role of money in boom-
bust financial cycles in the post-WWII period in other industrial countries found by Schularick 
and Taylor (2012) and Aikman et al. (2015), the limited role of bank leverage found here 
probably reflects the impact of financial repression in Iceland over a large part of the post-
WWII period. Thus, cyclical expansions of the leverage ratio typically reflect depressed 
financial savings and bank capital through rampant inflation and artificially low interest rates 
rather than the financial expansions reflected in the other financial variables. As discussed in 
                                                
91 For our principal component analysis and the construction of the aggregate financial cycle we normalise all the 
medium-term cycles so that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. We also tried to estimate 
the aggregate financial cycle using a dynamic factor analysis. The results were broadly the same: most of the 
cyclical peaks and troughs corresponded to those estimated from the principal component analysis but the dynamic 
factor analysis produced a cycle with greater short-term fluctuations. Schüler et al. (2015) estimate an aggregate 
financial cycle for a number of European countries using multivariate spectral analysis that allows for time-varying 
weights of financial variables that includes credit, house and stock prices, and bond yields. For a discussion of 





Einarsson et al. (2015), there are also some measurement issues during the latest episode, with 
the declining leverage ratio in the run-up to the crisis reflecting the fact that the numerator (bank 
capital) is measured at book value, whose quality and quantity has since been seriously 
questioned (Rannsóknarnefnd Althingis, 2010). Hence, the three credit variables, banking 
system size, and the importance of its wholesale funding seem to perform better at capturing 
the balance sheet overextension within the financial system than the two money measures and 
the leverage ratio. 
As it is not meaningful in the context of our exercise to include variables with a negative 
weight in our measure of a common financial cycle, we exclude the three variables with 
negative loadings in our subsequent analysis of the aggregate cycle (Schüler et al., 2015, use 
similar arguments). The resulting “restricted” estimate in Table 5 gives roughly identical factor 
loadings for the remaining variables, while the variability of the aggregate financial data 
explained by the first principal component rises from 50% in the unrestricted version to 65%. 
The table also reports the normalised weights estimated over the three subsamples and it is clear 
from these that the weights remain roughly equal for all the seven variables over the whole 
sample period, while the proportion of the total variability of the financial data captured by this 
aggregate measure rises to 75% in the post-WWII period and further to more than 80% in the 
post-1980 period.92 This is considerably higher than the proportion of variance explained by 
aggregate cycles for the post-1970 period in a number of Euro Area countries reported by 
Hiebert et al. (2014) using a similar approach, which ranges from a third for Italy to roughly 
half for Ireland. 
Figure 2 gives the full-sample estimate of the financial cycle and an approximation of 
the contribution of individual components to the aggregate cycle calculated using the whole-
sample factor loadings from Table 5. To ease the presentation, we summarise the seven 
individual components into three groups, one denoted the “credit cycle” which contains the 
contribution of the medium-term cycles in the three credit transformations in our sample (real 
credit, credit-to-GDP, and credit-to-money), another denoted the “bank balance sheet cycle” 
which contains the contribution of the medium-term cycles in the three bank balance sheet 
variables in our sample (bank assets-to-GDP and the two non-core bank liabilities ratios), and 
the final one is the “house price cycle” which contains the contribution of the medium-term 
cycle in real house prices to the aggregate cycle. 
We identify seven cyclical expansions over the whole sample period. There is an 
expansion around the turn of the century that peaks in 1908, which is mainly driven by credit 
during the early phase of the expansion, but with a rising contribution of bank balance sheets 
as the expansion matures, followed by house prices in the final years of the expansion (which 
in turn play a large role in the cycle’s bust phase). There is another expansion that starts at the 
end of World War I (WWI), breaking off for a short period in the mid-1920s and expanding 
again until peaking in 1933 (therefore counting as two expansions). Here, house prices play a 
                                                
92 Our results are therefore almost identical to using a simple average (as suggested by Drehmann et al., 2012). 
Our final measure of the financial cycle also appears robust to the information set used to extract it from the data, 
reflecting the high synchronisation of the medium-term cycle in these variables: for example, it is closely matched 




key role during the expansion’s initial phase, followed by credit during the second stage of the 
expansion. The middle of the century is dominated by two relatively short financial expansions, 
one that peaks in 1949 and follows the large economic shock related to allied occupation in 
WWII (see Einarsson et al., 2015), and another one that starts in 1953 and peaks in 1958. Both 
are mainly credit driven, although house prices also play a role in the second cyclical expansion. 
The next expansionary phase lasts much longer, or fourteen years from 1969 to 1983, and is 
relatively broadly based. The final expansion starts in 1995 and lasts for eleven years before 
reversing sharply in 2006. This large expansion is mainly driven by expanding bank balance 
sheets during the cycle’s birth phase, which coincides with the completion of the country’s 
capital account liberalisation and a broad-sweeping privatisation of domestic financial institutes 
during the latter half of the decade and the first years of the new century. It is only after a few 
years of balance sheet expansion (much of which took place across borders) that a significant 
expansion of domestic credit and house prices emerges. During the bust phase of the cycle we 
see sizeable contributions from all components, but bank balance sheets again play a prominent 
role. The latest boom-bust cycle therefore highlights how the inclusion of bank balance sheet 
data in the estimation of the aggregate financial cycle can offer additional insights into its 
dynamics, due to the important role of financial institutions’ balance sheets in driving economy-
wide cyclical movements (cf. Adrian and Shin, 2011) by reinforcing the interactions between 
financing constraints and perceptions of value and risks, operating partly across borders.  
 
Figure 2 The financial cycle and contribution of individual cyclical components 




Financial cycle and contribution of individual cyclical components, weighted with their normalised factor loadings. House price component 
refers to the contribution of the medium-term cycle in real house prices to the financial cycle, Credit component refers to the weighted 
average contribution of medium-term cycles in real credit, credit-to-GDP and credit-to-M3 to the financial cycle, Bank balance sheet 
component refers to the weighted average contribution of medium-term cycles in bank assets-to-GDP, foreign non-core bank liabilities 
ratio and total non-core liabilities ratio to the financial cycle. The individual components are normalised so that their sum has the same 
mean and standard deviation as the aggregate cycle. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.2 Key properties of the financial cycle 
Table 6 summarises the key properties of the financial cycle over the whole sample period and 
the three subsamples. The duration of a complete financial cycle is found to be 16 years on 
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variables. This is primarily due to the lengthening of the expansionary phase of the cycle, which 
gradually becomes longer than the contractionary phase. Both phases of the cycle have also 
become more intense. Although caution is warranted given the relatively small number of 
cyclical episodes observed, these results are broadly in line with those found by Drehmann et 
al. (2012) for a sample of seven industrial countries. They also obtain financial cycles of 16 
years that seem to have grown longer and more intense as liberalisation progressed since the 
mid-1980s and macroeconomic conditions became more stable during the run-up to the recent 
global financial crisis.93  
 
Table 6 Key characteristics of the financial cycle 
     
 Total sample 1875-1944 1945-2013 1980-2013 
Duration in expansions 7.00 7.00 8.50 12.50 
Duration in contractions 9.50 9.50 8.50 9.00 
Duration of complete cycle 16.00 16.00 19.50 24.00 
     
Amplitude of expansions 2.14 1.61 2.53 3.13 
Amplitude of contractions -2.34 -2.46 -2.34 -3.54 
     
Slope of expansions 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.26 
Slope of contractions -0.20 -0.22 -0.20 -0.48 
The table reports summary statistics for the financial cycle. Duration is the number of years between troughs and peaks (for expansions) or 
peaks and troughs (for contractions). The duration of the full cycle is measured from peak to peak. Amplitude is the change from trough to 
peak (for expansions) or peak to trough (for contractions). Slope denotes the ratio between amplitude and duration. Duration, amplitude and 
slope are in all cases obtained using sample medians. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 7 gives the correlation coefficients of medium-term cycles in individual financial 
and macroeconomic variables with the aggregate financial cycle. Medium-term cycles in most 
of the financial variables remain highly correlated with the financial cycle throughout the 
sample period, with correlation coefficients around 0.7 or higher over the whole sample and 
close to 0.9 in the post-WWII period for all the variables except the two money measures and 
the bank leverage ratio. This is also borne out by Harding and Pagan’s (2006) concordance 
index reported in Table 7, which measures the fraction of time individual series are in the same 
cyclical phase as the aggregate financial cycle (see also Appendix 2, which shows the 
development of the financial cycle and the medium-term cycles in individual series).94 The 
index is close to 0.8 for most of the variables over the whole sample period and rises even 
further in the post-WWII period.  
The data therefore clearly shows how different segments of the financial system co-
move and have gradually become more and more synchronised over time, presumably 
reflecting the rising financial sophistication of the Icelandic economy. However, this is not 
exclusive to the financial variables, as we see that medium-term cycles in some of the 
macroeconomic variables have also become more closely tied to the financial cycle. This holds 
                                                
93 See Einarsson et al. (2015) and Central Bank of Iceland (2016) for discussions of Iceland’s varying degree of 
financial liberalisation. 
94 Two series which are perfectly pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) would therefore have a concordance index equal 
to unity (zero). For two series with fully independent cycles (and therefore have a correlation coefficient equal to 




particularly true for the cyclical components of economic activity (especially domestic demand) 
and the trade deficit, which becomes almost completely synchronised with the financial cycle 
in the post-1980 period. This points to an important interaction between the financial cycle and 
capital flows with regard to the capacity to finance domestic expenditure, consistent with 
implications of many of the papers cited in Section 2.2 above. We will return to this theme in 
our discussion of some of the issues that our analysis give rise to in the next section and in 
Section 7 below.95  
 
Table 7 Co-movement of individual variables with the financial cycle 
          
 Contemporaneous correlations  Concordance index 

















Real house prices  0.69 0.62 0.88 0.92  0.80 0.74 0.84 0.82 
Real credit 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.92  0.84 0.78 0.90 0.88 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.90  0.80 0.76 0.83 0.79 
Real M3 -0.11 -0.39 0.08 0.42  0.50 0.43 0.55 0.59 
M3-to-GDP ratio -0.33 -0.58 -0.15 0.11  0.43 0.48 0.39 0.47 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.79 0.90 0.69 0.79  0.80 0.79 0.81 0.71 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.71 0.47 0.87 0.95  0.74 0.69 0.78 0.76 
Bank leverage ratio -0.38 -0.70 0.10 0.54  0.35 0.16 0.51 0.62 
Foreign non-core liab. 0.75 0.50 0.91 0.95  0.76 0.60 0.88 0.97 
Total non-core liab. 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.93  0.87 0.91 0.83 0.88 
          
Real GDP 0.30 0.20 0.41 0.77  0.60 0.55 0.64 0.62 
Real domestic demand 0.28 0.10 0.42 0.89  0.58 0.52 0.64 0.71 
Trade deficit-to-GDP  0.25 -0.06 0.49 0.87  0.65 0.60 0.70 0.85 
USD exchange rate -0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.04  0.50 0.43 0.57 0.44 
Real exchange rate -0.12 -0.61 0.24 0.75  0.50 0.41 0.55 0.62 
Terms of trade -0.23 -0.32 -0.13 0.03  0.47 0.41 0.52 0.56 
Inflation -0.17 -0.62 0.43 0.44  0.53 0.36 0.67 0.68 
          
 Averages 
Financial variables 0.48 0.36 0.61 0.74  0.69 0.63 0.73 0.75 
Macro variables 0.04 -0.20 0.27 0.54  0.55 0.47 0.61 0.64 
All variables 0.30 0.13 0.47 0.66  0.63 0.57 0.68 0.70 
The table gives the contemporaneous correlations and concordance of the medium-term cyclical component of individual variables with the 
financial cycle. Shaded sells highlight numbers larger than or equal to 0.7. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.3 The financial cycle and economic activity 
A comparison of the cyclical properties of the financial cycle in Table 6 with the cyclical 
properties of GDP and domestic demand in Table 1 shows that the financial cycle is longer than 
the medium-term cycle in economic activity and has gradually become relatively more drawn 
out and intense. Figure 3 shows that this also applies when the financial cycle is compared to 
the short-term cyclical component of output and demand. The figure shows that the financial 
cycle is clearly longer than the business cycle – as it should be given the way the cyclical 
                                                
95 As with individual medium-term cycles in Tables 3 and 4, we find these findings are not sensitive to the inclusion 




components are defined and constructed. Nevertheless, the difference in the duration of the two 
cycles is large: over the whole sample period a complete cyclical episode takes 16 years on 
average for the financial cycle (see Table 6 above), but only 3 years for the business cycle (for 
GDP but slightly longer, or 4 years, for domestic demand). And the difference increases over 
time, with cyclical episodes occurring in the post-1980 period taking 24 years to be completed 
for the financial cycle while it remains roughly unchanged for the business cycle. By the same 
token, we also see that financial cycle contractions tend to be much more drawn out than 
business cycle contractions: a typical financial contraction lasts more than 9 years but 2 years 
for a typical business cycle contraction. The financial cycle has also gradually become more 
pronounced relative to the business cycle: the relative standard deviation of the financial cycle 
and the business cycle is almost twice as high in the post-1980 period compared to the 1875-
1944 period.  
 




Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Finally, in Table 8 we look more closely at economic activity over different phases of 
the financial cycle. First, we see that there is a marked difference in median demand and output 
growth over the expansionary and contractionary phases of the financial cycle: over the whole 
sample period we find that growth is almost three times higher on average during expansionary 
phases of the financial cycle than during its contractionary phases. This difference is less 
pronounced with respect to domestic demand in the first subsample period when the financial 
cycle played a smaller role in affecting macroeconomic developments, but by the post-WWII 
period we see that growth in GDP and domestic demand is almost four times higher on average 
during expansions than during contractions. We also find that business cycle contractions that 
coincide with contractionary phases of the financial cycle tend to be more drawn out than 
contractions that coincide with expansionary phases of the financial cycle. Together, the results 
in Table 8 suggest that the financial cycle plays an important role in the boom-bust cycles in 
the Icelandic economy (especially in the post-WWII period), for example through which 














































only to curtail it again in the contractionary phase of the cycle. We will return to these linkages 
in Section 7.96  
 
Table 8 Economic activity in different phases of the financial cycle 
     
 Total sample 1875-1944 1945-2013 1980-2013 
     
 Domestic demand 
Growth in expansionary phase 0.053 0.027 0.059 0.058 
Growth in contractionary phase 0.021 0.026 0.017 0.015 
Relative duration in contractions 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
     
 GDP 
Growth in expansionary phase 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.043 
Growth in contractionary phase 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.012 
Relative duration in contractions 1.50 1.00 2.00 2.00 
The table shows the median growth rate of domestic demand and GDP over the expansionary and contractionary phases of the financial cycle, 
and the relative duration (in years) of contractions in each series that coincide with contractionary phases of the financial cycle relative to 
contractionary phases that do not coincide with contractionary phases of the financial cycle. Thus, relative duration above (below) unity 
indicates that short-term (business cycle) contractions that coincide with contractionary phases of the financial cycle are longer (shorter) than 
contractions that do not coincide with contractionary phases of the financial cycle. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5 The financial cycle and global spillovers 
In Einarsson et al. (2015), we found strong links between global financial crises and financial 
crises in Iceland: the dates of financial crises were found to correspond remarkably well and 
our empirical analysis suggested that global crisis episodes typically led to a two- to threefold 
increase in the probability of a banking or multivariate financial crisis in Iceland (multivariate 
crises are defined in Appendix 3).  
The transmission channels of these global spillovers are relatively well known: financial 
boom-busts frequently have an important international dimension of some kind, be that due to 
common sources in a financially integrated global economy, such as the credit and asset price 
bubbles experienced by many advanced economies in the run-up to the most recent crisis, or 
due to the transmission of crises from one country (often a global financial centre) to another 
as a result of cross-border contagion working through both financial and trade channels (see, 
for example, Kaminsky et al., 2003, Borio, James, and Shin, 2014, Lane and McQuade, 2014, 
and Avdjiev et al., 2015). Both types of channels were at work in the recent global crisis but 
they also played a part in many earlier episodes (cf. Bordo and Murshid, 2001).  
                                                
96 These results are consistent with the findings in Einarsson et al. (2015) which suggest that recessions tend to be 
more severe when they coincide with financial crises, which as we show in Section 6 below tend to coincide with 
peaks in the financial cycle. Our results are also consistent with Claessens et al. (2012) and Drehmann et al. (2012), 
who find that recessions that coincide with contractionary phases of the financial cycle tend to be longer and more 
severe. They can also be viewed as being consistent with the findings in Jordà et al. (2013, 2014, 2015), who find 
that recessions tend to be more severe when they are preceded by periods of strong credit growth, in particular if 
this is driven by a strong expansion in mortgage credit and interact with abnormal increases in house prices. Borio 
et al. (2015) emphasise the interaction between sectoral allocation of resources and productivity dynamics across 
different phases of the financial cycle in explaining these characteristics. Romer and Romer (2015) provide a more 




One obvious extension of our analysis of the financial cycle in Iceland is therefore to 
investigate whether there are links between the domestic financial cycle and financial cycles in 
other countries. This is also relevant for the growing literature on general spillover effects which 
mainly focuses on how financial globalisation impacts the capacity of domestic policies to 
conduct independent monetary and financial policies (cf. Rey, 2013, Schoenmaker, 2013, and 
Obstfeld, 2015). We begin by analysing potential spillovers from the global financial cycle, 
which we proxy with the US financial cycle, given its international economic prominence and 
the fact that the US financial system has long served as a global financial centre. We then move 
on to look at the potential transmission channels through which the global financial cycle 
impacts the domestic cycle. Finally, we explore the possibility of additional regional channels 
by looking at the links between the domestic financial cycle and financial cycles in Denmark 
and Norway, given their close political, economic, and cultural links with Iceland, especially in 
the earlier part of the sample. We also look at potential regional spillovers from the financial 
cycle in the UK, given the long-standing trade and financial links between the two countries 
(and UKs leading role in global finance in the early part of our sample period).  
For the US we use the house price data collected by Shiller (2015), and data from Jordà 
et al. (2014) for the other variables (with updates until 2013 kindly made available by the 
authors). Data for the other three countries come from various sources, with Appendix 1 
providing the details and graphs of the data for all the four countries. Similarly to our treatment 
of the Icelandic data, we transform the data to log-differences (except for the US real interest 
rate, which is transformed using the log-difference of one plus the interest rate) and use the 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter to identify cycles with periodicity of 8 to 30 
years. The final estimate of the medium-term cycles for the individual series is then obtained 
by cumulating the resulting growth rates. 
 
5.1 Spillover effects from the global financial cycle 
We start by reporting the correlations of the Icelandic financial cycle with medium-term cycles 
of individual US financial series and an aggregate measure of the US financial cycle (explained 
below). The upper panel of Table 9 shows that there is a high and rising co-movement between 
the aggregate Icelandic financial cycle and medium-term cycles in many of the individual US 
series, especially house prices, credit, and the size of the banking system. For example, the 
Icelandic financial cycle is found to be in the same phase as the medium-term cycle in the US 
credit-to-GDP ratio close to 75% of the time. This implies that over a period of more than a 
century, an era covering a number of different policy regimes and varying degree of financial 
deepening and openness in Iceland, the domestic financial cycle has spent more than ninety 
years in the same phase as the US credit cycle.  
We construct a simple composite measure of the aggregate US financial cycle as the 
first principal component of the medium-term cyclical components of real house prices and the 




parsimoniously capture the aggregate financial cycle in advanced economies.97 As Table 9 
shows, there are remarkably strong links between the Icelandic financial cycle and this simple 
measure of the global financial cycle: over the whole sample the simple correlation coefficient 
and concordance index measure above 0.7. Furthermore, both are rising over time: the 
correlation coefficient rises to almost 0.9 in the post-WWII period while the concordance index 
rises to 0.8. Thus, the two aggregate cycles are tightly aligned, in particular in the second half 
of the sample period where the two series spend 80% of the time in the same cyclical phase.  
 
Table 9 Co-movement of US and Icelandic financial cycles 
          
 Contemporaneous correlations  Concordance index 
          

















Real house prices  0.67 0.47 0.82 0.90  0.57 0.45 0.67 0.74 
Real credit 0.58 0.53 0.65 0.63  0.65 0.59 0.70 0.71 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.63  0.72 0.67 0.75 0.74 
Real M3 -0.26 -0.21 -0.32 -0.08  0.39 0.34 0.42 0.56 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.18 0.59 -0.17 -0.22  0.60 0.66 0.55 0.53 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.81  0.67 0.62 0.72 0.62 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52  0.73 0.78 0.70 0.76 
Real long-term rate  0.51 0.62 0.38 0.30  0.59 0.64 0.55 0.56 
Real stock prices 0.13 0.45 -0.33 -0.33  0.46 0.59 0.36 0.38 
          
Composite fin. cycle 0.78 0.69 0.86 0.87  0.74 0.67 0.80 0.74 
          
Dates of peaks in Icelandic (first line) and US (second line) financial cycles 
1886 – 1908 – 1924 1933 – 1949 1958 – 1983 – 2006 
1890 1896 1907 1913 – 1931 1937 1949 1956 1964 1980 1988 2006 
              
Dates of troughs in Icelandic (first line) and US (second line) financial cycles 
– 1900 – 1917 1926 – 1943 1953 – 1969 – 1995 2012 
1892 1901 1909 1919 – 1935 1943 1953 1961 1969 1983 1994 2012 
The table gives the contemporaneous correlations and concordance of the medium-term cyclical component of US financial variables with 
the aggregate Icelandic financial cycle. The US composite financial cycle is obtained as the first principal component of the medium-term 
cycles in US real house prices and the credit-to-GDP ratio. Shaded sells highlight numbers larger than or equal to 0.7. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The strong link between the two financial cycles can also be seen in the two lower panels 
of Table 9, which report the dates of the peaks and troughs in the domestic and US aggregate 
financial cycles, as well as in Figure 4 which compares the Icelandic aggregate cycle to the 
medium-term cycles in US credit and house prices on one hand and the composite US cycle on 
the other hand. There are eight peaks in the aggregate domestic cycle (seven if the first one 
which coincides with the first observation of the series is excluded) and eight troughs, while 
the aggregate US cycle has twelve peaks and troughs. Again, the correspondence between the 
                                                
97 The aggregate measure explains more than 70% of the total variability in these two variables. We experimented 
with a number of other variations for the composite indicator (available upon request), e.g. by also including the 
bank asset-to-GDP ratio, real credit, and the real long-term interest rate, with very similar results. As in Drehmann 
et al. (2012) we find the medium-term cycle in real stock prices to be relatively weakly synchronised with the 
cycle in other financial variables. Comparison of our estimate of the aggregate US financial cycle with the one 
constructed by Drehmann et al. (2012) shows that the estimates are practically identical for the period they estimate 




two cycles is striking: six of the seven domestic peaks since the start of the 20th century 
correspond to peaks in the US cycle (with the Icelandic cyclical peak typically coinciding with 
the US peak or lagging it by a year or two). The troughs are also tightly linked, with seven of 
the eight domestic troughs occurring within a two-year window with troughs in the US.98  
 




Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In Table 10 we take a closer look at the possible channels through which the global 
financial cycle seems to work its way to Iceland. To do this we simply regress the medium-term 
cycle in each local financial variable on a constant and the composite US financial cycle 
measure. The table reports significant spillover effects on many of the domestic financial 
variables, but most clearly through credit and non-core bank liabilities, while there are also 
strong effects through total bank assets and house prices in the second half of the sample period. 
This indicates that there may be additional value from looking at the size and composition of 
the banks’ balance sheet instead of just credit and house prices with regard to capturing the 
transmission of global financial spillovers to the domestic financial cycle and thereby to 
economic activity (see Section 4.3).  
The table also reports the regression results for the aggregate financial cycle, again 
showing the strong spillover effects reported earlier: the composite US financial cycle explains 
over 60% of the variation in the Icelandic financial cycle over the whole sample period and, as 
discussed before, there is clear evidence that these links have been growing stronger over time 
with the explanatory power rising to almost 75% in the post-WWII period. This close co-
movement of the Icelandic financial cycle with its global counterpart stands in stark contrast to 
earlier studies (such as Gudmundsson et al., 2000, and Einarsson et al., 2013) on the domestic 
business cycle which have failed to find robust links between the domestic business cycle and 
                                                
98 There are four US cyclical peaks in the 20th century that have no corresponding peaks in Iceland: the two peaks 
leading into the two World Wars, a peak in the mid-1960s and a peak in the late 1980s roughly coinciding with 
the US Saving & Loans crisis. Interestingly, the short and shallow domestic cyclical reversal in the mid-1920s (the 
only peak that does not have a corresponding peak in the US) does show up in the US data as a clear slow-down 
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the business cycles of other developed economies.99 We will return to this issue and its policy 
implications in Section 7 below. 
 
Table 10 Spillover channels from the US financial cycle to financial variables in Iceland 
            
 Total sample  1875-1944  1945-2013  1980-2013 
            
 R2 p-val.  R2 p-val.  R2 p-val.  R2 p-val. 
Real house prices  0.37 0.00  0.31 0.02  0.58 0.00  0.77 0.00 
Real credit 0.56 0.00  0.53 0.00  0.59 0.00  0.74 0.00 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.38 0.00  0.29 0.01  0.57 0.00  0.59 0.00 
Real M3 0.00 0.64  0.08 0.21  -0.01 0.75  0.38 0.00 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.15 0.02  0.53 0.00  0.00 0.50  0.09 0.09 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.42 0.00  0.48 0.00  0.35 0.00  0.20 0.03 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.33 0.01  0.03 0.20  0.65 0.00  0.83 0.00 
Bank leverage ratio 0.11 0.03  0.32 0.00  -0.01 0.81  0.19 0.07 
Foreign non-core liab. 0.21 0.01  -0.02 0.89  0.53 0.00  0.58 0.00 
Total non-core liab. 0.54 0.00  0.47 0.00  0.61 0.00  0.63 0.00 
            
Aggregate financial cycle 0.61 0.00  0.47 0.00  0.74 0.00  0.76 0.00 
The table reports the results from regressing the medium-term cyclical component of the Icelandic financial variables and the aggregate 
financial cycle, respectively, on a constant and the composite US financial cycle. Reported are the R2 (degrees of freedom adjusted) and a 
p-value (based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors) for the null hypothesis that the US financial cycle is not statistically significant 
from zero.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5.2 Potential regional spillovers 
The analysis above suggests that there are strong spillover effects from the US financial cycle 
to the financial cycle in Iceland and a simple regression analysis indicates that similar spillover 
effects from the financial cycles in Denmark, Norway and the UK to Iceland also exist. But, as 
the analysis in Appendix 4 shows, these regional spillover effects may simply be reflecting the 
effects from the US financial cycle working their way indirectly through these countries to 
Iceland.100 Thus, to focus on possible additional regional spillover effects, we simply measure 
the “local” component of the financial cycles in Denmark, Norway and the UK as the residual 
from a regression of the financial cycle for each of these countries on the US cycle, which by 
construction captures the component of the financial cycle that is not explained by the US cycle. 
The importance of these local components of the financial cycle in these three countries for the 
Icelandic financial cycle is reported in Table 11.  
                                                
99 However, our results can be interpreted as being consistent with Obstfeld’s (2015) results that Iceland’s long-
term nominal interest rates correlate strongly with their US counterpart and that the speed of adjustment in 
Icelandic rates is exceptionally high in international comparison. 
100 The appendix shows that there is strong co-movement between the composite financial cycles in these four 
countries. A simple regression analysis shows that the composite US financial cycle explains about 40% of the 
Danish and Norwegian cycles and 50% of the UK cycle (in all cases found to be statistically significant from zero 
at the 1% critical level). The results with regard to the local UK cycle need to be interpreted with some caution as 
it rests on the assumption that we can treat the US cycle as exogenous in the regression, which can be questioned 
in the UK case – especially in the first decades of the period. The appendix also shows that there is a strong 
coincidence between financial crises in these four countries and that financial cycles have significant predictive 




Overall, we find these additional regional spillovers to be negligible. The global 
spillovers reported in the previous section therefore mostly stem from the spillover effects of 
the US financial cycle, with limited additional effects from financial cycles in Scandinavia and 
the UK. A possible exception is the first half of our sample period, which shows evidence of 
additional regional spillover effects from the Danish credit cycle and, perhaps to some extent, 
the UK credit cycle. This would be consistent with the strong political, economic and cultural 
ties between Iceland and Denmark in this period (with Iceland a part of the Danish Kingdom 
until 1944) and the strong financial links between the two countries as reflected, for instance, 
in Danish ownership of one of the two principal commercial banks in Iceland and the fact that 
Danish banks were a chief source of external financing for the Icelandic banking system, 
Treasury, and key industries. The same applies to the UK, which in addition to strong trade 
links, was also a prominent source of financing for Icelandic entities in the latter half of that 
period (see Einarsson et al., 2015, for more detail). For the post-WWII period we see, however, 
that these additional regional effects all but disappear. 
 
Table 11 Additional spillover effects from local components of regional financial cycles 
            
 Total sample  1875-1944  1945-2013  1980-2013 
            
 Corr. Con.  Corr. Con.  Corr. Con.  Corr. Con. 
Danish credit-to-GDP  0.02 0.53  0.56 0.76  -0.43 0.33  -0.37 0.35 
Danish real house prices 0.01 0.55  0.09 0.55  -0.03 0.55  0.22 0.53 
Danish financial cycle 0.03 0.55  0.49 0.67  -0.28 0.45  -0.13 0.41 
            
Norw. credit-to-GDP  0.07 0.52  0.18 0.57  0.00 0.48  0.02 0.59 
Norw. real house prices -0.09 0.45  0.05 0.48  -0.18 0.42  -0.20 0.44 
Norwegian financial cycle 0.00 0.45  0.18 0.53  -0.09 0.38  -0.08 0.50 
            
UK credit-to-GDP  0.05 0.52  0.67 0.64  -0.49 0.42  -0.68 0.32 
UK real house prices -0.11 0.51  -0.23 0.47  -0.06 0.55  0.26 0.68 
UK financial cycle -0.04 0.51  0.41 0.55  -0.28 0.48  -0.31 0.47 
The table reports the contemporaneous correlation and concordance index for the aggregate Icelandic financial cycle and the local 
component of the medium-term cyclical components of the credit-to-GDP ratio and real house prices, and the composite financial cycle, 
respectively, in Denmark, Norway and the UK. The local cyclical components are obtained as the residual from regressing the original 
cyclical components on a constant and the composite US financial cycle. Shaded sells highlight numbers larger than or equal to 0.7. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
6 The financial cycle and financial crises 
The analysis in Section 4.3 showed that median GDP and domestic demand growth is markedly 
higher during expansionary phases of the financial cycle than during its contractionary phases, 
and that recessions coinciding with financial cycle contractions are typically longer than other 
recessions. This suggests an important role of the financial cycle in facilitating real economy 
expansions and triggering its subsequent downturns. This can also be seen from the left-hand 
panel of Figure 5 which shows the tight connection between the financial cycle and its local 
component on the one hand, and particularly nasty real economy episodes on the other hand 




of “consumption disasters” (i.e. episodes where per capita domestic demand contracts by more 
than 10% from peak to trough).101 
One important manifestation of this co-movement of the financial cycle and excessive 
fluctuations in economic activity is through possible financial disruptions during the final stages 
of the cycle’s expansionary phase, for example when balance sheets become overextended and 
asset price overvaluations peak. Many studies (including ours, see Section 5 in Einarsson et al., 
2015) have indeed found that financial distresses are typically associated with more severe 
economic recessions. What remains to close the circle is therefore to consider whether there are 
close links between different phases of the financial cycle and the timing and incidence of these 
financial disruptions. Again, and consistent with the findings in Drehmann et al. (2012) and 
Aikman et al. (2015) for other industrial countries, we find a clear link: Figure 5 clearly shows 
that financial crises, whether they are banking crises or full-blown multiple financial crises (see 
Appendix 3 for a summary of financial crises dates), are closely aligned with peaks in the 
financial cycle, both the aggregate cycle and its local component.  
 
Figure 5 The financial cycle, demand disasters and financial crises 




Sources: Einarsson et al. (2015) and authors’ calculations. 
 
The close links between the financial cycle and excessive financial turmoil can also be 
seen in Table 12, which shows that almost all the identified cyclical peaks coincide with some 
kind of a financial distress at a similar date (about 80% of the peaks in the aggregate and local 
cycles have some type of a financial crisis within a three year window).102 Some of the crises 
                                                
101 We use domestic demand instead of private consumption as consumption data is not available prior to 1945. 
This criteria gives us nine disaster episodes that occur on average every 12 years and last for almost 3 years (1914-
15, 1918, 1923-24, 1931-32, 1948-51, 1968-69, 1975-76, 1988-93, and 2007-10). See Einarsson et al. (2015) for 
more detail. 
102 We use the same window size as Drehmann et al. (2012), disregarding the first peak of both cycles as they 
merely reflect the first observation of the series. A peak in the domestic cycle in 1886 would, however, be 
consistent with peaks in the Danish, Norwegian, and British cycles in 1885-86 (see Figure A.4.1 in Appendix 4). 
The only cyclical expansion in the table that does not have a financial crisis at a similar date is the one peaking in 
1908 which is not associated with any type of financial crisis in Iceland. However, as we discuss in Einarsson et 
al. (2015), this episode did coincide with some strain on the domestic financial system following the global banking 
panic in 1907 (starting in the US following the San Francisco earthquake in 1906 and the collapse of copper prices 
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occur soon after the cycle turns, but as in Drehmann et al. (2012) who focus on systemic banking 
crises in the period from 1970 and onwards, we also find cases where the cycle continues to 
expand for some time after the crisis occurs. This applies to the first two systemic banking 
crises in the early 1920s and 1930s, and may reflect a slower and somewhat more muted 
propagation mechanism between the financial system and the real economy at the prevailing 
degree of financial development compared to that existing in the post-WWII period. For 
example, in the last episode we find that the cyclical peak leads the crisis by two years. 
 
Table 12 Peaks in the financial cycle and financial distresses 
   
Cyclical peaks  




component Financial distresses at similar dates 
1908 1908 No financial crisis identified but there was a sharp deterioration of access to foreign 
funding for local banks following the global banking panic in 1907 
1924 1921 A currency crisis in 1919-20 and a systemic banking crisis in 1920 (part of a 
multiple financial crisis lasting from 1914 to 1921) 
1933 1935 A systemic banking crisis in 1930-31 and a currency crisis in 1932 (part of a 
multiple financial crisis lasting from 1931 to 1932) 
– 1943 No currency or banking crisis but an inflation crisis in 1940-43 
1949 1949 A currency crisis in 1950, followed by an inflation crisis in 1950-51 (part of a 
multiple financial crisis lasting from 1948 to 1951) 
1958 1960 A currency crisis in 1960 
– 1975 Inflation and currency crises lasting from 1973-89 and 1974-85, respectively 
1983 1983 Coincides with the ongoing inflation and currency crises from above and a non-
systemic banking crisis in 1985-86 
– 1994 A twin currency and (non-systemic) banking crisis in 1993 (part of a multiple 
financial crisis lasting from 1991-93) 
2006 2006 Currency and banking crises from in 2008-9 and 2008-10, respectively (part of a 
multiple financial crisis lasting from 2008 to 2010) 
The table gives the dates of peaks in the aggregate financial cycle in Iceland and its local component. These dates are compared to periods of 
financial turmoil at similar dates (see Appendix 3 for further detail). 
 
Sources: Einarsson et al. (2015) and authors’ calculations. 
 
The chronology in Table 12, together with our previous analysis, suggests that financial 
booms may fuel the economic expansion and increase the risks of overheating and 
overextension in the financial system and therefore sow the seeds of the subsequent bust. This 
raises the question whether expansions of the financial cycle may provide a robust early-
warning signal for financial crises. Indeed, this is what we find. As Table 13 shows, a financial 
cycle expansion is within three years followed by a banking crisis in almost 60% of all 
expansionary phases and by a multiple financial crisis in just under 50% of all expansionary 
phases. Not all cyclical peaks are followed by a financial crisis, however: just under 30% of 
expansions are not followed by a banking crisis and roughly 15% of the expansions are not 
followed by a multiple financial crisis.  
As the table shows, this compares favourably with the early warning capacity of the 
individual financial and macroeconomic variables (and the local component of the aggregate 




aggregate cycle and the fraction of expansions that are not followed by a crisis lower. The ratio 
between the “good” and “bad” signals can be interpreted as a “noise-signal” ratio, and we see 
that the aggregate financial cycle outperforms the individual variables and its local 
component.103 This suggests that by combining information from different financial variables 
and highlighting their important interaction in amplifying financial imbalances, the aggregate 
financial cycle can provide a better signal of future financial distresses than individual financial 
variable considered in isolation (see also Claessens et al., 2011, Borio, 2014, and Schüler et al., 
2015). 
 
Table 13 Cyclical expansions and financial crises 
        
 Banking crises  Multiple financial crises 























Real house prices  0.36 0.55 1.50  0.45 0.45 1.00 
Real credit 0.44 0.44 1.00  0.33 0.33 1.00 
Credit-to-GDP ratio 0.44 0.44 1.00  0.33 0.33 1.00 
Real M3 0.20 0.50 2.50  0.40 0.40 1.00 
M3-to-GDP ratio 0.44 0.44 1.00  0.44 0.33 0.75 
Credit-to-M3 ratio 0.57 0.29 0.50  0.43 0.14 0.33 
Assets-to-GDP ratio 0.40 0.50 1.25  0.30 0.40 1.33 
Bank leverage ratio 0.30 0.50 1.67  0.30 0.40 1.33 
Foreign non-core liabilities 0.33 0.44 1.33  0.22 0.33 1.50 
Total non-core liabilities 0.40 0.50 1.25  0.30 0.40 1.33 
        
Real GDP 0.18 0.55 3.00  0.55 0.45 0.83 
Real domestic demand 0.18 0.55 3.00  0.55 0.45 0.83 
Trade deficit-to-GDP ratio 0.31 0.62 2.00  0.38 0.54 1.40 
USD exchange rate 0.23 0.62 2.67  0.46 0.54 1.17 
Real exchange rate 0.31 0.62 2.00  0.38 0.54 1.40 
Terms of trade 0.14 0.64 4.50  0.29 0.57 2.00 
Inflation 0.36 0.64 1.80  0.29 0.57 2.00 
        
 Averages 
Financial variables 0.39 0.46 1.30  0.35 0.35 1.06 
Macro variables 0.24 0.60 2.71  0.41 0.52 1.38 
All variables 0.33 0.52 1.88  0.38 0.42 1.19 
        
 Financial cycle 
Financial cycle 0.57 0.29 0.50  0.43 0.14 0.33 
Fin. cycle (local comp.) 0.40 0.50 1.25  0.30 0.40 1.33 
Expansions (not) close to crises gives the fraction of medium-term cyclical expansions that are (not) followed by a financial crises within a 
3 year window. The noise-signal ratio gives the ratio between the two fractions.  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                
103 This is a slightly different approach to the early-warning exercise in Einarsson et al. (2015), where we measure 
the signalling properties of individual variables based on deviations that exceed 1.5 standard deviations from a 
smooth Hodrick-Prescott trend. There we find that individual variables do not provide robust enough early-




7 Discussion and some policy implications 
The existence of a clearly defined financial cycle in Iceland and the strong interaction of the 
cycle with real economic activity on the one hand, and the global financial cycle on the other 
hand, raises some fundamental issues with important policy implications, while also providing 
important new insights into a number of prevalent issues in the domestic economic debate. In 
this section, we touch upon several of these issues and highlight some of the key policy 
implications, but this can only be viewed as a first attempt. Further analysis is likely to be 
needed to explore the full implications of our findings. 
 
7.1 The financial cycle, capital flows and sudden stops 
Our previous analysis in Table 7 shows that the medium-term cycle in the trade deficit closely 
co-moves with the aggregate financial cycle and that this co-movement has strengthened over 
time. Thus, a financial cycle expansion tends to coincide with an expansion in the lower-
frequency component of the trade deficit, consistent with a trade deficit building up in the 
expansionary phase of the financial cycle and reversing at roughly the same time as the 
aggregate cycle turns.  
 
Figure 6 The financial cycle, capital flows and sudden stops 




Financial cycle and medium-term cycles in the trade deficit-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of foreign non-core bank liabilities to total liabilities, 
respectively. Currency crises are denoted as shaded grey areas and currency crises that coincide with sudden stop of capital inflows as 
orange shaded areas (see Table A.3.1 in Appendix 3 for details on currency crisis dates). 
 
Sources: Einarsson et al. (2015) and authors’ calculations. 
 
This is consistent with the analysis in Einarsson et al. (2015), which also shows that 
large trade reversals tend to coincide with currency crises, and is also evident from Figure 6, 
which shows that cyclical peaks in the trade deficit are frequently followed by a currency crisis 
and that the timing of these crises typically coincides with the cyclical trough. The same is also 
apparent when looking at the medium-term cycles in the ratio of foreign non-core funding of 
domestic banks, especially during the first period of relatively free capital movements up until 
1930 and again from 1970 and onwards when domestic banks’ access to foreign credit improved 
again. The figure also shows that two of the more dramatic cyclical reversals, in the early 1920s 
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depreciation, also coincide with a sudden stop crisis and the introduction of widespread capital 
controls.104 Figure 6 therefore clearly points to an important link through which the 
expansionary phase of the financial cycle facilitates the build-up of external imbalances and 
forces a sharp reversal in capital flows, even resulting in currency crises, once the cycle turns. 
 
7.2 The financial cycle and the consumption boom-bust cycle 
Einarsson et al. (2013) show that private consumption is more volatile in Iceland than in other 
industrial countries and that this high volatility cannot be accounted for by more volatile 
external macroeconomic conditions (either export volumes or terms of trade). They also find 
that private consumption is more volatile than income, a common finding among emerging 
market economies but an unusual feature among advanced economies (cf. Aguiar and Gopinath, 
2007). This unusually high consumption volatility is also consistent with Barro and Ursúa’s 
(2008) finding that the frequency of consumption disasters is by far the highest in Iceland 
among advanced economies in the post-WWII period (and even in the higher region among the 
emerging market economies in their sample). 
 Einarsson et al. (2013) also document the cyclical volatility (at business cycle 
frequency) in several sub-components of private consumption, showing that a notable feature 
of the consumption cycle in Iceland is the high volatility of durable goods consumption, and 
that this volatility is strongly correlated with fluctuations in the exchange rate. They also find 
that as the volatility of the exchange rate increased following the move to a more flexible 
exchange rate regime in 2001, so did short-term fluctuations in total consumption, and durable 
consumption in particular. One possible explanation offered by Einarsson et al. (2013) is that 
this reflects the high import content of durable goods in Iceland, which in turn reflects the 
country’s relatively small manufacturing sector and its narrow production structure. But this 
could also reflect effects of the financial cycle, with rising asset prices and easing credit 
conditions during the expansionary phase of the cycle (which tend to coincide with the 
expansionary phase of the real exchange rate cycle as shown in Table 7 above), working to 
reduce financial constraints and make leveraged consumption spending easier. As the cycle 
subsequently reverses, so do financial conditions. 
 Figure 7 therefore compares the financial cycle with the medium-term cycles in total 
private consumption and its key subcomponents from 1960 to 2013. There seems to be a strong 
link between the financial cycle and the medium-term cyclical component in consumption of 
semi-durable and durable goods, which appears to have become even stronger since the late 
1980s consistent with the increasing financial deepening and liberalisation discussed earlier (cf. 
Juselius and Drehmann, 2015). Not surprisingly, these links are less apparent in non-durable 
                                                
104 Sudden stop crises are episodes where financing a large current account deficit suddenly becomes more difficult 
and capital inflows reverse, typically forcing a sharp narrowing of the current account deficit and a currency 
depreciation. We follow Calvo et al. (2008) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) in defining sudden stop crises as 
episodes where reversals in the trade deficit that exceed two standard deviations coincide with output contractions. 
This gives us two episodes: 1919-20 and 2008-9, both of which saw very large currency depreciations and a 
reversal of trade balance amounting to 20-30% of GDP from peak to trough. Widespread capital controls were 
also introduced in 1931 but this episodes falls short of the sudden stop criteria used here. See Central Bank of 




consumption shown in the second figure (note the different scale of the two figures). This 
suggests that the financial cycle may be an important source of consumption volatility in Iceland 
which is an issue that needs further exploring, including its relation to capital flows and 
exchange rate movements discussed above, and fiscal policy discussed in the following section.  
 
Figure 7 The financial cycle and consumption 




Financial cycle and medium-term cycles in total consumption and its subcomponents. Shaded areas denote multiple financial crises (see 
Table A.3.1 in Appendix 3 for details on crisis dates). 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. 
 
7.3 The financial cycle and fiscal policy 
Einarsson et al. (2013) find evidence that government expenditure in Iceland tends to be 
positively correlated with the business cycle and a Central Bank of Iceland (2012) report 
documents strong pro-cyclicality of both government spending and tax policy in the lead-up to 
the financial crisis in 2008. There was a strong pick-up in government revenue in the run-up to 
the crisis as the asset price bubble and the enormous expansion of credit and balance sheets (cf. 
Table 7.c in Einarsson et al., 2015) led to rising income from taxes (on income, consumption, 
property and capital gains), import tariffs, excise and stamp duties. The government seemed to 
interpret this windfall income as being permanent (cf. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007, and Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009) and thus went on a spending spree and cut taxes substantially at the same 
time. This could suggest an important role for the financial cycle in explaining the pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy in Iceland, which indeed seems to be supported by the data (the 
importance of the financial cycle for fiscal policy is also discussed in Bénétrix and Lane, 2011, 
Poghosyan, 2015, Budina et al., 2015, and Borio et al., 2016). 
 Figure 8 shows the financial cycle together with the medium-term cycles in current 
spending and income of the Treasury. Both spending and income tend to co-move with the 
financial cycle (with a whole-sample concordance index above 0.6 for spending and above 0.7 
for income). The data show, however, that the strong co-movement of cyclical income and the 
financial cycle has been rising over time while the opposite is true for cyclical spending: the 
concordance index for income rises from 0.72 in the 1875-2013 period to 0.79 in the post-1980 
period, while it falls from 0.66 to 0.47 for expenditure. Government income therefore seems 

















1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Financial cycle (left)
Durable consumption (right)























over time, presumably in part reflecting the increasing financial deepening, and the rising 
homeownership and financial wealth in the economy. Fluctuations in the financial cycle have 
also crept into current government spending, and although the concurrent co-movement 
between the two seems to have declined over time, a significant link between the financial cycle 
and lagged spending remains. The latest boom-bust cycle is a clear example, with the expansion 
of the financial cycle followed by a strong cyclical expansion in current spending. This suggests 
an additional channel through which the financial cycle reinforces the boom-bust dynamics of 
the Icelandic economy and at the same time strengthening even further the interlinkages 
between the financial cycle, capital flows, and domestic demand, as discussed above.  
 
Figure 8 The financial cycle and fiscal policy 




Financial cycle and medium-term cycles in the government expenditure and income ratios to nominal GDP. Shaded areas denote multiple 
financial crises (see Table A.3.1 in Appendix 3 for details on crisis dates). 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. 
 
7.4 Some policy implications 
Our uncovering of the financial cycle in Iceland and its main characteristics raises a number of 
issues for domestic policymakers, highlights the importance of financial factors in many of the 
challenges that economic policy has failed to overcome throughout the country’s economic 
history, and contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on the financial cycle, especially 
with regard to portraying its salient features in small open economies. 
Our findings suggest that the financial cycle plays a pivotal role in fuelling the 
characteristic boom-bust behaviour of the Icelandic economy, while at the same time revealing 
strikingly strong spillovers from the global financial cycle. The key underlying macro-financial 
amplifying mechanism shows up in the expansionary phase of the cycle when easing financial 
constraints facilitate domestic demand growth, especially credit-financed expenditure, with the 
global financial cycle serving a further amplifying role by supporting a domestic bank balance 
sheet expansion and credit extension. As the boom progresses, macro-financial fragilities build 
up in the form of balance sheet overextensions, asset price overvaluations, and external 
imbalances, ultimately leading to the expansionary phase of the financial cycle giving way to a 







































 This implies that to obtain better economic policy outcomes, the financial cycle and its 
associated macro-financial linkages need to be taken into account in the design of the overall 
policy framework and in implementation across different policy areas. The recent reform of the 
policy framework in Iceland represents a step in that direction as it entails a broader view of 
monetary and financial stability, greater awareness of the systemic risk associated with the 
build-up of macro-financial imbalances, and the introduction of new policy tools to strengthen 
the resilience of the financial system and, hopefully, constrain to some extent the boom-bust 
dynamics that have been so prominent (Central Bank of Iceland, 2016). However, it remains to 
be seen how effective these reforms will be.  
Our results also indicate that further reforms are desirable to increase the authorities’ 
capacity to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability. First, more coordinated and robust 
policy anchors are needed for the monetary, financial, and fiscal policy spheres, so that no single 
policy authority becomes overburdened. The financial cycle entails powerful, pro-cyclical, and 
long-lasting forces, which to a significant degree originate outside the domestic economy 
domain, increasing the negative effects of pro-cyclical policy behaviour. Hence, a firm, wide-
reaching, and robust commitment to counter-cyclical stabilisation becomes even more 
important. This holds particularly true now, as the economy re-opens its capital account and 
again faces possible global headwinds in its conduct of independent monetary policy with 
relatively illiquid domestic financial markets and exceptional global conditions.  
 Second, capital flow management measures may need to be considered to complement 
other stabilisation policies in light of the important role played by cross-border capital flows in 
the aforementioned macro-financial linkages. However, as our results clearly demonstrate, 
international spillovers do not necessarily cease when the capital account is heavily controlled. 
Hence, expectations should be kept in check with regard to what such measures can hope to 
accomplish. On the other hand, Iceland’s experience does not rule out that the use of capital 
flow management measures, as an addition to an otherwise comprehensive, coordinated and 
credible stabilisation policy, would be able to moderate to a greater extent the domestic impact 
of the global financial cycle and the entrenched boom-bust characteristic of the economy.  
 Third, our results highlight the need to strengthen the analytical foundations for policy 
making within small open and financially integrated economies. This implies further research 
into the strong spillover dynamics from the global financial cycle to its domestic counterpart, 
which in the case of Iceland could challenge the prevalent view of relatively weak links between 
the domestic and global business cycle (Gudmundsson et al., 2000, and Einarsson et al., 2013), 
which has been an important argument in the debate on the country’s currency and exchange 
rate regime (Central Bank of Iceland, 2012). Our results can also only be taken as a first step in 
analysing the capacity of financial cycle developments to function as an early warning for risks 
of financial distress. Further work is also needed into mapping and modelling the important role 
played by financial factors in affecting macroeconomic developments. This includes 
uncovering the underlying financial sector externalities at work (cf. Korinek, 2011, and De 
Nicolò et al., 2012) and taking financial factors into account in assessment of key policy-
relevant unobservables, such as the output gap, the neutral rate of interest, and the equilibrium 




 Fourth, the fact that the duration of the contractionary phase of the latest financial cycle 
episode was shorter than on average over the whole sample, may be interpreted as evidence of 
a more successful crisis management and resolution this time around compared to earlier 
episodes, especially given the exceptional size of pre-crisis macro-financial imbalances 
(Einarsson et al., 2015). Although further evidence is needed, it seems clear that bank 
resurrection and private sector debt restructuring was more comprehensive in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis than in earlier episodes, in addition to being supported by wide-
reaching resource reallocation in the real economy and policy improvements (Central Bank of 
Iceland, 2016). 
 Finally, it is clear that the features of the financial cycle in Iceland, especially the 
presence of strong global spillovers and a prominent boom-bust interaction between credit, 
capital flows, and domestic demand are likely to apply to other small open economies. This 
holds particularly true for small open emerging market economies, many of which have already 
attained certain experience in adjusting their policy frameworks to lean against global spillovers 
and increase capacity for domestic stabilisation. The jury is still out, however, with regard to 
how successful they will be. As in the case of Iceland, efforts to understand and tame the 
financial cycle are likely to offer serious policy challenges for years to come. 
 
8 Conclusions  
In an earlier study of financial booms and busts in Iceland (Einarsson et al., 2015), we identified 
and dated different types of financial crises over a period spanning more than a century and 
analysed the main properties of these episodes and the development of key macroeconomic and 
financial variables in the run-up to these crises and in the period when they unfold. Here, we 
take the analysis a step further and attempt to capture the low-frequency co-movement of a 
number of financial variables in a single and well-defined financial cycle. 
Our findings suggest that indeed there exists such a financial cycle in Iceland and that it 
has gradually become more prominent as the financial deepening and sophistication of the 
Icelandic economy has increased. The aggregate cycle is much longer than the typical business 
cycle, with a median duration of sixteen years, and seems to be getting longer and more intense 
over time. The underlying cycles in most of the individual financial variables are also becoming 
more tightly aligned with the aggregate cycle over time and the proportion of variability in the 
underlying individual cycles captured by the aggregate cycle is growing ever larger, reaching 
75% in the post-WWII period and exceeding 80% in the post-1980 period. 
We find that there is a large difference in economic performance over different phases 
of the financial cycle: the average growth rate of output and domestic demand is almost three 
times higher in expansionary phases of the financial cycle than in its contractionary phases 
(rising to almost four times higher in the post-WWII period). We also find that economic 
recessions that coincide with the contractionary phases of the financial cycle tend to be more 
drawn out than recessions that do not coincide with the contractionary phases of the cycle. The 
financial cycle therefore seems to have played a prominent role in the country’s macroeconomic 




peaks in the financial cycle coincide with some type of a financial crisis and that cyclical 
expansions provide a robust early-warning signal for subsequent crises. Furthermore, our 
results show that the aggregate cycle provides an improvement over the capacity of individual 
financial and macroeconomic variables to signal ensuing financial crises, highlighting the 
importance of the interaction of different financial variables in amplifying financial imbalances. 
We find strikingly strong ties between the Icelandic financial cycle and its global 
counterpart, which is proxied with the US financial cycle (captured by a composite measure of 
medium-term cycles in credit and house prices): over the whole sample period these two 
financial cycles spend close to 75% of the time in the same cyclical phase and almost all of the 
cyclical peaks in the Icelandic financial cycle occur close to peaks in the global cycle, with the 
peaks usually coinciding or the Icelandic cyclical peak lagging by a year or two. There is also 
evidence that these spillover effects have been growing stronger over time. There is limited 
evidence, however, of additional regional spillover effects from Scandinavia and the UK, 
although there is some evidence of important regional spillover effects from the Danish credit 
cycle in the first half of the 20th century consistent with the prominent role of Danish financing 
of the domestic financial system during that period. 
This tight link between the domestic and global financial cycles highlights the 
importance of accounting for the financial channel through which global developments 
penetrate the Icelandic economy and may call the prevalent view of the Icelandic business cycle 
being dominated by idiosyncratic supply shocks into question. Our results also suggest that 
understanding fluctuations in capital flows, the surprisingly high volatility of private 
consumption in Iceland, and fiscal policy dynamics, to name only three important issues in the 
domestic economic debate, is hard without understanding the financial cycle. We conclude the 






Appendix 1 The data 
 
Icelandic data 
The data used in this paper is obtained from various sources. All of the data span the period 
1875-2013, except for money, credit, and non-core banking liabilities which date back to 1886, 
and the data on private consumption which dates back to 1957 (for the consumption 
subcomponents, although data on total consumption is available from 1945). Table A.1.1 
summarises the key data sources, while Figure A.1.1 shows the data. 
 
Table A.1.1 The data and sources 
  
Variable Source 
Banking system assets Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Tables 13.2, 13.3, 13.6a-c, and 
13.7), Björnsson (1961, p. 126-127), Björnsson (1981, p. 106, 119, and 129), 
Financial Supervisory Authority, and Central Bank of Iceland (Annual Reports, 
various years)  
  
Banking system equity Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Tables 13.2, 13.3, 13.6a-c, and 
13.7), Fjármálatíðindi (p. 186), Gudnason (1972), Financial Supervisory 
Authority, and Central Bank of Iceland (Annual Reports, various years) 
  
Banking system non-core 
liabilities 
Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Tables 13.2, 13.3, 13.6a-c, and 
13.7), Björnsson (1961, p. 126-127), Björnsson (1981, p. 106, 119, and 129), 
and Central Bank of Iceland 
  
Broad money (M3) Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Table 13.1) and Central Bank of 
Iceland (Website and Annual Report, 2007) 
  
Private consumption Statistics Iceland (with data on consumption subcomponents constructed from 
historical data on consumption by items) 
  
Credit Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Tables 13.9 and 13.12), and Central 
Bank of Iceland 
  
Domestic price level Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Table 12.25), and Statistics Iceland 
  
Domestic demand Jónsson (1999, Tables V.14.6 and V.15.4), and Statistics Iceland 
  
GDP Jónsson (1999, Table V.14.6), and Statistics Iceland 
  
Government expenditure and 
income 
Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Table 15.3), and Statistics Iceland 
  
House prices Árbók Reykjavíkurbæjar 1940, (p. 38-39), and Statistics Iceland 
  
Nominal exchange rate Abildgren (2004), Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Table 13.16), and 
Central Bank of Iceland 
  
Real exchange rate Abildgren (2004), Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Table 13.16), 
Statistics Iceland, and Central Bank of Iceland 
  
Terms of trade Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics (Table 10.23), and Statistics Iceland 
  
Trade balance Jónsson (1999, Tables V.14.6 and V.15.4), and Statistics Iceland 
All the data, except the data on government expenditure and income, private consumption and house prices, is obtained from Einarsson et 
al. (2015) and further detail on how the data was constructed can be found there. The house price data for the early part of the sample period 
(up to 1940) has been updated from the previous version of the series (and now starts in 1875 instead of 1900). The current series is based 
on payed fire insurance premiums for housing in the Reykjavík area for the period 1875-1939 (Árbók Reykjavíkurbæjar 1940, p. 38-39), 
the building cost index from Statistics Iceland for the period 1940-1945, and the implicit housing stock price deflator from Statistics Iceland 
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For all the series except house prices we use data from Jordà et al. (2014), which covers the 
period 1870-2011, with an updated dataset to 2013 kindly made available by the authors (this 
dataset is an update of an earlier version of the data from Schularick and Taylor, 2012). There 
is a gap in the Jordà et al. credit series in 1941-44 which we fill using log-linear interpolation. 




For the credit-to-GDP ratio we use data on the ratio of loans from banks and mortgage-credit 
institutes to GDP from Abildgren (2006) for the period 1875-1965 (Tables A.2, A.3 and A.9) 
combined with data on the ratio to GDP using total credit from banks to the private non-
financial sector from the BIS’ Total Credit Statistics database from 1966-2013 
(http://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm?m=6%7C326). For house prices we use data from 
Abildgren (2006) on prices for one-family houses from 1938-69; combined with prices for 
farms from 1875-1937 (Table A.16). These series are combined with data on residential 
property prices from the BIS’ Residential Property Price database from 1970-2013 
(http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm?m=6%7C288). Data on domestic consumer prices are 
from Abildgren (2006) for the period 1875-2005 (Table A.10) and the IMF World Economic 
Outlook database for 2006-13. 
 
Norway 
We use Eitrheim et al. (2004, 2007), with updates from the Norges Bank Historical Database 
as a source for credit (total credit private banks), nominal GDP, house prices (country-wide 
prices), and domestic consumer prices (consumer price index). There is a gap in the GDP series 
from 1940-45 and linear interpolation is therefore used to provide data for the credit-to-GDP 




We use the Bank of England historical dataset (Three Centuries of Macroeconomic Data, 
Version 2.2) as a source for credit (total stock of bank and building society lending), nominal 
GDP, house prices (property prices) and domestic consumer prices (consumer price index). 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx. 
 
The following figures show the data: first Figure A.1.2 for the nine US variables used, 
followed by Figure A.1.3 for the credit-to-GDP ratio and real house prices for Denmark, 










Sources: Jordà et al. (2014) and Shiller (2015). 
 
 




Sources: Abildgren (2006), Bank of England, Bank for International Settlements, Eitrheim et al. (2004, 2007), International Monetary 
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Appendix 2 Cyclical components of the domestic data 
This Appendix shows the medium-term (8 to 30 year) and complete (2-30 year) cycles of 
individual domestic financial (Figure A.2.1) and macroeconomic (Figure A.2.2) variables 
together with the composite measure of the aggregate financial cycle.  
 




Financial cycle, medium-term (8 to 30 year) and full (2-30 year) cycles in individual financial variables. 
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The figures show how most of the variables are dominated by their medium-term 
cyclical components and how closely most of these medium-term cycles coincide with the 
aggregate financial cycle. 
 




Financial cycle, medium-term (8 to 30 year) and full (2-30 year) cycles in individual macroeconomic variables. 
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Appendix 3 Financial crises in Iceland 
In this Appendix we summarise the dates of different types of financial crises in Iceland over 
the period 1875-2013 and give a short description of the criteria used to date these episodes. 
For a detailed description and analysis, see Einarsson et al. (2015). 
 
Currency and inflation crises 
Table A.3.1 shows the dates of different types of financial crises in Iceland over the period 
1875-2013. Currency and inflation crises are identified using the numerical threshold suggested 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011) (15% per annum for annual currency depreciations and 
20% per annum for annual inflation).105 This gives us eleven currency crises and five inflation 
crises with an average duration of 2.4 and 5.4 years, respectively. Not surprisingly, the two 
types of crises are closely connected with all the inflation crises coinciding with currency crisis 
episodes, with the temporal sequence usually from a currency crisis to an inflation crisis. One 
episode stands out in terms of its longevity: the currency and inflation crisis starting in the mid-
1970s which lasts for more than a decade with a cumulative depreciation amounting to almost 
98% and inflation averaging at almost 40% per year. Some of the shorter currency crisis 
episodes are also nastier than others: the crises in the early 1920s, in 1950, the two crises in the 
1960s, and the latest one, all saw the currency collapsing by close to 50%. As discussed in 
Einarsson et al. (2015), two of these episodes (the first and the last) also coincided with a full-
blown sudden stop crisis that eventually led to the introduction of capital controls.106 
 
Banking crises 
For dating banking crises, we follow the standard practice in the literature in basing our event 
criteria on identifying dates where there are significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system, as reflected in large-scale bank runs (be that a conventional run on deposits or a more 
“modern” run on wholesale funding) that lead to the closure, merging, or public sector takeover 
of a significant share of the banking system (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, and Laeven 
and Valencia, 2013). 
 This gives us five banking crisis episodes, occurring every 22 years and lasting for 2 
years on average. Three of these episodes are defined as systemic: the two early episodes in the 
early 1920s and 1930s, and the latest episode starting in 2008. All three would register as serious 
on any banking crisis barometer (although the latest one beats them all, hands down): all 
involved between two-thirds to more than 90% of the banking system and coincided with a 
contraction in real credit that amounted to 10-20% in the first two episodes to more than 80% 
in the latest one. The two other episodes (in the mid-1980s and early 1990s) are smaller, non-
systemic crises that only involved one, albeit important, financial institution in distress.  
 
                                                
105 There are a few exemptions explained in Einarsson et al. (2015). 
106 The currency crisis in the early 1930s also led to an introduction of capital controls but this episode falls short 
of the criteria for identifying sudden stop crises used (a trade balance reversal exceeding two standard deviations 




Table A.3.1 Financial crises in Iceland 1875-2013 
    
Currency crises Inflation crises Banking crises Multiple financial crises 
1919-20 1916-18 1920-21 1914-21 
1932 – 1930-31 1931-32 
1939 1940-43 – – 
1950 1950-51 – 1948-51 
1960 – – – 
1968-69 1969 – 1968-69 
1974-85 1973-89 – – 
1988-89 – 1985-86 – 
1993 – 1993 1991-93 
2001 – – – 
2008-9 – 2008-10 2008-10 
The dates of currency and inflation crises as identified by the numerical thresholds suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011): exchange 
rate crises are defined as episodes where annual depreciations is greater than 15% per annum and inflation crises as episodes where annual 
inflation is in excess of 20% per annum. The dates identified for the 1985-86 and 1993 banking crises are obtained from Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) (also used by Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2011), while we use Laeven and Valencia (2013) to date the start of the latest banking crisis. 
The dating of the two pre-WWII banking crises is based on archived documentation. Identification of multiple financial crises is based on the 
Harding and Pagan (2006) non-parametric common cycle algorithm.  
 
Source: Einarsson et al. (2015). 
 
Multiple financial crises 
To capture the clustering nature of the financial crises in Iceland, we also apply a version of 
Harding and Pagan’s (2006) non-parametric common cycle algorithm to identify the more 
serious multiple financial crisis episodes. This gives us six multiple crises occurring every 15½ 
years on average. The first two episodes occur during the early 1900s: the first coincided with 
the WWI and lasted into the early 1920s, when a sharp collapse in economic activity led to an 
inflation crisis that was followed by a sudden stop and a currency crisis and eventually by a 
systemic banking crisis; while the second crisis coincided with the outbreak of the Great 
Depression in the early 1930s when another systemic banking crisis followed a recession and 
morphed into a currency crisis in 1932. There are two further episodes occurring at the end of 
the 1940s and in the late 1960s that are related to a serious deterioration of external conditions, 
in both cases leading to currency and inflation crises: the first followed a sharp deterioration of 
terms of trade and a contraction in economic activity; the second of these episodes following a 
collapse in fish catch, a major export item. The fifth episode occurs during the early 1990s when 
falling economic activity, following attempts to rein in the chronic inflation of the 1970s and 
the 1980s, led to a twin currency and (non-systemic) banking crisis in 1993. The final episode 
is the most recent one when a build-up of large imbalances in the run-up to the crisis were 






Appendix 4 Global financial cycles and crises 
Figure A.4.1 shows the estimated aggregate financial cycles from 1875 to 2013 for the four 
countries used to analyse global and regional spillovers to Iceland and the dates of banking and 
general financial crises in these countries, as identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).107 The 
figure shows that peaks in our measure of the US financial cycle closely coincide with the dates 
of banking crises in the US. From 1890 (the first observation of the composite US financial 
cycle), Reinhart and Rogoff identify seven banking crises in the US: in 1890, 1893, 1907, 1914, 
1929-33, 1984-91, and 2007-10, and our composite financial cycle peaks within a three year 
window of the start of six of these episodes – it is only in the mid-1980s that the cyclical peak 
falls outside this three year window (occurring four years after the start of the crisis). There are 
also cyclical peaks that do not coincide with a banking crisis, but some of them coincide with 
other types of financial crises, such as the currency crisis in 1947. The broader defined measure 
of financial crises gives a greater number of crises, but again we find that a significant number 
of those coincide with peaks in the financial cycle (ten of the total of seventeen). 
For the other three countries, the same results emerge: most of the financial crises 
identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) coincide with a cyclical peak in our composite 
measure of their respective financial cycles. In fact, for the four countries we find that almost 
80% of the banking crises identified coincide with a cyclical peak within a three year window. 
The number of general crises coinciding with cyclical peaks is lower but is still as high as 58%. 
Inspection of the figure suggests that the cycles across these four countries tend to move 
together over time, with peaks and troughs more often than not coinciding. This visual 
perception is confirmed by the concordance index which suggests that over the whole sample 
period the four cycles tend to be in the same phase from almost 60% (the US and Norwegian 
cycles) to close to 80% (the Danish and the US and UK cycles) of the time. The financial crises 
identified here also show a strong common global component: the concordance index suggests 
that the four countries are roughly 70-90% of the time in the same financial state. Finally, panel 
probit regressions show that the composite financial cycle has a statistically significant 
predictive power for impending financial crises and that cyclical expansions significantly 
increase the probability of a financial crisis: for example, a lagged binary indicator that equals 
unity at cyclical peaks and zero otherwise is found to be statistically significant (p-values equal 
to 0.002 and 0.012 for banking and general financial crises, respectively) and suggests that a 
peak in the financial cycle coincides with roughly two- to almost threefold increase in the 
probability of a financial crises two years after the cyclical peak.108 
 
                                                
107 General financial crises corresponds to dates when Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2011) BCDI index signals two or 
more crisis episodes (i.e. at least two of banking, currency, external sovereign debt, or inflation crises). 
108 The regressions include a constant and time-invariant country-specific effects. Using cross-country averages, 
the empirical results suggest that the probability of a banking crisis rises from roughly 10% to 28%, whereas the 




Figure A.4.1 Financial cycles and crises in the US, Denmark, Norway, and the UK 




Financial cycle, estimated as the first principal component of the medium-term cycle of the credit-to-GDP ratio and real house prices for 
each country. Dates for financial crises are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). General financial crises are defined as years when there are 
two or more crisis episodes involving either a banking, currency, external sovereign debt or inflation crises identified by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011). 
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simultaneously in distress and negative housing equity. We find that the degree of financial 
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in Iceland were in distress at year-end 2010. The share of indebted homeowners in negative 
housing equity increased from 6 to 37 per cent. Negative housing equity is more widespread 
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Household debt played a pivotal role in starting the global financial crisis. What seemed initially 
to be an increased incidence of arrears in a small subsection of the vast US mortgage market 
metamorphosed into the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression. Households 
in advanced countries have felt the impact of the crisis, most notably through increased 
unemployment and loss of wealth, which has prompted them to increase savings by cutting 
back on spending and paying down debt. The macroeconomic effects of changed household 
behaviour have been widely felt. Icelandic households were among the hardest hit by the global 
financial crisis, as is reflected in one of the largest contractions in private consumption 
experienced in any medium- to high-income country. This is not surprising, given that Icelandic 
households were among the most indebted household sectors in the run-up to the crisis and 
were the only households with widespread borrowing in foreign currency to experience a 
currency crisis on top of a banking system collapse leading to a dramatic increase in debt levels 
and debt service (Ólafsson and Pétursson, 2011). Nominal debt levels rose even further, as the 
majority of mortgages in Iceland are indexed to consumer price inflation, which rose steeply 
due to the massive depreciation of the currency.  
 This paper aims to portray how the state of Icelandic households’ finances evolved in 
the run-up to and aftermath of the financial crisis in Iceland. Our analysis builds on a unique 
nationwide household-level database designed and compiled by the Central Bank of Iceland. It 
combines a comprehensive loan-level dataset including detailed information on each individual 
loan for nearly all indebted households in Iceland with a household-level dataset covering 
information on income levels and various demographic characteristics for each individual 
household; e.g., family type, age, and place of residence. Hence our database contains detailed 
information on each individual loan and household for an entire country’s population of 
indebted households at a time of unexpected adverse shocks in the form of a banking system 
collapse and a currency crisis of exceptional magnitude.  
Our analysis of households’ position centres on the following issues. First, we assess 
how the share of indebted households in financial distress evolved over the four-year period 
from 2007-2010. Households are defined to be in financial distress if they have a negative 
financial margin such that their disposable income is insufficient to cover both debt service and 
necessary minimum living expenses. Second, we analyse the development in homeowners’ 
housing equity with particular focus on the incidence of negative housing equity; i.e., where the 
outstanding mortgage balance exceeds the value of the underlying property. Third, we analyse 
the size of the highly vulnerable group of households simultaneously in distress and negative 
housing equity. Fourth, we shed light on the main characteristics of vulnerable households in 
order to support policy-making in this field. Fifth, we analyse the effects of debt restructuring 
measures, as well as court judgements declaring widely used exchange rate-linked loans illegal 
and in need of recalculation. Throughout, we provide a breakdown of results for various groups 
based on factors such as income, currency-denomination of debt, and family type. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the data and 




empirical results on the evolution of financial distress and negative housing equity are presented 
in Section 3. Furthermore, we analyse the characteristics of vulnerable households and offer 
some international comparison. In Section 4, we interpret the main economic and policy 
findings. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2 The data and construction of profiles 
This section describes the data analysed in this paper and introduces the profiles constructed 
for payments for each individual loan, income and living expenses for each household, and 
housing wealth profiles for each homeowner.109 
Traditionally, shortfalls of household-level data limit analysis of households’ financial 
position to aggregate data, surveys, or small samples of micro data. This can be a drawback. 
Aggregate data measures contain income and assets from debt-free households, and they 
provide limited information on the distribution of debt – across income groups, for instance – 
and the size of debt held by households in distress. Hence aggregate data can understate the 
degree of indebtedness and the vulnerability of debtors. Survey data is usually the main source 
of household sector analyses, but they allow limited guidance on the effects of debt 
restructuring measures, and results are associated with sampling uncertainty, interpretations 
difficulties, and delay. 
The Central Bank of Iceland began preparations for extensive data gathering on 
households shortly after the collapse of the banking system in late 2008. Over the course of 
2009, a small working group within the Central Bank designed a data request and subsequently 
collected detailed data on individuals and households from financial institutions, the tax 
authorities, and the Directorate of Labour. Data were gathered by permission from the Icelandic 
Data Protection Authority (2009), which set strict rules of procedure. The analysis was 
conducted using coded and anonymous data and the encryption key subsequently destroyed in 
accordance with the permission, obstructing the possibility of adding new data to the database 
at a later date. 
This database was unprecedented for a country that has experienced a financial crisis at 
the time of its compilation. Efforts have been made to build similar databases in some countries, 
especially in Ireland, but we are not aware of any household-level database covering a whole 
nation or any work using a household-level database to build payment profiles for each 
individual loan on the scale that we do in this paper. 
The data can be categorised into the following groups. The first group consists of three 
encrypted variables used for identification of individuals, households, and loans.110 This allows 
for combining information on loans, individuals, and households from different data sources in 
order to obtain an overview of households’ financial position at the household level. Each 
                                                
109 A more detailed description of the data can be found in Ólafsson and Vignisdóttir (2012). 
110 A household is defined as individuals with the same (coded) family number, which is equal to the (coded) social 
security number of the oldest family member. The disadvantage of defining a household in this manner is that 




individual’s social security and family number is encrypted, as is each loan’s identification 
number. 
The second group of data consists of 21 variables describing terms, conditions, and loan 
amounts for each individual loan, including date of issuance, type of loan, maturity, debt service 
method, currency composition, interest rate level, interest premium level, number of payment 
dates per year, type of interest rate (fixed/floating), original loan amount, and outstanding 
balance on 31 December 2008.  
The third group of data consists of information regarding assets and collateral. 
Commercial banks and savings banks provided data on each individual’s deposits by type as of 
31 December 2008, and pension funds supplied available data on each individual’s pension 
savings assets. Financial institutions also provided data on the official December 2008 Land 
Registry value of each property used as collateral, which is used as a reference point of 
homeowners’ housing wealth.  
The fourth group of data consists of information on household income. Annual tax 
returns provide the best possible overview of household income in Iceland, but the most recent 
data available from this source at the time of the data gathering was for the year 2007. It was 
clear from the outset that, in many cases, this would provide a poor representation of household 
income after the banks’ collapse. Therefore, we opted to supplement tax return data on each 
individual’s annual income in 2007 with income data from tax withholding records. The tax 
authorities provided data on each individual’s income according to tax withholding records for 
February 2009, the most recent data available at the time of data gathering, as well as a year 
earlier; i.e., February 2008.  
The final group of data consists of indicator variables on demographics. First, there is 
an age indicator variable for each individual’s age interval, which permits analysis for different 
age groups. Second, there is an indicator variable for each individual’s place of residence. We 
also constructed an indicator variable for family type, using the number of individuals with the 
same family number, which enabled us to analyse households’ financial position for different 
family types; i.e., singles, single parents with children, couples without children, and couples 
with children. 
We have information on the debt position of 120,745 indebted households in our 
database. Debt-free households are excluded from the analysis. Our results show that the 
currency-denomination of debt has an important effect on households’ financial position. 
Foreign-denominated borrowing was far more widespread among households with motor 
vehicle debt than among those with mortgage debt.111 Roughly 80 per cent of households with 
motor vehicle debt had at least some portion of that debt denominated in foreign currency, while 
the same applies to only approximately 10 per cent of mortgagors. 
The main strength of our approach lies in the construction of various profiles, which 
enables us to capture the crisis dynamics and provide an assessment of our specified topics of 
interest. First, we utilise our detailed database to construct payment profiles for each of the 
roughly 424 thousand individual loans in our database which allows us to combine debt 
                                                
111 We define all loans backed by real estate as mortgages, as it is problematic to distinguish between loans taken 




payments and outstanding balances for each household so as to assess how their debt service 
burden and debt level develop over time. In this manner, we transform our loan-level database 
from merely providing information on each loan at a particular point in time to a dataset 
portraying how debt service and debt levels evolve over time; i.e., from cross-sectional data to 
panel data.112 We can compare the evolution of financial distress with and without various debt 
restructuring measures and legal interventions by constructing both payment profiles with these 
measures (our baseline scenario) and a counterfactual scenario without them (our alternative 
scenario). 
Second, we use individual income data and information on family type to assess each 
household’s disposable income and necessary minimum living costs. Our measure for living 
expenses is based on the Debtors’ Ombudsman’s consumer guidelines for minimum living 
expenses for different family types, but we add a 60 per cent buffer to cover factors not included 
in the consumer guidelines.113 We also add the cost of motor vehicle operation for households 
with motor vehicle loans. We extrapolate the wage income information in the database to 
provide an income profile for our four-year period. Income for the year 2007 is given by income 
according to tax returns but is distributed throughout the year such that it develops according 
to the Statistics Iceland wage index. Income for 2008 is estimated in terms of reported income 
in February 2008 and extrapolated in line with the wage index. Household income from January 
2009 through December 2010 is estimated in terms of reported income in February 2009 and 
extrapolated in line with the wage index. Consideration is given to changes in taxes and personal 
tax deductions, and mortgage interest subsidies and child benefits are calculated for each 
household. Thus we obtain a profile for disposable income for each household for the entire 
reference period for which we have wage information for all the data points (i.e., for the year 
2007, February 2008 and February 2009).114 
Third, we construct a housing wealth profile for each homeowner based on the official 
Land Registry value and the evolution of house prices in the various districts around the 
country. This, alongside the payment profiles, allows us to assess developments in housing 
equity. Our housing wealth measure is based on the value of each dwelling according to official 
Land Registry value in December 2008 for all residential properties used as mortgage collateral. 
The official Land Registry value should broadly reflect the market value of each residential 
property in February 2008, and we extrapolate this measure of housing wealth by allowing it to 
                                                
112 The detailed loan-level data provide most of the information necessary to build payment profiles for each 
individual loan. Some assumptions are nevertheless necessary, especially with regard to interest rate and interest 
rate premium developments for loans with floating rates, for which we only have information on at the time of the 
data gathering. Fortunately, 80 per cent of indexed ISK-denominated mortgages in our database have fixed (real) 
interest rates for which we have information for individual indexed mortgages. A detailed account of the 
assumptions used is available in Ólafsson and Vignisdóttir (2012). 
113 This includes a variety of fixed expenses, such as telephone services, subscriptions, property taxes, insurance, 
and day-care. The Debtors’ Ombudsman’s consumption guidelines are updated in January and August each year. 
The analysis of households’ position is based on a linear approach so that living costs rise month-on-month instead 
of increasing in stages each January and August. In Ólafsson and Vignisdóttir (2012) we assess the robustness of 
our results on distress by using a 50-70 per cent buffer on the consumer guidelines. 
114 We exclude some households for which we only have information for the year 2007 from tax returns to prevent 
the fact that many low-income singles included in the 2007 income data are not included in the 2008 data from 




evolve in accordance with our constructed house price index for each district over the period 
from January 2007 to December 2010. The index is based on the development of average 
purchasing price per m2 for each district according to data from Registers Iceland. 
When profiles have been prepared for payments on each loan, as well as profiles for 
living expenses and disposable income for each indebted household, then it is possible to assess 
how households’ ability to service debt and cover living expenses has developed. Furthermore, 
we can assess households’ housing equity using the outstanding balances according to the 




In this section, we report the main findings of our analysis of households’ financial position. 
Section 3.1 presents the results of the financial margin analysis, which builds on the constructed 
payment, income and living cost profiles. Its main aim is to assess the share of households in 
financial distress and how that share evolved over the four-year period from January 2007 to 
December 2010. In Section 3.2 we assess the balance between household’s mortgage debt and 
housing wealth and estimate the share of homeowners in negative housing equity. In Section 
3.3 we analyse how the share of homeowners in the especially vulnerable position of being both 
in financial distress and negative housing equity evolved over the four-year period. We analyse 
the main characteristics of vulnerable households in Section 3.4 and provide some international 
comparison of our results in Section 3.5. The economic and policy interpretations of our 
findings are mostly contained in Section 4.  
 
3.1 Results on financial distress from the financial margin analysis 
Our preferred method of assessing the share of households in financial distress is based on each 
household’s financial margin. We calculate each indebted household’s financial margin by 
subtracting total debt service payments and minimum necessary living expenses (based on the 
Debtors’ Ombudsman’s consumer guidelines with a 60 per cent buffer) from the household’s 
disposable income. We define households in financial distress as all households with a negative 
financial margin. The main focus of our analysis is to assess how the share of indebted 
households in financial distress evolved in the run-up to and aftermath of the banking and 
currency collapse and how it has been affected by various policy measures and legal rulings. 
It is important to note that financial distress does not necessarily lead households to 
default on their debt payments. Households whose total spending on debt service and necessary 
living expenses exceeds their disposable income have various ways to defer default. They can 
liquidate some of their assets such as deposits, bonds, motor vehicles, housing, or even pension 
fund assets, as was made possible in the aftermath of the crisis. They can also increase their 
overdraft debt, restructure their debt – for instance, take on mortgage equity loans and pay down 




of which could even take place outside the organised labour market).115 Thus it is likely that 
households can navigate through temporary periods of distress without defaulting. On the other 
hand, persistent payment problems are likely to lead to default. 
An important factor determining households’ possibility of escaping financial distress 
by liquidating assets or restructuring debt is their equity position, particularly their housing 
equity. Households’ housing wealth in excess of their mortgage debt is important, as it affects 
both borrowers’ opportunity to offer collateral for more favourable loans and thereby 
restructure their debt and lenders’ incentive to push for foreclosure in the event of payment 
problems. Hence we are interested in assessing the share of households that are both in financial 
distress and negative housing equity (Section 3.3). 
The results of the financial margin analysis indicate that roughly 12½ per cent of 
indebted households were already likely to be in financial distress in January 2007. The share 
of households in distress rose gradually over the course of 2007. The effects of the outbreak of 
the global financial crisis are evident in August 2007 when the monthly currency depreciation 
measured roughly 8 per cent using our household debt exchange rate index.116 The share in 
distress is assessed to have been roughly 17 per cent at year-end 2007, but households’ financial 
position deteriorated rapidly thereafter as the currency depreciated and inflation rose. The share 
of households in distress is estimated to have been 23½ per cent on the eve of the banking 
system collapse in autumn 2008, when the annual drop in our constructed household debt 
exchange rate index measured 50 per cent and annual inflation was just shy of 16 per cent 
(Figure 1). This represents a roughly 96 per cent increase in the number of households in distress 
from January 2007 and reflects that the lion’s share of the shocks to the households’ balance 
sheet had already taken place when the banking system collapsed. 
The freezing of payments on the majority of foreign-denominated loans prevented the 
share in distress from rising to 27 per cent in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.117 Instead it 
fell to roughly a fifth, but of course these forbearance efforts only provided short-term breathing 
space in the aftermath of the banks’ collapse and increased the indebtedness of the households 
that made use of this option, as their interest and principal payments were merely postponed 
and therefore added to the outstanding balance of their loans. 
 
 
                                                
115 For some households found to be in financial distress, it may be that the imbalance between total spending and 
disposable income is mitigated by financial income, which is not included in our analysis as we only have data on 
financial income for 2007. A rough assessment of the importance of financial income in 2007 indicates that the 
share of indebted households in distress may be overestimated by roughly 1.3-1.5 percentage points that year due 
to this factor. However, this problem is probably smaller in the following years as total financial income decreased 
by over 70 per cent between 2007 and 2010. Financial income is very unevenly distributed and, for instance, 
roughly 2,200 households held 78 per cent of the total financial income held by indebted households in 2007. 
116 We construct a household debt exchange rate index where currencies are weighted according to their share in 
households’ foreign-denominated loans 
117 After the collapse of the banking system, households were able to freeze payments on foreign-denominated 
loans because the domestic currency depreciated rapidly and the foreign exchange market was highly unstable. 
We base our analysis on our collected information on which loans were frozen at the time of data submittal in the 
beginning of 2009, and we assume that all loans that were frozen at that time were frozen from November 2008 






We assume that full payments resumed on frozen foreign-denominated loans in July 
2009. Some payments actually remained frozen for a longer period, but our assessment is based 
roughly on when the bulk of debt payment freezing ended. Hence the share of households in 
distress increased dramatically when the freezing ended, despite the introduction of payment 
smoothing on foreign-denominated mortgages, which affected relatively few households.118 
The share in distress is assessed to have peaked at 27½ per cent in October 2009. Debt 
rescheduling through payment smoothing of indexed ISK mortgages119 is assumed to have 
begun in November 2009, and it affected a large number of households. The share in financial 
distress continued to decline gradually over the course of 2010, reaching just shy of 23½ per 
cent in August 2010. 
Our analysis assumes that all foreign-denominated and mixed loans were recalculated 
at the end of August 2010, following the Supreme Court rulings. After recalculation, the share 
of households in distress dropped from 23½ per cent of households to 20 per cent. In December 
2010, an estimated 21,000 indebted households were likely to be in financial distress. In all, 
this group of households in distress included roughly 47,660 individuals. Therefore, 
                                                
118 This method involves setting the original payment at the level (in ISK) that applied in May 2008, or at the level 
of the first instalment if the loan was taken after that date. Subsequent payments change in accordance with the 
modified mortgage payment index, as calculated by Statistics Iceland. The modified mortgage payment index 
weighs together developments in wages and employment levels. We base our analysis on the assumption that all 
foreign-denominated mortgages were subjected to payment smoothing from mid-2009 until August 2010, when 
all foreign-denominated loans were recalculated due to the Supreme Court ruling. 
119 This is a means of temporarily lightening the burden of regular loan instalments by linking them to the modified 
mortgage payment index instead of the consumer price index. The difference between actual and implicit payments 
is posted to a special account and paid at the end of the loan period, so that the duration of the loan is extended 
and the number of payments is increased. The duration of the loan is never lengthened by more than three years, 
however, according to the terms and conditions, as a ceiling is placed on the extension of the maturity date. In 
order to estimate what this measure could achieve, it is assumed that all index-linked mortgages were subjected to 
payment smoothing in November 2009 when it became an opt-out option. In reality, approximately 50 per cent 




approximately 15 per cent of all individuals (indebted and debt-free) in Iceland are estimated 
to have been in distress at year-end 2010. 
Out of the group of households in distress in December 2010, roughly 67 per cent were 
not in financial distress in January 2007; 52 per cent were not in distress in January 2008, when 
the currency depreciation started to gain momentum; and roughly 42 per cent were not in 
distress when the banks’ collapsed in October 2008. This is a certain indication of the scope of 
the consequences of the banking and currency collapse for households’ capacity to service debt 
and cover minimum necessary living expenses. 
The results above represent our baseline scenario, which allows for explicit debt 
restructuring measures and recalculation of foreign-denominated and mixed loans. However, it 
is interesting to assess how the scope of households’ financial difficulties would likely have 
developed if there had not been any explicit policy measures taken to reduce households’ debt 
service burden and foreign-denominated loans had not been deemed illegal. This is done in our 
alternative scenario. In that counterfactual scenario, the share of households in financial distress 
would have continued to rise following the collapse of the banking system, instead of declining 
sharply due to freezing of payments. The share would have measured roughly 27 per cent in 
January 2009 (approximately 6 percentage points higher than in the baseline scenario) and 
would have peaked at 27½ per cent in September 2009.  Thereafter, it would have declined 
gradually to about 24½ per cent in December 2010. This is a 4½ percentage point higher share 
than in the baseline scenario. 
Now we return to our baseline scenario and analyse how the extent of financial distress 
varies across different groups of households; for instance, according to income, currency 
denomination of debt, and family type. 
Household income is one of the determinants of the probability of financial difficulties. 
This is unsurprising, as a household’s income level determines its capacity to take on debt and 
cover necessary living expenses. It is then up to the individual household (and possibly its 
creditor, if it is credit-constrained) to decide to what extent it makes use of this capacity. We 
analyse the share of households in financial distress across different income quintiles. The 
results clearly show that the degree of financial distress is inversely related to income. 
The share of households in distress at the beginning of the period varies widely across 
income quintiles. For instance, it is assessed at roughly 27 per cent in the lowest income quintile, 
11½ per cent in the middle group, and only 2 per cent in the highest income quintile. The scope 
of financial distress also varies at the end of the four-year period. It measures just shy of 47 per 
cent in the lowest income quintile group, roughly 20 per cent in the middle income quintile, and 
only 2 per cent in the highest income quintile group (Figure 2).120 
                                                
120 It is likely that we overestimate the share of low-income households in distress, as we probably underestimate 
the income of students, who earn a large share of their income during the summer, and we are counting some 
young persons as individual households, due to the fact that they receive their own family number at age 18. 
However, when we compare the relative size of this age group within the lowest income quintile to the size of this 
age group within the distress group they are the same. Approximately 28 per cent of households in the lowest 
income quintile are in the age interval 18-24 years old and roughly 28 per cent of the lowest income households 





Using the second-lowest income quintile as an example, the share of households in 
this group that were already in financial distress in early 2007 is estimated at around 17½ per 
cent. Following the financial crisis, the share in distress peaked at roughly 33½ per cent in 
autumn 2009. After payment smoothing of ISK mortgages was introduced, it fell gradually, to 
an estimated 26½ per cent at the end of 2010. Roughly 65 per cent of the total number of 
distressed households belongs to the two lowest income quintiles. It is therefore evident that 
low-income households are much more likely to have experienced financial difficulties than 
high-income households. 
It is noteworthy that the results indicate that households in the second-highest quintile 
seem to have benefitted most from the recalculation of foreign-denominated loans, as the share 
in distress declined by 4.3 percentage points afterwards. For comparison, the decline was 1.2 
percentage points in the lowest quintile and 2.3 percentage points in the second-lowest quintile. 
This reflects that high-income households were more likely to have foreign-denominated debt. 
Over half of all FX borrowers belong to the two highest income quintiles. 
It is not just in terms of income that a clear pattern emerges regarding the extent of 
financial distress. The currency denomination of debt is also an important factor. We analyse 
the extent to which financial distress differs across households with at least some foreign-
denominated debt (FX borrowers) and those with ISK-denominated loans only (ISK 
borrowers). In short, it is clear that the share of households in financial distress is considerably 
higher in the former group, although the recalculation of foreign-denominated loans has 
narrowed the difference between the two groups to a certain extent. 
Around 18½ per cent of FX borrowers were already in financial distress in January 2007, 
compared to 9½ per cent of ISK borrowers. Distress among FX borrowers had probably 
increased to some extent in 2006 when the currency depreciated abruptly in the so-called mini-




largest increase occurring in August, with the onset of the global financial crisis. The currency 
depreciation gained momentum in early 2008, paused for a while over the summer months, and 
then continued in the autumn. Hence roughly 38½ per cent of FX borrowers are estimated to 
have been in distress by the time the banks collapsed in October 2008, following the 50 per cent 
currency depreciation (using our constructed household debt exchange rate index). The share 
of FX borrowers in distress is estimated to have peaked at 47½ per cent after the temporary 
freezing of many foreign-denominated loans ended in mid-2009, although this result should be 
interpreted with care as payments on many loans remained frozen beyond this point in time. 
Hence the number of FX borrowers in distress had almost tripled from January 2007. 
The share of FX borrowers in distress fell to 31 per cent at the end of 2010 following 
further debt restructuring measures and recalculation of foreign-denominated loans. The 
recalculation was especially influential, as roughly a quarter of FX borrowers escaped distress 
following it (Figure 3). 
The share of ISK borrowers in distress rose gradually, from below 10 per cent in early 
2007 to 17½ per cent in the autumn of 2009. This represents a 75½ per cent increase in the 
number of ISK borrowers in distress over this period, when the consumer price index, to which 
a large share of this group’s debt is indexed, rose by 32½ per cent. The share in distress fell by 
2 percentage points when payment smoothing of indexed ISK mortgages is assumed to have 
begun, and remained close to 15 per cent throughout 2010 (Figure 3). Therefore, there is still a 
significant difference across currency groups despite the recalculation of foreign-denominated 
loans, as the share in distress is twice as high for FX borrowers as for ISK borrowers. This is 








There is also a clear pattern in financial distress across different family types, as families 
with children are much likelier to experience payment difficulties than childless households. 
As early as January 2007, 14½ per cent of families with children were in distress. The share in 
distress rose until autumn 2009, when it peaked at 36½ per cent. It declined by 3 percentage 
points after payment smoothing of indexed ISK mortgages was introduced, continued to decline 
gradually until the recalculation of foreign-denominated loans took place when the share in 
distress fell by 3 percentage points. At the end of 2010, roughly 28 per cent of indebted families 
with children were in distress (Figure 4). Hence roughly one out of every five children had 
parents in financial distress at year-end 2010. 
Childless couples are the least likely to be in financial distress. Only 6½ per cent of 
these households were in distress in early 2007. The share is assessed to have reached 17½ per 
cent by the time the banks collapsed, peaking at 20½ per cent in autumn 2009, and then 
declining to 13½ per cent. The share of singles in distress falls between the childless couples 
and those with children. One out of nine is assessed to have been in distress in early 2007. The 
share peaked at just shy of 27 per cent and then decreased to 20 per cent (Figure 4). 
As expected, financial distress is inversely related to age (Ólafsson and Vignisdóttir, 
2012). A particularly hard-hit group consists of young households with children that took 
mortgages late in the housing boom. Roughly 21½ per cent of these households were already 
in distress in January 2007, and by mid-2009 the share was nearly 47 per cent. At year-end 
2010, approximately 35½ per cent of these young households were still likely to be in distress. 
The effects of the crisis are also evident in changes to households’ financial margin 
distributions across time. Not only did the extent of distress almost double in the run-up to the 




exceeding 100,000 kr. a month, close to quadrupled to 10½ per cent.121 Most households in 
distress in January 2007 had only a small negative margin but the situation had deteriorated 
considerably when the banks collapsed. By December 2010, the share in acute distress was still 
just shy of 8 per cent and roughly half of all acutely distressed households at that time were 
families with children, over 70 per cent of which had foreign-denominated loans. 
We find that some of the seeds of households’ financial difficulties were sown by 
imprudent lending in 2007 and 2008, when 16 per cent of the total amount of new loans was 
granted to households already in distress in the three months running up to the loan issuance. 
Furthermore, up to 34 per cent of households in distress at year-end 2010 were granted loans in 
2007-2008, when they were already financially distressed. 
 
3.2 Results of housing equity analysis 
We assess each indebted homeowner’s housing equity by relating the value of his/her property 
according to the constructed housing wealth profiles to the outstanding balance on the mortgage 
according to the constructed payment profiles. We are particularly interested in assessing the 
share of indebted homeowners in negative housing equity; i.e., those whose mortgage debt 
exceeds housing wealth, and to what extent this goes hand-in-hand with financial distress.  
Negative housing equity can affect indebted homeowners in at least three ways. First, it 
greatly reduces their bargaining power and can prevent mortgagors with (temporary) payment 
problems from getting out of distress by liquidating housing assets or negotiating debt 
restructuring with their creditors. Second, some mortgagors with negative housing equity may 
opt to default if they assess the costs associated with default to be lower than the costs of 
continuing to service the mortgage. Third, homeowners with negative housing equity cannot 
trade up or down in the real estate market in response to changes in family size, or in 
employment and income status. 
For most countries it applies that a household ends up with negative housing equity if 
the decline in the price of the home from the peak exceeds the combined buffer comprising (i) 
initial equity (which is, again, a function of the loan-to-value ratio), (ii) the equity built up by 
house price increases from the house purchase to the peak of the housing prices, and (iii) the 
reduction in principal due to instalments made since the loan was originally taken. Research 
has shown that the design of mortgage contracts influences the risk of negative housing equity 
by affecting the first and third of the aforementioned factors (Ellis, 2008). Icelandic households 
are relatively more likely to end up in negative housing equity than households in many other 
countries due to the characteristics of Icelandic mortgage contracts. This is mainly due to the 
extensive indexation to consumer price inflation and exchange rate developments, which 
exposes the debt position to exchange rate and inflation risks. Another contributing factor is the 
popularity of fully amortising payment loans with a long maturity (30-40 years), which means 
that debt payments consist mainly of interest payments for many years and reduction of 
principal through instalment payments progresses slowly. In addition, like in many other 
countries, loan-to-value ratios were raised dramatically at the beginning of the housing boom, 
                                                




reducing households’ ability to withstand adverse shocks to house prices and debt and the 
introduction of mortgage equity withdrawals made it possible for households to run down their 
equity without trading in the real estate market, which further increased the risk of negative 
housing equity under adverse conditions. 
The incidence of negative housing equity increased considerably in the run-up to and 
aftermath of the crisis, as house prices declined and mortgage debt levels rose due to the 
currency depreciation and accompanying inflation on top of the rapid debt accumulation. The 
share of households with negative housing equity increased gradually from about 6 to 13 per 
cent from January 2007 to April 2008 and then rose at a more rapid pace thereafter. Almost 22 
per cent of indebted homeowners were underwater at the time of the banking sector collapse, 
and by February 2009, when the currency had more or less stabilised, it had reached 28 per 
cent. The inflation spike and further house price declines made the share in negative housing 
equity continue to escalate even further (Figure 5). It peaked at almost 39 per cent before the 
court ruling and new legislation on foreign-denominated loans reduced it slightly, to 37 per 
cent. Hence roughly 27 per cent of all homeowners (indebted and debt-free) were in negative 
housing equity at the end of the four-year period. 
Consistent with the comparison of households in financial distress, it is interesting to 
view the results on negative housing equity across various groups. The share in negative equity 
among ISK mortgagors increased steadily from 6½ per cent in early 2007 to 37 per cent in 
December 2010. This share increased more sharply for FX mortgagors, especially over the 
course of 2008, peaking at 58 per cent in August 2010 before the recalculation of FX loans 








FX mortgagors were seriously underwater before the recalculation of foreign-
denominated loans; in addition, many had seen their equity deteriorate substantially, although 
they had not reached the stage of being in negative housing equity. However, the debt position 
of many FX mortgagors improved after the recalculation. The share of FX mortgagors in 
negative housing equity fell by 17 percentage points, mainly reflecting a decrease in the group 
of FX mortgagors who were in negative housing equity by more than 10 m.kr. The share of FX 
mortgagors in this group was cut in half, decreasing from 34 per cent to 17 per cent as a result 
of recalculation. Furthermore, the share of FX mortgagors with more than 10 m.kr. in positive 
equity increased by 9½ percentage points. 
Hence it is clear from the above that the currency-denomination of mortgages plays an 
important role in determining the incidence of negative housing equity. The share of indebted 
homeowners in negative housing equity is higher among FX mortgagors, although the 
recalculation has narrowed the difference considerably, but the fact is that a large majority of 
homeowners underwater are ISK mortgagors. Now we turn to income groups. Is there a clear 
difference in the incidence of negative housing equity across different income quintiles?122 
Our analysis of the share of indebted homeowners in negative housing equity across 
income quintiles reveals that all income groups except the lowest one (which we discuss later) 
follow a very similar path over the four-year period. They all start off with a relatively low 
share in negative housing equity – between roughly 5½ and 7 per cent – and the share increases 
to between 19 and 24 per cent at the time of the banks’ collapse. In August 2010, before 
recalculation of foreign-denominated loans takes place, all these income groups have between 
37 and 42 per cent of indebted homeowners in negative housing equity. The effects of the 
recalculation of foreign-denominated loans on the incidence of negative housing equity increase 
                                                
122 Homeownership increases in line with income, in our database it increases from roughly one-third in the lowest 




in line with income, as is discussed in Section 3.3. By year-end 2010, almost 35 per cent of 
homeowners in the highest income group were in negative housing equity, as opposed to 38 per 
cent of homeowners in the second-lowest income quintile. 
Homeowners in the lowest income quintile seem to deviate from other income groups, 
as a smaller proportion is in negative housing equity throughout the four-year period. The share 
is almost 29 per cent at year-end 2010. It is interesting that roughly a fifth of indebted 
homeowners in the lowest income quintile had more than 20 m.kr. in positive housing equity at 
the start of the period. Furthermore, more than a third had between 10 and 20 m.kr. in positive 
housing equity at that time. Hence many low-income households had considerable ability to 
withstand adverse shocks to house prices and debt levels before falling into negative housing 
equity. This stands in stark contrast to their capacity to withstand the rise in debt service and 
living expenses that resulted from the crisis. 
The largest number of households in negative equity comes from the two highest income 
quintiles. This holds throughout the four-year period. In December 2010, roughly 52 per cent 
of households in negative housing equity come from the two highest income quintiles, or more 
than double than from the two lowest income quintiles. These results confirm that higher-
income households were more heavily indebted than lower-income households, especially in 
foreign-denominated mortgages, and were therefore more likely to end up in negative housing 
equity. 
An analysis of the results on housing equity by family type reveals a pattern similar to 
that found in the results on financial distress. Families with children are more likely to end up 
in negative housing equity than other groups are. The largest increase occurs among single 
parents, 48 per cent of which were estimated to be in negative housing equity in December 
2010, as opposed to 4½ per cent in January 2007. Almost 42 per cent of couples with children 
were in negative equity at the end of the reference period, compared to roughly 8 per cent at the 
beginning. Relatively speaking, childless couples are least vulnerable, even though almost 30 
per cent of them were underwater at the end of 2010. Similarly, childless couples were least 
likely to be in financial distress according to the financial margin analysis. 
 
3.3 Homeowners in both financial distress and negative housing equity: the 
findings 
As discussed in Section 3.1, households in financial distress have various methods of easing 
their financial burden and are not always in serious risk of default. However, households’ 
possibilities to escape from distress by selling their properties or negotiating debt restructuring 
are diminished if they are simultaneously in distress and negative housing equity. Hence in 
order to estimate the size of the group in greatest danger of default, we assess the share of 
households that are in both financial distress and negative equity.  
As with other measures of financial vulnerability, the share of homeowners in both 
financial distress and negative housing equity rose sharply over the reference period. At the 
beginning of 2007, only 1.3 per cent of indebted homeowners were estimated to be in this 




the time of the banking collapse. It then peaked at 14 per cent in October 2009 and had fallen 
to approximately 10 per cent by the end of 2010. This corresponds to 7 per cent of all 
homeowners (indebted and debt-free) being in this vulnerable position. The recalculation of 
foreign-denominated loans managed to reduce this group by roughly 3 percentage points 
(Figure 7).  
As expected, lower-income homeowners were relatively more likely to be in both 
financial distress and negative housing equity throughout the four-year period. In fact, the two 
lowest income quintiles follow a similar path, where the share of homeowners with both 
payment and debt difficulties is estimated to have risen from around 2½ per cent in January 
2007 to 17-19 per cent in December 2010. The second highest income quintile, however, 
developed broadly in line with the entire reference group, except that the share in both distress 
and negative equity at the end of the period is estimated at almost 8 per cent, which is lower 
than the share for the entire group. In December 2010, 55 per cent of homeowners both in 
financial distress and negative housing equity came from the middle and second-lowest income 
groups, whereas 20 per cent belonged to the lowest income quintile and 5½ per cent came from 
the highest income quintile. 
By these measures, homeowners in the second-highest income quintile benefitted the 
most by the recalculation of foreign-denominated loans, with the share of homeowners in both 
financial distress and negative equity falling by 4 percentage points. The corresponding 
reduction was estimated at 2.8 percentage points in the highest income quintile and 3 percentage 
points in the middle-income quintile. It is noteworthy that the share of homeowners in the 
lowest-income quintile declined by only 0.9 percentage points due to the recalculation, a further 
indication that lower-income homeowners were less likely to have foreign-denominated debt 






The currency-denomination of debt plays a crucial role in whether homeowners are 
simultaneously in payment difficulties and negative housing equity. The share of those 
homeowners that had foreign-denominated debt of some kind and were in both financial distress 
and negative equity rose from just over 2 per cent in January 2007 to almost 23 per cent in 
August 2010, before the recalculation reduced it to approximately 16 per cent. Therefore, a 
large majority of homeowners in severe payment and debt troubles had some kind of foreign-
denominated debt. Homeowners that had ISK-denominated debt only were in a much less 
vulnerable position, as only 6 per cent of them were likely to be in both financial distress and 
negative equity at the end of 2010, up from just shy of 1 per cent four years earlier (Figure 8). 
When the results are viewed by family type, they confirm previous findings that families 
with children are most likely to experience payment and debt problems, as they are often buying 
their first apartment, are highly indebted, and have relatively high necessary living expenses. 
Only 2 per cent of families with children were in both financial distress and negative equity in 
January 2007. The share began to rise at that time and peaked at 18½ per cent in October 2009, 
before payment smoothing of indexed ISK mortgages began. In December 2010, around 13½ 
per cent of families with children were assessed to be in distress and negative housing equity, 
almost 4 percentage points lower than before foreign-denominated loans were recalculated. In 
comparison, 8½ per cent of singles and over 6 per cent of childless couples fell into this category 
at the time (Figure 9). Therefore, at the end of 2010, roughly 57 per cent of households in both 
payment and debt troubles are families with children, while childless couples represented 17 
per cent and singles 26 per cent.123 
 
 
                                                
123 The possibility that the share of singles in financial distress is overestimated is less important in this case, as 






3.4 Characteristics of households in financial difficulties 
One of the main purposes of our analysis is to shed light on the characteristics of vulnerable 
households. Our results indicate that distress is inversely related to income and age, that a larger 
share of families with children are in distress compared to childless households, and that the 
share of FX borrowers in distress is roughly twice as high as that among ISK borrowers. On the 
other hand, negative housing equity was more common among high-income households than 
low-income ones, but as in the case of distress, the share in negative housing equity was higher 
among families with children than among childless households. 
If we examine the composition of households in distress at the end of the period, 
simultaneously across both income quintiles and different family types, we find that 37 per cent 
of distressed households at year-end 2010 were low-income singles124, while roughly a third 
were middle-income families with children. However, almost half of homeowners in negative 
housing equity are high-income nuclear families, while one in six are low-income singles.125 
More interestingly, when we turn to the composition of the most vulnerable households being 
simultaneously in distress and in negative housing equity at year-end 2010, two groups stand 
out. On the one hand, just shy of 47 per cent of them were middle-income families with children, 
of which two-thirds were FX borrowers. On the other hand, roughly 22 per cent were low-
income singles, that were split evenly between being FX and ISK borrowers (Figure 10). 
 
 
                                                
124 It should be noted that 11 per cent of households in distress were singles in the 18-24 age group who, in many 
cases, could actually still be living at home with their parents. 
125 We use the term nuclear family for all households consisting of single parents, couples without children, and 





An analysis of debt-at-risk - i.e., the share of total debt held by households in distress 
across different types of debt - reveals that distressed households hold an unusually large share 
of motor vehicle debt. Motor vehicle debt-at-risk peaked at almost 54 per cent in October 2009 
and is assessed to have measured 37½ per cent at year-end 2010, or almost twice the relative 
size of the group of debtors concerned. Mortgage debt-at-risk aligns more closely with the size 
of the distressed group, as these 20 per cent of households held 25½ per cent of total mortgage 
debt at year-end 2010. Overall, debt-at-risk measured 26 per cent at that time, after having 
peaked at 37½ per cent.126 This implies that debt-financed motor vehicle purchases played an 
important role in bringing households into distress. In December 2010, almost one out of every 
six distressed household had more than one such loan.  
 
3.5 International comparison 
How does the financial position of Icelandic households compare to that of households in other 
countries hit by the global crisis or to earlier crisis episodes? International data on the extent of 
households’ financial difficulties is scarce, and a comparison with data from individual 
countries can often be problematic due to differing definitions and metrics regarding 
households’ vulnerabilities. Our preferred method of measuring financial distress is based on 
the financial margin analysis, but in Ólafsson and Vignisdóttir (2012) we also provide evidence 
based on debt service ratios. In this section, we provide some international comparison on the 
extent of households’ financial difficulties, with a focus on evidence from micro data. First, we 
compare households’ position in 2007, before the global financial crisis entered panic stage. 
                                                
126 The implications of these results for financial stability are not straightforward as the three large commercial 
banks received deep discounts on their assets, among those were household loans. Roughly 20 per cent of the book 
value of household loans from the three large banks and Housing Financing Fund were non-performing at year-




Second, we provide some evidence on the situation at the end of our reference period in 2010. 
Third, we compare the evolution of financial distress in Iceland in the current crisis to 
developments in the Norwegian banking crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Our results indicate that, on average, roughly 14 per cent of indebted Icelandic 
households were in financial distress in 2007; the share rose from 12½ to 16½ per cent over the 
course of the year. According to survey data from Norges Bank, a similar share, or 
approximately 11½ per cent, of indebted Norwegian households had negative financial margins 
in 2007. Our results also indicate that, on average, roughly 16 per cent of indebted households 
in Iceland had to allocate more than 40 per cent of their disposable income to total debt 
payments in 2007. The share was only a little lower in the US, or 14.7 per cent, according to 
survey data (Bucks et al., 2009). We can also compare households’ debt service burden in 
Iceland and Canada. The only caveat is that research within the Bank of Canada tends to focus 
on the share of households that must use more than 40 per cent of their gross income on debt 
payments, while we use disposable income. However, based on the assumption that disposable 
income averages around 75 per cent of gross income, the Bank of Canada threshold corresponds 
to roughly 53 per cent on our scale. Roughly 4 per cent of indebted Canadian households had 
such a high debt service ratio in 2007 (Faruqui, 2008), while, on average, just shy of 12 per cent 
of indebted Icelandic households had a total debt service ratio that exceeded 53 per cent at that 
time. 
These results regarding households’ position in 2007 indicate that the share of Icelandic 
households with either a debt service burden exceeding common threshold limits or negative 
financial margins was only a bit higher than in Norway and the US, while the position of 
Canadian households seems to have been considerably stronger.  Of course, these figures do 
not capture possible underlying vulnerabilities such as those reflected in the composition of 
liabilities, which can lead to dramatic changes in households’ debt service burden in the event 
of adverse shocks. 
The effects of the global crisis have been evident in an overall decline in asset prices, a 
contraction in consumption, a rise in unemployment, and a surge in non-performing loans and 
incidence of negative housing equity, as is discussed in Section 1. A comparison of non-
performing loans across countries can therefore provide some evidence of the effects of the 
crisis. Non-performing mortgages as a share of total mortgages outstanding at year-end 2010 
measured roughly 15 per cent in Iceland, 7½ per cent in the US, 6 per cent in Ireland, 2½ per 
cent in Spain, 2 per cent in the UK, and ½ per cent in both Austria and Canada (IMF, 2012b). 
This implies that payment difficulties are more widespread in Iceland than in most, if not all, 
other advanced economies. However, while households’ financial position is improving in 
Iceland, it is still deteriorating in some other countries – Ireland, for instance. Hence it is 
interesting that, at year-end 2010, a similar share of indebted households seems to be likely to 
have experienced both payment and debt problems in Iceland and Ireland (Kennedy and Calder, 
2011). 
The incidence of negative housing equity in Iceland is also high in an international 
context. Our results indicate that 37½ per cent of indebted homeowners in Iceland were 




2011, and 7-11 per cent in the UK in 2009 (Kennedy and Calder, 2011; CoreLogic, 2011; 
Gittelsohn, 2011; Hellebrandt and Kawar, 2009). This is unsurprising in light of the combined 
effect of a drop in house prices and an increase in debt levels due to indexation to the consumer 
price index and foreign currencies in Iceland. 
The Nordic banking crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s provide an interesting 
historical comparison to the crisis in Iceland, as well as for the global crisis in general. Norway, 
Sweden and Finland are small, open economies that underwent a boom-bust cycle where 
financial deregulation, rapid bank expansion, and low real after-tax interest rates contributed to 
strong credit and house price bubbles, as well as large increases in aggregate demand and 
accompanying current account deficits. The Norwegian crisis began in 1988, when a cyclical 
economic downturn went hand-in-hand with some small bank failures; the crisis became 
systemic in 1991 but was more or less over in late 1993. The share of Norwegian households 
in distress (i.e., with a negative financial margin) was higher in the run-up to the crisis than 
what we assess for Iceland, but the two crises’ peak level of distress is almost identical at 27½ 
per cent. Higher after-tax real interest rates, a slowdown of income growth, rising 
unemployment, and declining asset prices all contributed to increased distress among 
Norwegian households following the boom years in the mid-1980s. For instance, higher 
nominal interest rates, a decline in inflation, and changes to the tax system caused the real after-
tax interest rate for an average Norwegian household to increase from zero in 1987 to more than 
7 per cent in 1992 (Norges Bank, 2004). 
It is interesting to compare the pace of the decline in distress in the two crises episodes. 
It took roughly 7 years for the share of indebted households in distress to fall to 20 per cent in 
Norway, while the same decline was achieved in just 15 months in Iceland according to our 
analysis, although in practice it may have taken a bit longer due to the implementation of the 
recalculation of foreign-denominated loans. No household debt restructuring measures were 
introduced in the Norwegian banking crisis, but the welfare system provided important support 
to households’ debt servicing capacity (IMF, 2012b). Hence it is interesting that our alternative 
scenario, where debt restructuring measures and the recalculation of foreign-denominated loans 
are excluded, indicates that the decline in distress over the aforementioned 15-month period 
would only have measured 2.8 percentage points, instead of 7½ percentage points in the 
baseline scenario. The debt restructuring measures have therefore played an important role in 
the relatively more rapid decline in distress among Icelandic households compared to that 
achieved in the Norwegian banking crisis. 
 
4 Interpretation of the findings 
We interpret our results such that households’ rapidly deteriorating financial position in the 
crisis was caused by the build-up of vulnerabilities in the prelude to the crisis and the large 
shocks suffered by households, particularly the currency depreciation and the resulting surge in 
inflation. According to aggregate data from the IMF, the rise in household debt in the run-up to 
the crisis was not exceptional in Iceland (Figure 3.1 in IMF, 2012b), but Icelandic households 




crisis. Furthermore the composition of aggregate debt changed over time and vulnerabilities 
were exacerbated by the fact that the share held by low-income households is rather high in 
international comparison. 
The accumulation of household debt in the run-up to the financial crisis in Iceland can 
be split into two phases. The former began in August 2004, when the newly privatised and 
lightly regulated commercial banks responded to looser lending standards at the state-owned 
Housing Financing Fund by entering the mortgage market with full force, empowered by 
enhanced access to foreign funding and increased balance sheet capacity. A massive credit 
boom, especially in indexed ISK-denominated mortgages, followed. During this phase, many 
Icelandic households opted to refinance existing debt at lower interest rates and with extended 
maturities while taking on new loans, so that their debt service did not rise in tandem with 
increased indebtedness, especially not when measured against rapidly rising disposable income. 
The credit expansion lost momentum in early 2006 during the so-called mini-banking crisis, 
when concerns escalated over mounting evidence of overheating in the Icelandic economy and 
the banks’ business model, especially their high dependency on short-term market funding and 
their interconnectedness (cf., Fitch 2006, Danske Bank, 2006, and Moody’s, 2006). As the 
banks’ access to European debt markets grew tighter, they slowed the pace of new lending to 
households and the economy showed signs of adjustment as domestic demand eased. 
Unfortunately, at least in hindsight, concerns over the banking sector eased in the latter half of 
2006, especially after an influential report on financial stability in Iceland by Mishkin and 
Herbertsson (2006) and the successful launch of foreign deposit accumulation.  Furthermore, 
hopes of continuing strong output growth were boosted in early 2007 by indications of further 
large investment projects in aluminium production and easing of fiscal policy in the run-up to 
parliamentary elections. Hence any signs of adjustment in the economy soon disappeared, and 
a second phase of rapid household credit expansion began in early 2007.  
We find that the debt accumulation taking place in the second phase of the credit boom 
in 2007 and 2008 was especially unfortunate, as foreign-denominated loans became more 
popular and these risky loans were increasingly granted to low- and middle-income households, 
many of which were already in financial distress at the time of loan issuance (Ólafsson and 
Vignisdóttir, 2012). Hence households became more exposed to adverse shocks and it is safe 
to state that such shocks did indeed materialise. 
It is beneficial to get a sense of the size of the shocks suffered by households. From peak 
to trough, the currency depreciation measured 60 per cent (using our constructed household 
debt exchange rate index), the rise in the consumer price index 37½ per cent, the decline in real 
wages 13½ per cent, the increase in unemployment 8½ percentage points, and the fall in real 
house prices 34 per cent over this four-year period. These shocks caused large increases in 
households’ debt service burden, debt levels, and living costs, as well as deep declines in 
housing wealth and real disposable income. 
The currency depreciation and the accompanying rise in inflation on top of the large 
debt accumulation were the principal forces behind the increased frequency of payment 
difficulties. FX borrowers were the first to feel the impact of the currency depreciation through 




share of households with foreign currency-denominated debt in financial distress. The increase 
in payment difficulties among ISK borrowers was more subtle but nevertheless substantial. This 
is unsurprising, given that the shock these borrowers experienced was smaller and its effects on 
debt service burden were spread out over the remaining maturity of their loans. Both FX and 
ISK borrowers’ capacity to withstand the rise in debt service was undermined as real wages 
declined, employment decreased, and unemployment rose. Real wages fell to a low in May 
2010 but increased by 3½ per cent in the two following months, when the deferred wage 
increases resulting from the collective bargaining agreement signed in June 2009 took effect. 
Real wages rose by a total of 7 per cent from May to December 2010 and were at that time 7½ 
per cent below their January 2008 peak. 
Short-term domestic interest rate developments seem to have limited direct effects on 
the extent of financial distress among Icelandic households. This stands out in stark contrast to 
households in many other advanced economies, which have benefited greatly from the 
monetary policy accommodation taking place over this four-year period.  These differences 
reflect the different composition of households’ debt and the nature of loan contracts. 
Nevertheless, monetary policy has important effects on households’ position, through its impact 
on the exchange rate and inflation, both of which are among the main determinants of 
households’ debt service burden and their overall debt position. Furthermore, the capital 
controls introduced during the crisis were crucial in preventing further currency depreciation, 
which would have increased households’ financial difficulties considerably. 
The government had limited fiscal space to counteract the effects of the crisis through 
increased fiscal expenditures, public investment, or tax cuts despite having a strong pre-crisis 
fiscal position. On the contrary, starting in mid-2009 the government introduced strict austerity 
measures to ensure public debt sustainability. Nevertheless, important changes were made to 
the tax system and benefit schemes over the period, where the tax burden of high-income 
individuals was increased and mortgage interest subsidies were temporarily raised. Hence, the 
austerity measures were designed to shield the groups most likely to be in financial distress 
from taking on a large share of the increased tax burden. 
The increase in the number of households in negative housing equity is driven by two 
main factors. On the one hand, households’ debt levels rose sharply as a result of the debt 
accumulation taking place in the run-up to the banking collapse and the effects of the currency 
depreciation and the associated rise in inflation, through the widespread indexation of debt to 
the consumer price index and exchange rates. Owing to the combined effects of these factors, 
the total mortgage debt of households in the reference group increased by 75 per cent from 
January 2007 to its peak, before the recalculation of foreign-denominated loans. On the other 
hand, the decline in house prices also played a part in the increased incidence of negative 
housing equity. Total nominal gross housing wealth of all homeowners in the reference group 
declined by 14 per cent from peak to trough over the four-year period. Hence it is clear that the 
increase in mortgage debt has been the main driving factor behind the rise in the number of 
underwater homeowners. 
What are the policy implications of our findings? Clearly many households took on too 




is likely that many households, especially younger ones, overestimated their future income in 
light of the rapid increase in income during the upswing. In some cases, borrowers took large 
risk intentionally, but it is likely that many households neither understood the costs associated 
with borrowing nor were in a position to assess the risk associated with different forms of loans, 
especially not the wide variety of new types of financial instruments. Research has confirmed 
that financial literacy is severely lacking in Iceland, especially among low-income households 
and those in the youngest and oldest age groups (Ministry of Business Affairs, 2009). Hence a 
clear policy implication from observed borrowers’ behaviour in the escalation of households’ 
financial vulnerability is the need to support education in financial literacy, particularly in 
schools, where this form of education has been more or less disregarded for years. 
In our view, the main reason for the build-up of households’ financial weaknesses 
nevertheless lies in the changed behaviour of lenders. After all, financial institutions’ main role 
is to be efficient intermediaries of funds between savers and borrowers. This involves screening 
and monitoring borrowers in order to make enlightened decisions on who should be granted 
loans, as well as providing guidance on what type of loan is best suited for each borrower. This 
role was neglected by Icelandic financial institutions in their race for balance sheet growth and 
profits. Increased balance sheet capacity made the banks more willing and temporarily able to 
take on exposures and increase their provision of credit both at home and abroad, especially in 
foreign currency. However, the financial institutions’ infrastructure was simply incapable of 
sustaining strong credit quality given the pace of credit expansion. 
Despite the discussion above, our view is that the role of preventing the build-up of 
households’ balance sheet weaknesses cannot rest solely on financial institutions, as their 
incentives and those of their borrowers and society as a whole will often diverge, at least in the 
short run. In the end, policy-makers must try to limit the escalation of financial imbalances. 
This was not done in Iceland during the upswing. On the contrary: various measures were taken 
to fuel credit expansion and domestic demand, and monetary policy was overburdened with 
fighting the overheating, all of which led to high interest rates, which again made foreign-
denominated borrowing seem an attractive option to many households. Economic policy must 
aim for overall macroeconomic stability and should not overextend the economy with demand-
supporting policies that make the economy highly-dependent on foreign funding and hence 
vulnerable to financial crises. Rapid household credit expansion should be seen as an indicator 
of mounting vulnerability in the household sector, even when income and asset prices are rising 
in tandem as those increases can turn out to be unsustainable under more adverse circumstances 
as in the case of Iceland. Furthermore, policy makers must look at the composition of household 
debt and assets, not just their aggregate level. This involves analysing how sensitive 
households’ debt service burden is to adverse shocks, what possibilities are available to 
restructure the debt in the case of shocks, and to what extent households could deleverage 
through liquidating assets if needed. This type of analysis calls for access to micro data on 
households’ financial position. What looks sustainable on an aggregate level can prove to be 
highly unsustainable once a more detailed overview emerges. 
Iceland has been praised for a bold policy response to households’ financial difficulties 




expected, and indeed, household deleveraging has been more rapid here than in other crisis 
episodes. We find that debt relief measures - for instance, write-offs due to court decisions 
declaring exchange rate-linked loans illegal and debt rescheduling in the form of payment 
smoothing - have enabled thousands of households to escape from financial distress. In two 
years, Iceland has achieved a decline in financial distress similar to that achieved in seven years 
in Norway following the banking crisis there. Despite this impressive progress, we remain 
critical of measures such as the 110 per cent option, which prioritises reducing the debt 
overhang instead of financial distress that is more likely, in our view, to lead to payment 
difficulties and personal bankruptcy.127 We are also highly critical of repeatedly proposed 
across-the-board write-offs in discussions on these matters. Distressed households have only 
received a small share of the write-offs due to the 110 per cent option and of the special interest 
rebates financed by a special bank tax. The distribution of across-the-board write-offs would be 
even more skewed and still leave a large majority of distressed households still in distress, while 
exhausting the capacity to assist those households further. The emergency bank restructuring 
measure applied in Iceland during the crisis provided domestic financial institutions with 
valuable capacity for debt restructuring, and it is important that it be used efficiently to reduce 
financial distress, thereby reducing costly defaults. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The goal of this paper is to portray how households’ financial position evolved in the run-up to 
and aftermath of the financial crisis in Iceland, and how it was affected by policy and legal 
interventions. We do this by designing and collecting an extraordinary detailed micro database 
with information covering nearly all individual loans and households within the country and 
then utilising the information to build profiles for debt service, outstanding balance, disposable 
income, living expenses, and housing wealth enabling us to capture the key dynamics of the 
crisis. To the best of our knowledge, no similar study of households’ financial position has been 
carried out to date. A major benefit of our analysis is that it allows us to uncover a more 
complete account of both the build-up of households’ balance sheet weaknesses, the devastating 
consequences of adverse shocks, and the mitigating effects of debt relief measures. 
The picture that emerges from our analysis is of a household sector that became 
increasingly vulnerable to adverse shocks in tandem with strong credit expansion and 
unfortunate changes to the composition of both the type of household debt and income 
distribution of borrowers. We reveal evidence of quite extensive financial distress already in 
early 2007 reflecting the effects of the currency depreciation and associated rise in inflation 
taking place during the so-called mini crisis in 2006. At the time of the banks’ collapse in 
                                                
127 In 2011 Icelandic homeowners could apply for a reduction of their mortgage debt if it exceeded 110 per cent of 
the underlying property value. Limits were set on maximum nominal write-offs and other assets could be taken 
into account and lead to reduced write-offs. Furthermore, a special interest rebate was paid out amounting to 
roughly 0.6 per cent of mortgage debt and was independent of households’ income. We assess the distribution of 
the special interest rebates and the write-offs due to the 110 per cent option, as well as possible write-offs in 
relation to a hypothetical 20 per cent across-the-board principal reduction of indexed mortgages, and their effects 




October 2008, when most of the adverse shocks to households’ debt service had already 
occurred, the share of households in distress had nearly doubled and the number of acutely 
distressed households almost quadrupled, since early 2007. Debt relief measures in the form of 
forbearance efforts, debt rescheduling, and court decisions, as well as rising income, managed 
to reduce the extent of financial distress to roughly 20 per cent by year-end 2010. Financial 
distress is found to be inversely related to income and age, as well as being higher among 
families with children and those with foreign-denominated debt than among childless 
households and those with ISK-denominated loans only. Roughly a third of distressed 
households are found to be in the highly vulnerable position of being simultaneously in negative 
housing equity and financial distress. Middle-income families with children, most of which 
have foreign-denominated loans, and low-income singles are found to be especially vulnerable. 
Looking forward, we find that it is important to adjust the current framework for debt 
restructuring and manage expectations more efficiently with regard to what government-
initiated measures can hope to achieve. We emphasise the need for tailor-made solutions for 
acutely distressed households, as no realistic across-the-board measure is going to enable them 
to escape from distress.128 This involves individually appropriate combinations of principal and 
interest rate reductions, maturity extensions, and temporary forbearance efforts. Both creditors 
and borrowers must have a strong incentive to find such a solution where possible. Families 
with children are the majority of the acutely distressed group, and both lenders and the 
households themselves should prioritise efforts to seek a solution where possible. Financial 
institutions should not be reluctant to make use of reasonable principal reductions for individual 
distressed households where needed. They should continue to speed up decentralised debt 
restructuring. It is also important to avoid providing acutely distressed households with 
disincentives to participate in debt restructuring by continuously discussing unrealistic across-
the-board measures. 
We also suggest that the government should make adjustments to various benefit 
schemes in order to target households that can escape financial distress through such measures. 
This could include combined changes to child benefits and general mortgage interest subsidies, 
so as to channel them more effectively towards middle-income families with children. Such 
measures could allow thousands of not-too-acutely distressed households to escape from 
distress. In the end, future developments will also be highly dependent on the pace of economic 
recovery. Fortunately, economic growth has gained momentum, employment has increased, 
and disposable income has risen. 
 
  
                                                
128 It should be noted, however, that further write-offs due to a likely second round of foreign-denominated loan 
recalculation in light of recent and upcoming Supreme Court judgements is expected to provide some FX 
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This paper develops a small open economy model with a sophisticated credit market set-up 
where global and domestic liquidity is intermediated to the corporate sector through two 
financial intermediation processes. On the one hand, investment banks intermediate cross-
border credit through interlinked debt contracts to entrepreneurs and, on the other hand, 
commercial banks intermediate domestic savings to liquidity constrained final good 
producers. Both processes are needed to facilitate the use and development of key inputs in 
aggregate production. The richness of the credit market framework allows the model to 
qualitatively produce procyclical investment bank leverage dynamics, global liquidity 
spillovers, domestic money market pressures, and multifaceted macrofinancial linkages 
through which shocks propagate across the two financial intermediation processes, affecting 
interest rate spreads and balance sheets, as well as the real economy through investment and 
working capital channels. Furthermore, empirical motivation for modelling interactions 
between cross-border and domestic credit developments is provided by utilising banking 
statistics from the Bank of International Settlements for a sample of fifty countries.  
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This paper develops a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model with a rich credit market set-up where investment banks and commercial banks 
intermediate global and domestic liquidity to the corporate sector through two financial 
intermediation processes. In particular, global liquidity is intermediated by investment banks to 
entrepreneurs through interlinked credit contracts, that allow for asymmetric information and 
bankruptcies, which give rise to domestic and global interest rate and balance sheet relations, 
through which the cross-border financial intermediation and the real economy interact. On the 
other hand, commercial banks intermediate domestic liquidity to cash-in-advance constrained 
final good producers. Hence, production within the small open economy depends on both 
financial intermediation processes enabling funding and development of key production inputs.  
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the interactions between cross-border 
banking flows, domestic credit and liquidity extension to corporates, and aggregate production 
in small open economies. In particular, with regard to the multifaceted macrofinancial linkages 
through which various financial shocks work their way across balance sheets and borders, the 
real economy, and the financial sector within an advanced small open economy.  
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, there has understandably been renewed 
attention to global liquidity and cross-country spillovers. This holds both with regard to gross 
capital flows in general (cf. Forbes and Warnock, 2012, Broner et al., 2013, and Obstfeld, 2015), 
and cross-border banking flows, in particular. This paper is more closely related to the latter 
category. A common theme of interest in the rapidly growing literature on cross-border banking 
is to uncover the main driving factors of cross-border flows. Bruno and Shin (2015a) and 
Hofmann et al. (2016) emphasise the role of US investment banks’ leverage in determining the 
ease of funding in global markets and the capacity of currency movements to shift the supply 
between countries through the so-called risk-taking channel of currency appreciation. Others 
have pointed towards other important driving factors of the supply of cross-border funding (cf. 
Rey, 2013, Cerutti et al., 2014), echoing earlier debates on the importance of push and pull 
factors in determining capital flows to emerging markets (cf. Calvo et al., 1993, 1996). 
The model developed here neither attempts to account for the determinants of global 
liquidity nor does it allow exchange rate fluctuations to play a role. Instead, the emphasis is on 
providing a general equilibrium framework that is able to capture important interlinkages, for 
instance due to investment banks’ procyclical leverage dynamics (Adrian and Shin, 2009, 2010, 
2011) between cross-border credit intermediation, domestic liquidity provision, and the real 
economy. This represents an uncommon endeavour as the modelling approach with regard to 
cross-border banks has mainly consisted of deriving partial equilibrium models (cf. Bruno and 
Shin, 2015a and Hofmann et al, 2016). In addition, I provide empirical motivation for modelling 
interactions between cross-border and domestic credit and liquidity developments by utilising 
banking statistics from the Bank of International Settlements for a sample of fifty countries. 
A second strand of literature that this paper is related to is the financial accelerator 
literature, especially its segment that makes use of Townsend’s (1979) costly state verification 




This literature traditionally emphasises the role of financial frictions related to credit demand 
due to balance sheet constraints faced by non-financial borrowers (cf. Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Carlström and Fuerst, 1997, and Bernanke et al., 1999). The 
key ingredient in these models is the so-called external finance premium which lenders charge 
non-financial borrowers due to asymmetric information and bankruptcy cost. This premium 
depends inversely on the strength of the borrowers' balance sheet as lenders' potential losses are 
greater when the borrowers’ net worth and collateral values are lower.129  
A shortcoming of traditional financial accelerator models is that they assume that firms 
effectively borrow directly from households and treat financial intermediaries simply as a veil 
and thereby deem them to play a passive role in business cycle dynamics. The recent global 
financial crisis, however, has provoked renewed interest into the importance of financial 
intermediaries in macroeconomic dynamics, echoing early advocates of important role for 
banks in macroeconomic models (cf. Gurley and Shaw, 1955, Brunner and Meltzer, 1963, and 
Tobin and Brainard, 1963). In some ways, the financial accelerator extends naturally to 
financial intermediaries, which can face constraints on their ability to obtain funds, but there 
are important differences in their balance sheet composition that need to be taken into account, 
for instance, with regard to their reliance on leverage.  
Hirakata et al. (2009, 2011, 2013), and Ueda (2012) expand the Bernanke et al. (1999) 
framework by introducing credit constrained financial intermediaries, in addition to credit 
constrained entrepreneurs. Hence, their credit contract framework uses the costly state 
verification structure at two stages in the credit intermediation and can therefore account for a 
wider variety of macrofinancial linkages than the traditional models.  
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on working capital in macroeconomic 
models, for instance, Christiano et al. (1995), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), 
Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2011), and Kim and Shin (2013). 
The model developed here is a small open economy DSGE model where there are two 
financial intermediation processes with the former applying the Hirakata et al. (2009) 
framework of interlinked credit contracts to cross-border credit intermediation by investment 
banks, while the latter involves commercial banks’ domestic liquidity provision to fund 
working capital. The model will be shown to be qualitatively capable of producing important 
macrofinancial behaviour, such as procyclical leverage of investment banks, domestic money 
market pressures, and global liquidity spillovers. The model represents a more complicated 
financial intermediation structure than in both Hirakata et al. (2009), which has no role for 
working capital, domestic money market pressures, nor global liquidity shocks, or the 
abovementioned models with working capital, although they include nominal rigidities.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some empirical 
motivation for modelling the interactions between cross-border and domestic credit 
developments. The model is developed in Section 3 with special emphasis on the two financial 
intermediation processes in the credit market. Section 4 describes the parameterisation used and 
presents the results of economic analysis of various shocks. Section 5 concludes.  
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2 Empirical motivation 
This paper emphases the interactions within the financial system and across to the real economy 
between cross-border banking flows, domestic credit and liquidity extension, and aggregate 
production. For motivational purposes, I provide some empirical evidence in this section on 
cross-border banking flows and domestic credit extension by utilising statistics on international 
and domestic banking activity. 
 
2.1 The data 
My country sample includes forty-three small open economies, in addition to seven large 
economies. To expose important differences in cross-border and domestic credit developments 
across different country groups, I divide the sample into groups with regard to income levels, 
geography, and financial system characteristics (i.e. with regard to whether their financial 
system is more bank- or market-based, as explained below). Table 1 gives an overview of the 
country sample and its division into different groups. 
My source of data on cross-border credit and banking flows is the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) locational banking statistics, which provide a comprehensive picture of cross-
border exposures (i.e. loans, securities, and other claims) for a wide range of countries over a 
rather long time span. It is compiled following principles consistent with balance of payments 
and is reported in US dollars. I use the exchange rate adjusted data to capture changes in the 
actual underlying positions of bank claims rather than effects of exchange rate movements. In 
particular, I use quarterly data covering the period from 1985Q1-2013Q4. 
 I compile three different measures of cross-border credit. The first measure is domestic 
banks’ gross cross-border liabilities, which captures the banks’ overall reliance on funding from 
abroad. I follow Borio et al. (2011) and use claims held by rest-of-world against banks in each 
country as a proxy for countries that do not report to the BIS (with claims on banks being given 
by the difference between claims on all sectors and claims on non-banks in each county). 
The second measure of cross-border credit is domestic banks’ net cross-border 
liabilities, which is given by the difference between cross-border liabilities of banks and their 
cross-border claims. I only focus on cases where this variable is positive to capture the banks’ 
use of cross-border credit to fund domestic credit extension. Hence, this measure can be referred 
to as indirect (or domestic bank-intermediated) cross-border credit. 
The third measure is direct cross-border credit to domestic non-banks, which represents 
cross-border claims held by rest of the world on non-banks in each country (including on the 
government and domestic non-banking financial institutions). The aim is to compare the 
characteristics of such credit flows that by-pass domestic banks with the aforementioned bank-
intermediated cross-border flows. 
To capture domestic credit developments, I use the BIS statistics for domestic banks’ 
credit to the non-financial private sector. I follow Borio et al. (2011) and convert the published 




credit developments. As the BIS domestic credit statistics do not cover as many countries over 
such a long time span as the cross-border credit data, I focus for the most part on domestic 
credit developments in advanced small open economies and compare it with the evolution of 
cross-border bank funding. 
I use crisis indicator variables from the Laven and Valencia (2013) database and GDP 
data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database to highlight developments in the run-up 
to and the aftermath of some financial distress and GDP contractionary episodes. 
 
 
Table 1 Country sample 
    
Argentina Finland Latvia Singapore 
Australia France Lithuania South Africa 
Austria Germany Luxembourg Slovakia 
Belgium Greece Malta Slovenia 
Brazil Hong Kong Malaysia Spain 
Bulgaria Hungary Mexico Sweden 
Canada Iceland Netherlands Switzerland 
Chile Indonesia New Zealand Thailand 
Croatia Ireland Norway Turkey 
Cyprus Israel Poland United Kingdom 
Czech Republic Italy Portugal United States 
Denmark Japan Romania  
Estonia Korea Russia  
    
    
Different country groups 
Advanced economies   
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
  
Emerging market economies  
 Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey 
  
Small open economies   
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey.        
  
Advanced small open economies with bank-based financial systems  
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal. 
  
Advanced small open economies with market-based financial systems  
 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Korea, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.  
  
A few geographical country groups  
 (i) Central and Eastern European (CAEE) countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia; (ii) South-East Asian 
countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand; (iii) Scandinavian countries: 






Finally, I follow Demirguc-Kant et al. (2013) and use the World Bank Development 
indicators to construct a financial structure ratio for each country in my sample to split them 
into countries with market- and bank-based financial systems. The financial structure ratio is 
given by the mean ratio of private credit (i.e. deposit money bank credit to the private sector) 
to stock value traded over the sample period (as data availability allows). This categorisation 
allows me to provide further insight into the interactions between cross-border banking flows 
and domestic credit extension with regard to the relative importance of the banking system in 
domestic financial intermediation. 
 
2.2 Cross-border and domestic credit developments in small open economies 
Table 2 summaries key properties of the three cross-border credit measures for the whole 
sample period and for two subsamples, which roughly divide the data into two equally long 
periods. The former subsample covers the period of global liberalisation of financial markets, 
beginning in the mid-1980s, as well as the run-up to and aftermaths of financial crises in 
Scandinavia and East Asia in the 1990s. The latter subsample, however, covers the period 
leading up to the recent financial crisis and the subsequent years when the crisis unfolded and 
a weak recovery took place. Key statistics on domestic banks’ gross and net cross-border 
funding, as well as direct cross-border credit to domestic non-banks, are provided for the whole 
country sample and different country groups, i.e. advanced (also split into bank- and market-
based) and emerging market small open economies.  
As Table 2 shows, banks in advanced small open economies have increased their cross-
border funding more than their emerging market counterparts. This holds particularly for the 
degree to which banks make use of cross-border liabilities to fund their domestic assets 
(including credit) although there is evidence of increased tendencies to do the same among 
emerging market banks in the latter half of the period. Banks’ cross-border funding seems to be 
more volatile (especially net liabilities) than cross-border credit extended directly to domestic 
non-banks. Finally, banks’ overall reliance on cross-border funding seems to have grown more 
rapidly and be more volatile in bank-based advanced countries than among small open 
economies that rely to a larger extent on financial markets. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of cross-border credit developments in 
different groups of small open economies over the sample period. The upper-panel shows the 
expansion of domestic banks’ gross and net cross-border liabilities. The prolonged expansion 
and subsequent deleveraging by emerging market banks in the run-up to and aftermath of the 
East Asian financial crisis during the 1990s is evident, as well as the even more extreme 
evolution in advanced economies with regard to the recent global financial crisis. During the 
recent post-crisis era, banks’ cross-border funding recovered swiftly in emerging markets and 








 Table 2 Summary statistics for cross-border credit 
         
 Total sample 
(1985Q1-2013Q4) 
 First half  
(1985Q1-1999Q4) 
 Second half  
(2000Q1-2013Q4) 
         
 Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev. 
         
 Gross cross-border bank funding 
Country sample 0.038 0.044  0.040 0.041  0.035 0.059 
Advanced SOEs 0.042 0.046  0.042 0.047  0.040 0.051 
Emerging market SOEs 0.025 0.059  0.019 0.029  0.037 0.074 
Advanced bank-based SOEs 0.049 0.062  0.044 0.047  0.054 0.074 
Advanced market-based SOEs 0.036 0.046  0.038 0.050  0.032 0.047 
         
 Net cross-border bank funding 
Country sample 0.034 0.068  0.031 0.069  0.042 0.088 
Advanced SOEs 0.044 0.092  0.050 0.093  0.042 0.093 
Emerging market SOEs 0.003 0.123  0.001 0.062  0.035 0158 
Advanced bank-based SOEs 0.050 0.118  0.047 0.146  0.056 0.115 
Advanced market-based SOEs 0.050 0.136  0.045 0.141  0.057 0.128 
 
 Direct cross-border credit to domestic non-banks 
Country sample 0.038 0.038  0.038 0.038  0.038 0.045 
Advanced SOEs 0.039 0.039  0.034 0.033  0.051 0.048 
Emerging market SOEs 0.032 0.047  0.033 0.050  0.021 0.059 
Advanced bank-based SOEs 0.045 0.049  0.042 0.036  0.056 0.060 
Advanced market-based SOEs 0.037 0.040  0.032 0.041  0.047 0.046 
         
 
  
The lower-panel of Figure 1 shows cross-border banking for specific geographical 
groups (1c) and selected individual countries (1d). There is a notable difference in the intensity 
and volatility of banks’ cross-border liabilities developments between different geographical 
country groups. For instance, South-East Asian countries had just reached their pre-East-Asian-
crisis peak in gross cross-border funding when the recent global crisis caused a swift, but short-
lived, decline. Central and Eastern European countries, however, experienced an even more 
rapid increase in the run-up to the recent crisis and gross cross-border banking flows did not 
stage a lasting recovery during the rest of the sample period. 
Figure 1d provides evidence of increased domestic banks’ reliance on cross-border 
funding for domestic credit purposes in the run-up to various financial crises in selected small 
open economies. Korea is a noticeable example as net cross-border funding increased and 
subsequently declined during the financial crisis in Japan, the East Asian financial crisis, and 
the recent global crisis. The increase in net cross-border funding was also dramatic in the case 
of Ireland and Iceland, with Icelandic banks reaching a net cross-border funding position similar 
(in US dollars) as banks in Sweden during the country’s financial crisis in the early 1990s.130  
                                                
130 A historical account of Icelandic banks’ reliance on foreign funding and its financial and macroeconomic 













                                                
forthcoming Central Bank of Iceland (2016) report on the capital account liberalisation in Iceland, of which I am 





Figure 2 shows the developments in the three measures of cross-border credit, as well 
as domestic bank credit to the non-financial private sector in advanced small open economies. 
The upper-panel provides evidence of contrasting developments in both cross-border and 
domestic bank credit between the two groups of advanced economies with regard to whether 
their financial intermediation is chiefly bank- or marked-based. The difference between cross-
border banking flows in the two groups was discussed above, but Figure 2 reveals that this 
distinction also applies to domestic bank credit, which has contracted in bank-based economies 
but expanded in market-based economies.131 The figure also implies that there is something 
special about the part of cross-border credit, which is intermediated by domestic banks, as there 
is no clear difference between direct cross-border credit developments in the two country 
groups: in both cases foreign banks’ credit extension to domestic non-banks stagnates during 
the post-crisis era. 
The lower-panel of Figure 2 portrays cross-border and domestic credit developments in 
two prominent examples, Ireland and Korea, with the former belonging to the bank-based group 
while the latter has a market-based financial system. Domestic banks’ cross-border liabilities 
expanded rapidly in Ireland in the pre-crisis era, to the extent that a considerable net liability 
position had built-up as result of the banks’ use of foreign funds to fuel the ongoing domestic 
credit boom. What followed was a severe systemic banking crisis with dramatic declines in 
cross-border banking flows (which were replaced by official flows) and a prolonged and severe 
contraction in domestic credit and economic activity. Again, the decline in direct cross-border 
credit to non-banks is less severe compared to cross-border banking flows. Similar 
developments, although less severe in terms of magnitude and endurance of contraction in 
domestic credit took place in Korea in the East Asian crisis, but the country managed to escape 
from experiencing a banking crisis in the recent global crisis (although not a currency crisis), 
but nevertheless opted to introduce prudential limits on domestic banks’ cross-border liabilities 
(cf. Bruno and Shin, 2014). 
In short, the empirical evidence provided in this section suggest that there may be value 
in further analysis into the interactions between cross-border banking flows, on the one hand, 
and domestic credit and macroeconomic developments, on the other. In the next section, I will 
introduce a small open economy DSGE model that allows for some interactions of this kind, in 
particular by enabling shocks to be transmitted through interlinked credit intermediation across 
borders and between balance sheets in the real economy and the financial sector.   
                                                




Figure 2 Cross border credit and domestic bank credit to  













3 The model 
In this section, I develop a small open economy model with the key elements that the funding 
and development of production inputs relies on both cross-border credit being intermediated by 
investment banks and commercial bank’s domestic liquidity provision.  
 
3.1 Overview of the model 
Cross-border credit frictions and domestic liquidity constraints, with the former operating 
through an investment channel and the latter trough a working capital channel, play a pivotal 
role in the model and other types of market imperfections are excluded from the analysis. 
Hence, a credit market set-up with two financial intermediation processes is introduced into an 
otherwise standard version of the small open economy real business cycle model. 
As in the standard version the model includes a single homogenous final good, single 
one-period internationally traded bond, and neither money nor other nominal variables (cf. 
Mendoza, 1991, and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). In the standard version, however, 
households accumulate capital and put capital to work in a completely straightforward manner. 
Furthermore, borrowers and lenders are implicitly assumed to be the same people and with no 
conflict of interest between them. In contrast, in my model, putting capital to work involves a 
special kind of creativity that only entrepreneurs possess and the transformation of new installed 
(raw) capital into effective capital services is risky. Importantly, entrepreneurs are assumed to 
have insufficient equity to finance their investments such that they borrow from domestic 
investment banks, who again need to borrow from global banks, as discussed below. This gives 
rise to interlinked debt contracts that are designed to mitigate the assumed asymmetry with 
regard to information on payoffs and the presence of bankruptcy. In addition, the model 
includes another financial intermediation process where commercial banks channel domestic 
savings to liquidity constrained final good producers. The combination of these two financial 
intermediation processes are at the heart of the nexus between the financial system and the real 
economy within the model.132  
In the model there are ten type of agents: households, final good producers, 
entrepreneurs, capital producers, government, a central bank, saving funds, investment banks, 
commercial banks, and global banks. The good market is assumed frictionless, i.e. input and 
output markets are fully competitive and nominal rigidities are absent. Final good producers 
use rented effective capital from entrepreneurs and labour from households, the domestic 
financial institutions, and the entrepreneurs to produce final goods using Cobb-Douglas 
technology. Importantly, final good producers are assumed to be liquidity constrained as they 
have to pay for their wage bill in advance. Commercial banks provide them with working capital 
loans, by intermediating domestic savings in the form of non-interest bearing deposits and 
interest bearing certificates of deposits bought by saving funds in the money market. The central 
bank subjects commercial banks to reserve requirements. Final goods are consumed 
                                                
132 As is common in models with financial frictions, this model does neither allow for substitution between bank 




domestically by households and the government, or abroad, or used domestically for 
investment. Capital producers possess the technology to transform final goods into new 
installed capital but their activities are subject to investment adjustment costs. Entrepreneurs 
use their own net worth and borrowed funds from domestic investment banks to purchase new 
installed capital from capital good producers and provide effective capital services to the final 
good producers. Figure 3 provides a bird’s eye view of the model. 
 
 
The transformation of new installed capital into effective capital is risky as the success 
of projects requires a combination of talent and good fortune. Hence, some entrepreneurs will 
go bankrupt, while others experience sufficient returns to repay their debt. This is taken into 
consideration in the design of the FE loan contract between domestic financial institutions and 
entrepreneurs. Households' deposits accumulated by global banks across the globe are the 
source of all cross-border credit to the domestic economy. Domestic investment banks are both 
lenders and borrowers as they intermediate funds from the global banks to entrepreneurs but 
this intermediation is assumed risky, not only due to entrepreneurial credit risk, but also due to 
risk to the domestic financial institutions’ capacity to manage their balance sheet given various 
(un-modelled) liquidity, market and operational risk. This is taken into account in the design of 
the GF loan contract between global banks and the domestic financial institutions. 




3.2 Credit market 
This section describes the credit market of the model, which gives rise to different interest rate 
spreads and balance sheet relations, that play an important role in allowing developments in the 
credit market and the real economy to interact. This holds true in general for financial friction 
models, but the particular framework developed here provides a greater number of credit market 
participants and spreads than is most often the case in the literature. It can therefore include a 
number of shocks originating both domestically and in global financial markets.  
There are eight types of participants in the credit market: global banks (all others are 
domestic), investment banks, entrepreneurs, commercial banks, saving funds, final good 
producers, a central bank, and households. The focus is on credit intermediation to the corporate 
sector (entrepreneurs and final good producers). Households are assumed to borrow to smooth 
consumption in a relatively frictionless manner and the dynamics of their borrowing plays a 
minor role within the model. They are for simplicity reasons assumed to borrow solely from 
the global banks. The role of the central bank is also limited to liquidity regulation in the form 
of reserve requirements, which gives rise to a spread between commercial banks’ lending and 
funding rates. 
This section is split into four parts: first, the base interest rate determination within the 
economy is established; second, the cross-border credit intermediation underpinning 
entrepreneurial investment activity is developed; third, the domestic liquidity provision to fund 
production inputs that need to be paid in advance is described, and finally, a graphical 
representation of the key macrofinancial linkages in the model is provided.  
 
Domestic base interest rate 
The domestic base interest rate determination reflects the assumption that the small open 
economy faces a risk premium on top of the constant global risk free rate, ?̅?. In particular, I 
follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) to introduce independence of the model's steady state 
from initial conditions by assuming that the small open economy faces a debt-elastic interest 
rate premium, that is subjected to an exogenous shock, 𝜇𝑡
𝑔
 (similar to the set-up in Garcia-Cicco 




𝑅(𝑠𝑡) = ?̅? +  𝜓𝑔(𝑒
[(𝑑(𝑠𝑡)−?̅?)] − 1) + 𝑒𝜇𝑡
𝑔




where 𝑅 represents the base interest rate within the domestic economy, 𝑠𝑡 is the state in period 
𝑡, 𝜓𝑔 is a debt elastic interest rate parameter, 𝑑 is foreign debt, ?̅? is its steady state level. The 
domestic base interest rate therefore already includes one spread, which is affected by a global 
Country risk premium 
Domestic base 
interest rate 




liquidity shock. As discussed in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), this shock can either be interpreted 
as a country specific risk premium shock, possibly reflecting domestic financial imperfections, 
or as a global liquidity shock, which is uncorrelated with the state of domestic fundamentals. 
Here the latter interpretation is applied as the model includes domestic financial frictions that 
give rise to country-specific interest rate spreads. Here, the role of the shock is therefore to 
allow changes in global liquidity conditions to affect the base interest rate within the small open 
economy, and then affect spillover effects on investment and overall production through the 
two financial intermediation processes (described below). 
 
Intermediation process #1: Cross-border credit intermediation by investment banks 
This part of the credit market describes the former financial intermediation process in the 
model. It relies on Hirakata et al. (2009), however, as this model includes an additional financial 
intermediation process there are important departures from their model, for instance, including 
the presence of domestic liquidity constraints, a working capital channel, and commercial banks 
that can face money market pressures, and are subjected to regulatory restrictions. The model 
developed here therefore gives rise to macrofinancial linkages between aggregate production 
and a number of balance sheets, spreads, and shocks - both domestically and across borders. 
This will be discussed in more detail below. 
This first financial intermediation process relates global banks, investment banks, and 
entrepreneurs through interlinked credit contracts. It is assumed that a continuum of risk neutral 
entrepreneurs invest in domestic projects transforming new installed capital into effective 
capital services. The entrepreneurs' net worth is insufficient to cover the cost of their 
investments and hence they make one-period credit contracts with domestic investment banks 
to fund the difference between the cost of their projects and their net worth. The investment 
banks have their own net worth but it is insufficient to finance their portfolio of loans to the 
entrepreneurs and hence they make one-period credit contracts with global banks, which as 
discussed above accumulate deposits from households across the globe in a frictionless manner.  
The costly state verification framework applies to both contracts in this credit 
intermediation. Hence, both the investment banks and the entrepreneurs are assumed to be 
subjected to exogenous idiosyncratic productivity shocks and their assets returns only being 
observable to their lenders at a cost, interpretable as bankruptcy or monitoring cost. The 
entrepreneur's idiosyncratic shock is a substitute for more complicated processes, such as the 
stochastic quality or success level of projects, and reflects the riskiness of entrepreneurial 
investments. The investment banks’ idiosyncratic “productivity” shock is also a substitute for 
more complex processes, such as shocks to bankruptcy costs, technology of funding short-term 
assets and liabilities, and the overall quality and riskiness of their investments. The cost of funds 
for both the investment banks and the entrepreneurs are therefore set above the domestic base 
rate due to this information asymmetry and their associated bankruptcy costs, giving rise to 
interlinked interest rate spreads. 
Uncertainty in entrepreneurial return is modelled such that each entrepreneur is assumed 
to independently draw a random variable, 𝜔𝐸, assumed i.i.d across entrepreneurs and represents 




and once differentiable c.d.f., 𝐹𝐸(𝜔𝐸), over a non-negative support and with mean unity. More 
precisely, the c.d.f. is assumed to be log-normal and its properties is captured by its standard 
deviation, which is denoted by 𝜎𝑡
𝐸 . Entrepreneurs that draw 𝜔𝐸 ≥ ?̅?𝐸  experience sufficient 
returns to repay their debt while those drawing 𝜔𝐸 < ?̅?𝐸 go bankrupt. The realisation of 𝜔𝐸 is 
unknown at the time of loan issuance and is in the following only freely observable to the 
entrepreneur while the lender has to pay a monitoring cost to receive such information. The 
cross-sectional dispersion of 𝜔𝐸 is controlled by the risk parameter, 𝜎𝑡
𝐸 , referred to as riskiness. 
As described in Section 3.3, innovations to this risk parameters are mean-preserving risk shocks 
and a negative shock makes the left tail of the distribution fatter, leading to more bankruptcies, 
and hence both higher spreads on loans and less borrowing. The uncertainty among investment 
banks is modelled in the same manner but with a different risk parameter, 𝜎𝑡
𝐹. 
As in Hirakata et al. (2009), but different from Bernanke et al. (1999), investment banks 
are assumed to be monopolistic lenders of the entrepreneurs that maximize their profits and 
determine the borrowing rates of both contracts ensuring that the participation constraints of 
the entrepreneurs and the global banks are satisfied. More precisely, each investment bank, for 
instance, a type 𝑖, enters loans agreements with a specific segment of entrepreneurs, say group 
𝑗𝑖, that are attached to the bank. Each investment bank can diversify the credit risk associated 
with each segment of entrepreneur, ensuring a return on their loan portfolio equal to 𝑅𝐹(𝑠𝑡). 
As in Hirakata et al. (2009), the investment banks and the entrepreneurs are both at the 
heart of the nexus between credit frictions and investment activity in the model, while 
entrepreneurs are alone in that role in the more simple set-up in Bernanke et al. (1999). The 
borrowing rates in the interlinked credit contracts change with fluctuations in the riskiness and 
net worth (i.e. leverage) of both the investment banks and the entrepreneurs, as well as due to 
various other shocks and spread changes in the model. In contrast to Hirakata et al. (2009), 
however, another financial intermediation will be added to the model (as described in the next 
subsection).   
 
FE contracts 
The loan contracts between the investment banks and the entrepreneurs are standard loan 
contracts specifying both the amount of debt borrowed and the interest rate. Or, equally, the 
contracts provide a menu of leverage and cut-off values of the idiosyncratic disturbance to its 
real return on capital, ?̅?𝐸(𝑠𝑡), where the cut-off values reflect when the entrepreneur can repay 
his debt. Hence, the cut-off value equalises the entrepreneurs' profits and his repayments on the 
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𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡) is the interest rate on the entrepreneur's loan. Hence, there is a direct relation 
between the cut-off value and the borrowing rate and it will prove to be easier to work with the 
cut-off value in solving the maximization problem of the investment banks. I focus on the case 
where entrepreneurs' participation constraint is fulfilled such that they participate in borrowing 
from investment banks. This implies that their share of returns from investing their net equity 















In the expression above, {(1 − Г𝑡
𝐸(?̅?𝑗𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))}, is the expected share of entrepreneurial 
earnings kept by the entrepreneurs, and, Г𝑡
𝐸 (?̅?𝑗𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)) the gross share of entrepreneurial 
























 represents the part of the c.d.f. where 
entrepreneurs default if they draw from that segment. The net share of entrepreneurial earnings 











where 𝜇𝐸  represents the fixed share of entrepreneurial bankruptcy costs as a ratio of 
entrepreneurial total assets. Hence, entrepreneurial bankruptcy costs represent a deadweight 
loss to society due to the financial frictions and the costs are given by 
Share of entrepreneurial earnings 
kept by the entrepreneur 
Average return from the investment 
with borrowed funds and own equity 
Average return from only 






𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1)(1 + 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾(𝑠𝑡). (6) 
 
where 0 < 𝜇𝐸 < 1. This allows for expressing the investment banks' expected earnings (from 




𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))(1 + 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾(𝑠𝑡) (7) 
 
which also allows for defining the expected return on the loans to entrepreneurs, [1 +
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The investment banks act as intermediaries of funds from global banks to the entrepreneurs. 
Hence, they borrow from global banks according to the GF contract, which has the same 
standard debt contract form resulting from the costly state verification framework as the FE 
contract. In a sense, the monopolistic investment banks split their share of the earnings resulting 
from the FE contract with global banks to obtain funding to finance their investment. Just as in 
the FE contract, there is a cut-off value, ?̅?𝐹(𝑠𝑡), where the investment banks can repay their 























𝐸(𝑠𝑡)] the amount borrowed from global banks. As before, it is possible to 
interchange between the borrowing rates and the cut-off value. The participation constraint of 
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The monopolistic investment banks solve a maximization problem subjected to the two 
participation constraints given by equations (3) and (12):  
maxω̅F, ω̅̅̅E,   K ∑ π(s
t+1|st)[1
s𝑡+1







where π(st+l|st) is the probability weight for state st+l given state st, [1 − ГF(ω̅F(st+1|st))]  
represents the share of the investment banks' earnings kept by the institutions themselves, 
[1 + RF(st+1|st)] is the average return on the FE contracts, and [𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾𝑖(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑁𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡)] the 
amount lent to entrepreneurs. To solve this maximization problem it is beneficial to use 
equation (8) to replace [1 + RF(st+1|st)][Q(st)Ki(s
t) − Ni




𝑡). Appendix 1 provides details on the 
solution of the problem.133 The combined first-order-conditions are given by 
 
 
                                                 
133 Analytical expressions for the variables appearing in equation (14) are available in Dynare and are listed in 





















































+ 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)], ∀𝑗𝑖. 
(14) 
 
Equation (14) represents the efficiency condition for the interlinked credit contracts 
underpinning the cross-border and domestic credit intermediation in the model.  
The two participation constraints can be rewritten to provide a pivotal relation between 
the excess return on domestic investment over the base rate needed for those investment 
activities to be funded (i.e. the external finance premium) given the set-up of the credit market, 
on the one hand, and the net worth in the investment banking and entrepreneurial sectors, 
respectively, on the other. Equation (3) can be rewritten as Ф𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 (𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)Ф𝑖,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)[1 +



























 Hence, the external finance premium is inversely related to the share of investment 




to the share of entrepreneurs' earnings that is received by the investment banks (the second-
term), and positively dependant on the ratio of entrepreneurs' and investment banks' combined 
debt to aggregate capital (the third term). It seems straightforward that the cost of funds is lower 
when the lenders' share of the profits increases as reflected in the two first terms. Furthermore, 
that bankruptcy costs increase in line with rising total debt, which should, given all else being 
equal, lead to higher exposed debt and hence higher credit spreads. However, it is interesting 
that equation (15) indicates that the distribution of net worth between the two borrowing sectors 
is an important determinant of the cost of funds. This reflects the important differences in the 
degree of leverage between firms (entrepreneurs) and financial institutions. Hirakata et al. 
(2009) analyse the quantitative importance of this distribution in greater detail. 
 This expression can be rewritten to relate cross-border banking flows to the domestic 
spread confronted by entrepreneurs and the share of their entrepreneurial profits going to 





















Entrepreneurs and investment banks build-up net worth through earnings from 
entrepreneurial projects split between them by the credit contract. Furthermore, both receive 
labour income from providing labour input to final good producers. In order to prevent 
entrepreneurs and investment banks from accumulating sufficient equity to fund their 
investments without borrowing I follow standard procedure and assume that a fraction of them 
dies each period and consumes their net worth. Hence, the law of motion for net worth is given 
by: 
 










where 𝛾𝐹 and 𝛾𝐸 are the survival rates, ∆𝑛𝐹(𝑠𝑡) and ∆𝑛𝐸(𝑠𝑡) are exogenous shocks defined 
below, and 
Cross-border banking flows 
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Intermediation process #2: Domestic liquidity provision by commercial banks 
This section describes the latter financial intermediation process in the model where 
commercial banks channel domestic savings to liquidity constrained final good producers. The 
set-up here does not rely on the costly state verification framework, hence there are neither any 
agency problems, a role for net worth, nor bankruptcies, as in the previously described cross-
border intermediation process involving investment banks. However, the commercial banks 
involved in the process are assumed to operate within the scope of a central bank’s liquidity 
regulation such that they, in contrast to the unregulated investment banks, are required to hold 
unremunerated reserves at the central bank. This latter intermediation process adds four 
participants, two interest rate spreads, and one shock, to the credit market in the model.  
 
Liquidity constrained final good producers 
Final good producers combine rented effective capital and labour inputs to produce the final 
good within the economy, as will be described in more detail in Section 3.3. Here the focus is 
on their need for liquidity from commercial banks. The producers are assumed to be cash-in-
advance liquidity constrained as they need to pay for their labour inputs prior to receiving 
revenue from sales. Producers therefore attain working capital loans from commercial banks in 
the beginning of each period, pay for their wage bill, and need to save part of their sale revenue 
in the form of non-interest bearing deposits between periods to repay their loans. The constraint 
therefore implies the following for end-of-period deposits: 
 




where 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) are end-of-period deposits, 𝑅𝑊(𝑠𝑡) the lending rate on the working capital loans, 
and 𝐿(𝑠𝑡) the amount borrowed. There are no profits (as discussed in Section 3.3) and the 
liquidity constraint therefore implies that producers borrow just exactly to fund their wage bill: 
 




The composition of labour inputs is described in Section 3.3 where the final good producers’ 






The source of funds in this intermediation process is, on the one hand, the non-interest bearing 
producers’ deposits, but, on the other hand, it is assumed that there exist domestic saving funds 
who invest in interest-bearing certificates of deposits issued by commercial banks in domestic 
money markets. The use of funds in this process are, on the one hand, working capital loans to 
producers, and, on the other hand, bank reserves at the central bank (discussed below):  
  




where is 𝑆(𝑠𝑡) the amount invested by saving funds in commercial banks’ certificates of 
deposits and 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑡) represent unremunerated required reserves. The saving funds are for 
simplicity reasons assumed to be domestic money market participants that have the resources 
to invest in these certificates of deposits and the willingness to do so, given that they receive an 
interest rate above the domestic base interest rate level (TED spread). However, it is also 
assumed that domestic money market conditions can change. Hence, there is a money market 
spread over the domestic base interest rate, which is affected by a so-called domestic money 
market shock, which impacts the part of commercial banks’ liabilities that are funded on that 
market: 
 
𝑅𝑆(𝑠𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑠𝑡) +  𝜓𝐷(𝑒
[((𝐿(𝑠𝑡)−?̅?)] − 1) + 𝑒𝜇𝑡
𝑆−1 − 1 (24) 
 
where 𝑅𝑆(𝑠𝑡) is the money market rate on certificates of deposits, 𝜓𝐷 is a balance sheet elastic 
interest rate parameter, 𝐿(𝑠𝑡) debt, ?̅? is its steady state level.   
 
Central bank 
The role of the central bank in the model is to serve as a liquidity regulator to commercial banks 
(which traditionally have access to central bank liquidity services and even lender-of-last-resort 
loans). The investment banks as well as the saving funds, however, are assumed to be 
unregulated. The liquidity regulation takes the form of requiring commercial banks to hold 
unremunerated reserves at the central bank. The reserve requirement is set as a (fixed) ratio of 
commercial banks’ total liabilities: 
  




where φ𝑅𝑅 is the reserve requirement ratio. This has the importance implication that a spread 
arises between the lending and funding rate of the commercial banks, as explained below. 
 
Commercial banks 
The role of commercial banks in the model is to intermediate domestic savings to liquidity 
constrained final good producers, as well as to fulfil the reserve requirements set by the central 
bank. The model assumes complete competition in commercial banking and there is no role for 




by the sum of working capital loans, 𝐿(𝑠𝑡), and unremunerated reserves, 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑡), while their 
total liabilities are given by the sum of non-interest bearing producers’ deposits, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), and 
money market funding, 𝑆(𝑠𝑡). Hence, their balance sheet constraint implies that the interest rate 
on working capital loans is given by: 
 




such that there is a spread between the lending and funding rate (i.e. money market rate) of 
the commercial banks. 
 This concludes the development of the credit market in the model. Given the focus on 
financial intermediation, the rest of the model is kept as simple as possible, as described in the 
next section.  
 
3.3 The rest of the model 
Final good producers 
The representative final good producer faces perfectly competitive input and output markets 
and produces a tradable homogenous final good, 𝑌(𝑠𝑡). Technology is assumed to exist that 
can be used to convert the homogeneous final good one-for-one into a private or public 
consumption good, 𝐶(𝑠𝑡) or 𝐺(𝑠𝑡), while the transformation into new installed capital, 𝐾(𝑠𝑡), 
is subjected to adjustment costs, as explained below. The key element of the model is that 
production within this small open economy relies on corporate credit being extended to fund 
production inputs. Credit constrained entrepreneurs supply effective capital services to the 
representative final producer for a rental price, 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡). The final producer also hires labour 
from households, 𝐻(𝑠𝑡), the domestic financial institutions 𝐻𝐹(𝑠𝑡), and entrepreneurs 𝐻𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 
but importantly he/her is assumed to be liquidity constrained as the wage bill has to be paid in 
advance resulting in working capital loans from commercial banks, as described above.  
Other details with regard to the final goods producer is that his technology is represented 
by a relatively standard Cobb-Douglas production function, adapted to the composition of 
labour inputs (which for simplicity reason exclude participants in the financial intermediation 
of domestic savings). It is assumed that at the end of each period, the un-depreciated capital is 
sold back to entrepreneurs at price 𝑄(𝑠𝑡). Note that capital is assumed to depreciate during the 
production process within each period. This assumption regarding the reselling of the un-
depreciated capital is used to make the net worth of entrepreneurs well-defined at the end of 
each period, as they sell the un-depreciated capital further on to capital producers for the same 














































𝐷(𝑠𝑡−1) − [1 + 𝑅𝑊(𝑠𝑡−1)]𝐿(𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝐿(𝑠𝑡)





where 𝑎(𝑠𝑡), 𝛿, 𝛼, 𝛺𝐹 , and 𝛺𝐸  are the economy-wide level of total factor productivity, the 
capital depreciation rate, the capital share, the share of domestic financial institutions' labour 
input, and the share of entrepreneurial labour input, respectively. The assumed stationary 
stochastic process for 𝑎(𝑠𝑡) is defined below. 𝐿(𝑠𝑡), 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), and 𝑅𝑊(𝑠𝑡) are the working capital 
Aggregate production function 
Revenue from selling 
undepreciated capital back 
Rental cost of capital 
Wage costs 
Cost of liquidity provision 
from commercial banks 
Funds from net new 
liquidity provisions from 
commercial banks 
End-of-last-period‘s deposits to repay 
liquidity provision in the beginning of 
current period; needed end-of-current-
period‘s deposits to repay in beginning 
of next period 
Rental cost of capital 
Liquidity constraint ensuring end-of-period deposits to repay liquidity provision  
provided to fund the wage bill in advance in the beginning of the next period 
Combination of no-profits and the liquidity constraint  




loans from commercial banks, the final good producer’s non-interest-bearing deposits, and the 
lending rate, respectively. 
The first-order conditions for the representative final good producer are straightforward, 
equalising the marginal benefit of adding one extra unit of factor input to its marginal cost, 






− [1 + 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡)]𝑄(𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝑄(𝑠𝑡−1)(1 − 𝛿) = 0 (28) 
 
 
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝛺𝐹 − 𝛺𝐸)
𝑌(𝑠𝑡)
𝐻(𝑠𝑡)












= 𝑊𝐸(𝑠𝑡)[1 + 𝑅𝑊(𝑠𝑡−1)] (31) 
 
 










The technology applicable to transform the final good of the small open economy into new 
installed capital is assumed to be in the hands of a single, perfectly competitive, representative 
capital producer. The capital producer buys 𝐼(𝑠𝑡) amount of final goods from the final good 
producer and combines it with the un-depreciated capital (1 − 𝛿)𝐾(𝑠𝑡−1)  it bought from the 
entrepreneurs at price 𝑄(𝑠𝑡−1). It then produces new installed capital, 𝐾(𝑠𝑡), from these inputs 
using technology subjected to adjustment costs, that are increasing in the rate of investment 
growth as defined below, and sells the new installed capital to entrepreneurs in a competitive 
market at price 𝑄(𝑠𝑡). I follow Bernanke et al. (1999) in assuming that the price of new and 
used capital is the same (to the first order) and hence I can disregard the un-depreciated capital 











∗  [𝑄(𝑠𝑡) (1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝐼(𝑠


















 and 𝛥(𝑠𝑡) is the capital producer's subjective discount factor. Note that 
the parameter, 𝜅, determines the investment adjustment cost, and that those costs do not affects 
the steady state of the model where the relative price of capital goods in terms of the final good, 
or Tobin's 𝑄(𝑠𝑡), is unity. Investment adjustment costs are typically included in small open 
economy models to avoid excessive investment fluctuations in response to changes in domestic 
productivity or foreign interest rates. Furthermore, they are useful when introducing financial 
frictions into real business cycle models to attain a decline in the price of capital and hence net 
worth in the case of a negative risk shock. The first-order-condition of the capital producer's 


































where I have made use of the assumption that the capital producers are assumed to be owned 
by the households and hence have the same subjective discounting factor. The law of motion 
for capital is traditional and reflects the presence of investment adjustment costs: 
 
𝐾(𝑠𝑡) = (1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝐼(𝑠
𝑡), 𝐼(𝑠𝑡−1))) 𝐼(𝑠𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾(𝑠𝑡−1). (36) 
 
Households 
The small open economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum of infinitely lived 
households and the representative households maximises its expected utility subject to its 






















𝐶(𝑠𝑡+𝑙) + (1 + 𝑅(𝑠𝑡+𝑙))𝑑(𝑠𝑡+𝑙) + 𝑇(𝑠𝑡+𝑙) = 𝑑(𝑠𝑡+𝑙+1) + 𝑊(𝑠𝑡+𝑙)𝐻(𝑠𝑡+𝑙)  
 
 
The budget constraint reflects that period 𝑡 expenditures (use of funds) - reflecting 
consumption, debt repayments, and lump-sum taxes - need to be funded by new loans, 𝑑(𝑠𝑡+1), 
and (after-tax) labour income earned from working for the final good producer. Note that profits 
of the capital producers are zero by assumption and do therefore not affect the households' 
budget constraint. Households borrow funds to smooth consumption at the domestic base 
interest rate, 𝑅(𝑠𝑡), that includes a country risk premium as defined above. The household's 










𝑊(𝑠𝑡) =  𝜒𝐻(𝑠𝑡)
1




The government plays a passive role in the model and simply collects a lump-sum tax from 
households, 𝑇(𝑠𝑡), and maintains a balanced budget in each period: 
 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡) =  𝑇(𝑠𝑡)  , ∀𝑡 (40) 
 
Net exports and the economy’s aggregate resource constraint 
The key distinction between closed and open economies is that they have different constraints 
as there is international trade and capital flows in an open economy. The credit market set-up 
also implies that the aggregate resource constraint has to reflect the deadweight loss due to 
bankruptcy costs in the entrepreneurial and domestic financial sector, in addition to accounting 
for the domestic financial institutions’ and entrepreneurs' consumption. Hence, the final goods 
produced in the small open economy that are neither spent on domestic consumption by 
households, entrepreneurs, the domestic financial institutions, and the government, investment 











where entrepreneurial and the domestic financial institutions' consumption reflect that 
entrepreneurs and domestic financial institutions that fail to survive in period 𝑡 consume their 
net worth: 
 
𝐶𝐸(𝑠𝑡) = (1 − 𝛾𝐸) (1 − Г𝐸(?̅?𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1))) [1 + 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1)]𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾(𝑠𝑡) (42) 
 
 
𝐶𝐹(𝑠𝑡) = (1 − 𝛾𝐹)(1




Monitoring costs were defined above. 
 
Exogenous shocks 
The small open economy model includes seven exogenous shocks: a global liquidity shock, 
commercial banks’ funding shock, two risk shocks, two net worth (leverage) shocks, and a total 
factor productivity shock. I follow Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) in assuming that the global 
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𝜇𝑔
 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇𝑔
2 ) (44) 
 
The domestic funding shock affecting commercial banks is also assumed to follow a stationary 






  ;     𝑡
𝜇𝑑
 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
𝜇𝑑
2 ) (45) 
 
The risk shocks are associated with idiosyncratic disturbances to the investment banks' and 
entrepreneurs' productivities, 𝜔𝐹(𝑠𝑡) and 𝜔𝐸(𝑠𝑡). As discussed above, 𝜔𝐹(𝑠𝑡) and 𝜔𝐸(𝑠𝑡), are 
assumed to be log-normally distributed with unit mean and time-varying standard deviation - 
𝜎𝐹(𝑠𝑡)  and 𝜎𝐸(𝑠𝑡) - referred to as riskiness. The innovations to these standard deviations are 
the risk shocks, 𝜎𝜎𝐹
2  and 𝜎𝜎𝐸





) = 𝜌𝜎𝐹log (
𝜎𝐹(𝑠𝑡−1)
𝜎𝐹
) + 𝜎𝐹(𝑠𝑡) ;  𝜎𝐹(𝑠𝑡)~ i. i. d.  𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝐹









) = 𝜌𝜎𝐸log (
𝜎𝐸(𝑠𝑡−1)
𝜎𝐸
) + 𝜎𝐸(𝑠𝑡) ;  𝜎𝐸(𝑠𝑡) ~ i. i. d.   𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝐸
2 ) (47) 
 
 
where 𝜎𝐹 and 𝜎𝐸  are the steady state values of the standard deviations. The economy-wide level 
of total factor productivity is assumed to follow a stationary first-order autoregressive process: 
 
𝑎(𝑠𝑡) = 𝜌𝐴𝑎(𝑠




The net worth shocks in the entrepreneurial sector and in investment banking are also assumed 
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An equilibrium consists of a set of prices: {𝑅(𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝐹(𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝑆(𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝑊(𝑠𝑡),  
𝑊(𝑠𝑡), 𝑊𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 𝑊𝐹(𝑠𝑡), 𝑄(𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡), 𝑍𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡), 𝑍𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)}𝑡=0
∞  and 













∞ , {𝐿(𝑠𝑡), 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), 𝑆(𝑠𝑡), 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑡), 𝑌(𝑠𝑡), 𝐶(𝑠𝑡), 𝐶𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 𝐶𝐹(𝑠𝑡), 𝐼(𝑠𝑡), 𝑁𝑋(𝑠𝑡),   
𝑑(𝑠𝑡), 𝐾(𝑠𝑡), 𝐻(𝑠𝑡), 𝐻𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 𝐻𝐹(𝑠𝑡)}𝑡=0
∞  for a given fiscal policy {𝐺(𝑠𝑡), 𝑇(𝑠𝑡)}𝑡=0
∞ , realisation 
of exogenous variables { 𝑡
𝜇𝑔(𝑠𝑡), 𝑡
𝜇𝑑(𝑠𝑡), 𝑎(𝑠𝑡), 𝜎𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 𝜎𝐹(𝑠𝑡), 𝑁𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 𝑁𝐹(𝑠𝑡)}𝑡=0
∞ , and 
initial conditions 𝑁−1
𝐸 , 𝑁−1
𝐹 , 𝐾−1, such that for all 𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗𝑖:  
 
(1) the household maximizes its utility given the prices; 
(2) the investment banks maximize their profits given the prices; 
(3) the entrepreneurs maximize their profits given the prices; 
(4) the commercial banks maximize their profits given the prices; 
(5) the final goods produces maximize their profits given the prices; 
(6) capital goods producers maximize their profits given the prices; 
(7) the saving funds buy issued certificates of deposits given the prices, 
(8) the central bank enforces its reserve requirements, 
(9) the government budget constraint holds; and 




4 Economic analysis 
Solving for the steady state represents a substantial challenge in this model. Christiano et al. 
(2003, 2010, 2012) provide a method to solve a model with the traditional financial accelerator 
credit market set-up, but this is far more complicated in a framework combing interlinked credit 
contracts and domestic liquidity provision. I use the Dynare software to compute the steady 
state and linearise the model around the steady state. The computations are based on calibrating 
the model using traditional parameter values from the literature, as well to attain sensible 
interest rate spreads and shocks to those spreads. 
I follow Hirakata et al. (2009) and Bernanke et al. (1999) for many of the calibrated 
parameter values (Table 3). These include parameter values related to the real economy, such 
as the discount factor, capital depreciation rate, capital share, risk free interest rate, elasticity of 
labour, utility weight on leisure, investment adjustment costs, and most of the autoregressive 
parameters associated with the shocks. I also follow Hirakata et al. (2009) to calibrate six 
parameters associated with the two credit contracts in the former financial intermediation 
process, i.e. the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic disturbances to investment banks' and 
entrepreneurs' productivity in steady state, the monitoring costs, and the two survival rates. I 
calibrate ?̅? to ensure that the household debt as a ratio to GDP is in line with the average for 
small open economies included in Cecchetti et al. (2011). The debt elastic interest rate 
parameter is taken from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). The standard deviation of shocks to 
the global liquidity shock is based on Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010). 
Parameters for the domestic money market are chosen to attain roughly the average 
historical quarterly interest rate spread between 3-month interbank rates and 3-month treasury 
bills (Ted spread), which is roughly 60 basis points (bps.) over the period 1986-2016. The 
money market shock is calibrated to produce a roughly 200-250 bps. increase in the TED 
spread, as has been the case in a few episodes over this period. The Central Bank’s reserve 
requirement ratio is set to produce a roughly 300 bps. spread between commercial banks’ 
lending and funding rate. This implies a high value for the ratio, but its main role within the 
model is to produce a lending to funding spread of reasonable value. 
 Before analysing the equilibrium responses of the model economy to some of the 
exogenous shocks, Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the model’s key 
macrofinancial linkages, which will serve as a useful roadmap for the interpretation of the 






Table 3 Parameterisation of the model 
   
Parameter Value Description Source 
𝛽 0.99 Discount factor Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝛿 0.025 Capital depreciation rate Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝛼 0.35 Capital share in final goods production Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝑅 0.99-1 Risk-free rate Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜂 3 Elasticity of leisure Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜒 0.3 Utility weight on leisure Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜅 2.5 Investment adjustment cost Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜌𝑎, 𝜌𝜎𝐹 , 𝜌𝜎𝐸 0.85 Persistence of productivity and risk shocks Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜎𝐹 0.107366 Standard deviations of risk shocks in 
investment banking at steady state 
Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜎𝐸 0.312687 Standard deviations of entrepreneurial sector 
risk shocks at steady state 
Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜎𝑎 0.0098 Standard deviations of total factor productivity 
shocks 
Hirakata et al. (2011) 
𝜇𝐹 0.033046  Bankruptcy costs in investment banking Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝜇𝐸 0.013123 Bankruptcy costs in the entrepreneurial sector Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝛾𝐹 0.963286 Survival rate in investment banking Hirakata et al. (2009) 
𝛾𝐹 0.983840 Survival rate in the entrepreneurial sector Hirakata et al. (2009) 
Ω𝐹  0.01 Investment banks’ share of labour input Ueda (2012) 
Ω𝐸  0.01 Entrepreneurs’ share of labour input Ueda (2012) 
𝜓𝑔 0.0001 Debt elastic interest rate parameter for the 
domestic base interest rate level 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) 
?̅? 0.007 Household debt to GDP ratio at steady state Cecchetti et al. (2011) 
𝜌𝜇𝑔 0.85 Persistence of the global liquidity shock  
𝜎𝜇𝑔 0.056 Standard deviation of the global liquidity 
shock 
Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) 
𝜎𝑁𝐹 0.01 Standard deviation of net worth shock in 
investment banking 
 
𝜎𝑁𝐸 0.01 Standard deviation of net worth shock in the 
entrepreneurial sector 
 
𝜌𝜎𝑁𝐹 , 𝜌𝜎𝑁𝐸 0.85 Persistence of net worth shock in investment 
banking and the entrepreneurial sector 
Same persistence as for others. 
𝜓𝑑 0.2 Balance sheet elastic interest rate parameter 
for the commercial banks 
Average quarterly historical TED 
spread of roughly 60 bps.  
?̅? 3.00 Commercial bank assets at steady state  
𝜌𝜇𝑑 0.85 Persistence of the money market shock Same persistence as for others. 
𝜎𝜇𝑑 0.1 Standard deviation of the money market shock 250 bps. TED spread increase. 























Risk shock in the entrepreneurial sector 
Figures 5 portrays the equilibrium responses to increased risk in the domestic entrepreneurial 
sector. The first thing to note is that the domestic base interest rate level declines, which plays 
an important role in causing consumption to increase and mitigate the otherwise contractionary 
effects of this shock. At first, this is surprising, but actually this reflects a common feature of 
real business cycle models with financial frictions. When financial shocks are transmitted in 
such models, they interfere with intertemporal substitution and due to the simple and frictionless 
set-up of the real economy, current consumption relative to future consumption (i.e. the real 
interest rate) declines, inducing increased consumption. This would not necessarily take place 
in a more realistic set-up with nominal rigidities and monetary policy based on a traditional 
Taylor rule, as these factors would dampen the real interest rate response. However, the focus 
in this paper is on the interaction between credit intermediation to the corporate sector through 
two processes including a number of interest rate spreads, on the one hand, and investment and 
production, on the other. 
 Figure 5 shows that as riskiness in the entrepreneurial sector increases, entrepreneurs’ 
borrowing rate goes up, as investment banks’ increase the spread on those loans relative to their 
own funding costs. This reaction is due to the fact that as riskiness increases, bankruptcies 
among entrepreneurs increase as a larger share of investment projects fail to attain sufficient 
returns to repay debt. As a result, the price of capital falls, entrepreneurs’ net worth declines, 
and their leverage increases, resulting in a higher external finance premium. Hence, 
entrepreneurial investment activity falls, leading to further decreases in the price of capital, and 
tightening of credit constraints through the aforementioned dynamics. This amplification of 
shocks through credit frictions is why models with such features were generally referred to as 
financial accelerator models.  
 This shock originates in the entrepreneurial sector, and works its way through the former 
financial intermediation process to affect investment, and thereby production. Looking at the 
reaction in the latter financial intermediation process, movements in commercial banks’ funding 
and lending rate seem to be reflect the fall in the domestic base interest rate level (discussed 
above), and the reaction in interest rate spreads is very muted. However, working capital loans 
decrease as demand for labour decreases alongside less investment and production. Hence, this 
is an example of the interaction between the two processes of financial intermediation, which 
in this case seem to first and foremost work their way through real economy linkages in 
aggregate production. Other types of macrofinancial linkages, through which the two 
intermediation process will interact, will become apparent when other shocks will be discussed 
below. 
 Finally, a positive shock would have had the opposite effects, making the model able to 
produce qualitative boom-bust behaviour around the steady state, although coming short from 












Risk shock in investment banking 
The effects of a risk shock taking place in investment banking is shown in Figure 6. There are 
three important interrelated differences between the effects of a risk shock in investment 
banking compared to its previously discussed entrepreneurial counterpart. 
 First, in contrast to the increase in entrepreneurs’ borrowing rate as a result of a risk 
shock in their own sector, investment banks’ funding rate decreases after they experience a 
negative sectoral risk shock. This reflects that the investment banks’ funding rate reaction is 
dominated by the decline in the base interest rate level. This again reflects that the investment 
banks receive their funds from global banks at a spread over the base interest rate, while 
entrepreneurs’ borrowing cost include an additional spread due to the extra step of 
intermediating the funds through the investment banks. 
 Second, as the effects of increased riskiness in investment banking work their way 
across the credit market and interact with the real economy (Figure 6), investment banks’ 
leverage declines instead of increasing as in the case of entrepreneurs in Figure 5. This also 
reflects the difference positions of the two sectors in the intermediation process, as well as their 
specific balance sheet characteristics. Investment banks are the main actors in this former 
intermediation process in the model, such that they can affect key parameters in the interlinked 
credit contracts, resulting in a redistribution of losses across sectors. Entrepreneurs, however, 
are the ultimate borrowers in this credit process and are not in a position to mitigate the effects 
of a negative shock in the same manner. As a result of a negative risk shock, investment banks 
increase the spread between their lending and funding rate, which supports their own net worth 
(also helped by the direct decline in their funding rate which dominates their increased funding 
spread), but undermines the financial position of entrepreneurs. As a result, the investment 
banks deleverage, which is particularly important for them as they operate with more leverage 
than the entrepreneurs. The model’s capacity to produce sectoral leverage dynamics of this 
kind, is discussed further below.    
 A final important distinction between the two risk shocks is that the macroeconomic 
effects of a shock originating in investment banking are considerably larger compared to when 
they originate in the corporate sector. Hence, the effects that work their way across the real 
economy and towards commercial banks’ domestic liquidity provision is also stronger, as 
reflected in a larger drop in working capital loans. This sizeable difference in macroeconomic 
effects also reflects the aforementioned interrelated characteristics that investment banks are 
highly leverage institutions that due to their importance in the credit intermediation process can 
strongly affect the propagation and acceleration of negative shocks, both across sectors, 
aggregate production, and the other financial intermediation process. 
 These two risk shocks therefore provide important insight into the workings of model. 
Clearly there are important differences and interactions between the two sectors, providing 
preliminary evidence supportive of the modelling approach takin with regard to the credit 
market. In particular, it seems promising that the models gives raise to procyclical leverage 
dynamics resulting from investment bank behaviour within the model. This feature has been 













Domestic money market shock 
Figure 7 shows the effects of an adverse domestic liquidity shock in money markets, affecting 
the terms of commercial bank funding. Indeed, the banks’ funding spread on the market 
increases and they respond by increasing their lending to funding spread (more than one-to-one 
for their balance sheet constraint to hold). This results in balance sheet deleveraging in the sense 
that the commercial banks’ assets and liabilities shrink. Importantly, working capital loans 
decrease, as do labour usage and aggregate production through this working capital channel.  
 The dynamic response in the other financial intermediation process is interesting, 
especially in light of the discussion above in relation to risk shocks in the two credit market 
participants’ sectors. The shock considered here originated in the domestic money market 
where neither investment banks nor entrepreneurs are assumed to participate. Hence, the effects 
of the shocks reach these sectors through the effect that the working capital channels has on 
investment via its effect on aggregate production. This is different from the risk shock scenarios 
where the effects were first transmitted across the interlinked credit contracts, and then affected 
the real economy. As shown in Figure 7, entrepreneurs respond to the contractionary effects on 
investment activity by deleveraging, which leads to a decrease in the investment banks’ lending 
to funding spread, causing their net worth to decline. Hence, the fall in investment demand from 
entrepreneurs causes problems for the leveraged investment banks and, in contrast to the risk 
shocks, their capacity to propagate their problems onto the entrepreneurs is not the same. 
 
Global liquidity shock 
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses to a global liquidity shock, which is the only shock that 
directly affects the domestic base interest rate level. In contrast to the fall in the base interest 
rate level observed in previous domestic shocks, it increases following an adverse global 
liquidity shock, and now both financial intermediation processes are affected at once. 
Interestingly, both the commercial and investment banks’ funding spread actually fall on 
impact, such that the raise in the base interest rate is not fully transmitted into their funding rate. 
These banks are therefore to some extent guarded against global shocks, but nevertheless, both 
intermediary types respond to this adverse shock by increasing their lending to funding spreads. 
The result is therefore that contractionary macroeconomic effects work their way across both 
intermediation processes, and onwards through the working capital and investment channels.  
In case of a shock where the ease of financing in global financial system is enhanced, 
the opposite result would arise, with production being supported by enhanced financial 
intermediation on both parts of the credit market. Hence, the model captures some parts of 
possible risks associated with international capital flows and domestic financial conditions (cf. 
Jeanne and Korinek, 2010, Korinek, 2011, Rey, 2013, Cerutti et al., 2014, Brunnermeier and 


























In this paper, a small open economy DSGE model is developed where investment banks and 
commercial banks intermediate global and domestic liquidity to the corporate sector through 
two financial intermediation processes. In particular, global liquidity is intermediated by 
investment banks to entrepreneurs through interlinked credit contracts, that allow for 
asymmetric information and bankruptcies which give rise to domestic and global interest rate 
and balance sheet relations through which the financial intermediation and the real economy 
interact. On the other hand, commercial banks intermediate domestic liquidity to cash-in-
advance constrained final good producers. Hence, production within the economy depends on 
both financial intermediation processes as they enable funding and development of key 
production inputs. The richness of the credit market framework is reflected in the number of 
market participants, interest rate spreads, and shocks, as well as the diverse feedback and 
propagation mechanisms that it gives rise to between the financial system and the real economy. 
 The economic analysis of the model served to illuminate in a qualitative manner how 
the interconnectedness within the financial system and the macrofinancial linkages transmit 
shocks within the financial sector and across the real economy. The analysis showed that the 
model is qualitatively capable of producing a number of features in this regard, which have 
been emphasised in the literature.  
First, the model has financial accelerator characteristics as risk shocks can give rise to 
boom-bust investment dynamics that are strengthened by the presence of investment banks and 
the interlinked credit contracts. This is unsurprising as the Hirakata et al. (2009) is used as the 
underlying framework for one of the financial intermediation processes.  
Second, in contrast to Hirakata et al. (2009), the model also includes another 
intermediation process, where on the one hand, there is a role for specific domestic money 
market pressures that propagate through the working capital channel to the rest of the model. 
On the other hand, there is also an important role for shocks of various kinds to interact across 
the two financial intermediation processes, which is a relatively rare feature in financial friction 
models. This can reflect common shocks (i.e. the global liquidity shock) affecting both 
investment banks and commercial banks, but also shocks originating in either of the two 
intermediation processes (e.g. risk shocks or domestic money market shocks) that propagate 
across the two processes via the real economy. Hence, the model provides a richer framework 
than many other financial friction models, including Bernanke et al. (1999) and Hirakata et al. 
(2009), both with regard to the linkages within the financial system, global spillovers to the 
domestic financial system, and the macrofinancial linkages in place.  
Third, there is a role for a central bank as a liquidity regulator in the model in the sense 
that commercial banks are assumed to be regulated, while investment banks and saving funds 
are unregulated. This is a realistic assumption for many small advanced economies. Another 
difference between commercial and investment banks in the model is that the costly state 
verification framework is applied to the more risky investment banking activity that operates 




approach is applied to model the more traditional and purely domestic liquidity services of 
commercial banks. 
The qualitative capacity of the model to produce and analyse important macrofinancial 
features, such as procyclical leverage dynamics of investment banks, money market pressures, 
global liquidity spillovers, and a wide range of financial and macroeconomic interlinkages 
(including through investment and working capital channels), indicates that this approach 









Appendix 1 Solution to the investment banks’ maximisation 
problem 
The monopolistic domestic investment bank maximizes its expected profits: 
 
maxω̅F, ω̅̅̅E,   K ∑ π(s
t+1|st)[1
s𝑡+1








where π(st+l|st) is the probability weight for state st+l given state st+l−1, [1 −
ГF(ω̅F(st+1|st))] represents the share of investment banks’ earnings kept by the institutions 
themselves, [1 + RF(st+1|st)] is the average return on the FE contracts, and [𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾𝑖(𝑠
𝑡) −
𝑁𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡)] the amount lent to entrepreneurs. This maximization is solved subject to the 

















𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))} (1 + 𝑅𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))[𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾𝑖(𝑠
𝑡)
− 𝑁𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡)] ≥ (1 + 𝑅(𝑠𝑡))[𝑄(𝑠𝑡)𝐾𝑖(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑁𝑖





I focus on the case where these participation constraints hold with equality. For the 
entrepreneurs, this implies that their share of returns from investing their net equity and 
borrowed funds are equal to what they would receive from investing only their equity. In 
equation (A1.2) above, {(1 − Г𝑡
𝐸(?̅?𝑗𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))}, represents the expected share of 
entrepreneurial earnings kept by the entrepreneurs according to the FE contract, and 
Г𝑡
𝐸(?̅?𝑗𝑖
𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)), represents the gross share of entrepreneurial earnings received by the 
investment banks according to the same contract. The participation constraint of the global 
banks (equation A1.3) reflects that their net earnings from the GF contract must equal their 





𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))} ≡ Ф𝐹(?̅?𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡) represents the net share of investment banks’ 




expected return on the loans to entrepreneurs, (1 + 𝑅𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)) in equation (8) to rewrite the 
investment banks’ expected profits as  
 
 















𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)) represents the net share of entrepreneurial earnings going to the 
investment banks according to the FE contract. I also rewrite the global banks’ participation 





𝐹(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))}. Hence, the Lagrangian function becomes: 
 
 





























The first-order-conditions of the maximization problem with regard to ω̅F,  ω̅̅̅E and K, 
respectively,  are given by: 
 
𝜆1 =























𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡))(1 + 𝑅𝐸(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡) 


















+𝜆2 [1 − ГF(ω̅F(st+1|st))] = 0 
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